

CONFIDENTIAL.

PAPERS

RELATIVE TO THE

FORTIFICATIONS AND DEFENCES

OF

CANADA.

PRINTED SOLELY FOR THE USE OF THE CABINET.

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PAPERS

RELATIVE TO

FORTIFICATIONS AND DEFENCES

OF

CANADA.

No. 1.

Lord Seaton to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 1, 1840.)

My Lord,

Lyneham, December 30, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship, with reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, relative to the defensive works recommended to be constructed in Canada, that most of the posts which I directed to be occupied in June 1838, at a time of great excitement in the Upper Province, have been established.

The barrack at Chatham, however, was ordered to be built for 200 men instead of 400. No block-house has been erected at Queenston, and at the Niagara Falls, Brockville, Cornwall, and Lancaster. Barracks were hired for the accommodation of troops at those stations.

Since my despatch to Lord Glenelg of the 13th March, I have corrected my opinion in respect to the number of posts which I suggested should be established along the frontier of Lower Canada.

The stations which I think it will be necessary to protect by permanent works are described in the accompanying memoranda. The encouragement given by the American patriots to the disaffected in Upper Canada cannot fail to create alarms occasionally. Under these circumstances, and in the present state of Canadian affairs, public confidence will be much increased by establishing strong posts on the parts of the frontier most exposed to the incursions of the Americans, and thus rendering nearly the whole regular force disposable on any emergency, without incurring any risk by leaving depôts of arms and stores in charge of the militia.

The estimates for the construction of barracks at Chambly, St. John's, La Prairie, and Amherstburg amounted, I believe, to about 60,000*l*.

To this outlay Commissary-General Routh probably refers in his statement of disbursements for the ensuing year. If permanent works are erected at Amherstburg, and in the Niagara district, the outlay at each post would probably amount to 70,000*l*.

The work proposed for the defence of St. John's might be constructed for 40,000*l*.

From the confidential report which I have transmitted to Lord Fitzroy Somerset of the Officer commanding Engineers in Canada, after his inspection between the 8th May and the 1st June, your Lordship will obtain information respecting the importance of the posts of Amherstburg and Niagara.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) SEATON.

Inclosure in No. 1.

Memoranda respecting the defence of Upper Canada with reference to the present state of the Province and the Hostility of the American Patriots.

1st. THE parts of the frontier which are most exposed to attack, are the townships of Malden and Sandwich on the Detroit.

2nd. The frontier township on the St. Clair.

3rd. The Niagara frontier from Fort Erie to Fort Mississagua.

4th. The townships on the St. Lawrence from Brockville to Prescott.

It may be assumed that the American Patriots, with an irregular force, would not venture to cross at any other points, aware of the difficulty of returning to their own shores, in case of failing to establish a communication with the disaffected.

It is proposed, therefore, to protect the frontiers above mentioned with forts, in which the arms and ammunition intended for the militia could be safely deposited, and which could be defended by 200 men.

These defensive works would give confidence to the settlers in remote townships, and to the public generally, and enable nearly the whole of the regular force to be moved rapidly to any disturbed district.

A considerable expence has already been incurred at Fort Malden in repairing the old fort, and in erecting barracks for 400 men.

This work, when completed, according to the estimate, will be sufficient to secure it from any attack from an irregular force.

On Bois Blanc three block-houses have been constructed to contain 40 men each, and the new barrack at Sandwich has been made defensible. It would require an outlay of about 70,000*l.* to construct a permanent work fit for the protection of this frontier.

The occupation of Amherstburg, and the island of Bois Blanc, and Fighting Island by the Americans, would give them the command of the water communication between Lake Erie and the Upper Lakes, and as the settlers in the townships of Colchester, Gosfield, and others in the vicinity of Amherstburg, can be depended on, it is of great importance to the province to hold this remote possession, and secure it from incursion.

The defence of the townships on the St. Clair, which have lately been opened, must be confided to the militia, and the troops stationed at London.

Fort Mississagua, at the mouth of the Niagara, has been repaired, and is now tenable against any attack which may be made by an irregular force.

If a permanent work be constructed between Fort Mississagua and the One Mile Creek, or on Queenston Heights, the Americans would scarcely venture to occupy the Niagara frontier, except with a large force. The possession of this district would give them a harbour in the River Niagara, and intercept our communication with the lakes by the Welland Canal.

The Americans are now improving Fort Niagara, in consequence, probably, of Fort Mississagua having been repaired and armed. The permanent work proposed to be constructed in this district would be completed for about 70,000*l.*

Fort Wellington, at Prescott, has been repaired, and is now a respectable work. This post should be maintained both with reference to the importance of protecting our communication with the loyal settlers of the Eastern and Midland districts near Cornwall, and to the narrow channel which separates the townships on this part of the St. Lawrence from the lawless American population of the opposite shore.

At Cornwall a block-house should be constructed, in which arms and ammunition for the militia could be secured. The block-house might be completed for 1200*l.*

Between Cornwall and the Coteau du Lac, no posts will be required.

LOWER CANADA.

St. John's is a station of great importance. It commands the bridge over the Richelieu, and the continuous navigation of Lake Champlain, the Richelieu and the Chambly Canal. Barracks have been built for 800 men, from which the frontier on both sides of the Richelieu can be easily reinforced.

The old magazine has been converted into a defensible post for the protection of the barracks.

A permanent work constructed at this station would impede the operations of an invading force, and check any insurrectionary movements on the Richelieu.

No. 2.

J. Stephen, Esq., to R. Byham, Esq.

Sir,

Downing Street, January 13, 1840.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to transmit to you herewith a copy of a communication from Lieutenant-General Lord Seaton, containing a report on the subject of the military works, which he is of opinion should be established on the American frontier of Upper and Lower Canada.

This Report contains the following recommendations:—

- | | |
|--|----------|
| 1. That barracks should be erected at Chambly, St. John's La Prairie, and Amherstburg, the probable expence of of which Lord Seaton estimates at | £60,000 |
| 2. That permanent works of defence should be constructed at Amherstburg, Niagara, and St. John's, those at Amherstburg being estimated at | 70,000 |
| At Niagara at | 70,000 |
| And at St. John's at | 40,000 |
| Making a total cost of | £240,000 |

Lord John Russell being desirous that the question of the military defences of the Canadas should be forthwith taken into consideration, and finally determined, I am to desire that you will submit the inclosed communication to the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, requesting them to report to his Lordship how far any of the above works have been estimated for, or proceeded with by the officers acting under their Board, accompanying such report with any information which may be in their possession relating to this subject.

I have, &c.,

J. STEPHEN.

No. 3.

Sir H. Vivian to Lord John Russell.

My Lord,

Office of Ordnance, March 4, 1840.

I HAVE delayed answering the letter of Mr. Stephen, of the 13th January, addressed to Mr. Byham, on the subject of the Defences of the Canadas, until I had an opportunity of learning whether Lord Seaton's proposition, contained in his letter of the 30th December last, had reference to entire new works which he considered it necessary should be constructed, or solely to an additional expenditure on the existing works, on which already, within a short period, considerable sums have been expended. From an interview I have this morning had with his Lordship, I find it is his opinion that new and complete works should be built at the different stations of Amherstburg, Niagara, and St. John's, and that these works should be of a permanent nature; and, when completed, the existing works at the same places may be got rid of.

From the information received from Lord Seaton, and by what I have been enabled to learn, after a careful perusal of the proceedings of the Commission appointed by the Duke of Wellington, in 1825, and his Grace's letter to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st March, 1819, I can have no doubt of the necessity of constructing the works of defence now recommended by Lord Seaton. In conjunction with the works now in progress at Quebec, Kingston, and Halifax,

for which grants are annually taken in the Ordnance Estimates, and which ought to be completed as early as possible, they form the most important features in the system of defence for our North American Colonies laid down in the documents above referred to. They are necessary under any circumstances; but with respect to any further works of defence recommended by the Commission of 1825, it may be desirable to defer entering upon the consideration of them; the necessity of their erection is not so certain, and the varying circumstances of the country may eventually render it inexpedient or unnecessary to undertake them.

I have not yet received the plans and estimates for the proposed works at Amherstburg, Niagara, and St. John's; but should your Lordship concur in the view which I have taken of this subject, it will be requisite to take a vote, on account, at the rate of 20,000*l.* per annum, for these works.

With respect to the barracks at Chambly, St. John's, La Prairie, and Amherstburg, adverted to by Lord Seaton, I find that the sum of 40,000*l.* has already been expended for barracks at those stations, under the orders of the Commander of the forces in Canada; and I apprehend that this expenditure forms a portion of the 60,000*l.* stated by his Lordship to be required on this account.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HUSSEY H. VIVIAN.

No. 4.

J. Stephen, Esq., to R. Byham, Esq.

Sir,

Downing Street, March 11, 1840.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL having had under his consideration the letter addressed to his Lordship by the Master General of the Ordnance, on the 4th instant, relative to the defences of the Canadas, I have received his Lordship's directions to acquaint you, for the information of the Master General and Board, that his Lordship entirely concurs in the recommendation therein contained, that permanent works should be forthwith constructed at Amherstburg, Niagara, and St. John's, in conjunction with the works at present in progress at Quebec, Kingston, and Halifax, and that the construction of any further works of defence which were contemplated by the Commission of 1825 should be deferred for future consideration. I am, therefore, to request that you will move the Master-General to furnish his Lordship with a statement of the sums required for these services for the year, from April, 1840, to April, 1841, distinguishing the sums placed on the Ordnance Estimates from those which will form part of the Extraordinary Vote for Canada.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. STEPHEN.

No. 5.

R. Byham, Esq., to J. Stephen, Esq.

Sir,

Office of Ordnance, April 3, 1840.

I HAVE the honour, by command of the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 11th ultimo, signifying the concurrence of his Lordship, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the recommendations contained in Sir Hussey Vivian's communication of the 4th ultimo, relative to the works of defence in the colonies; under which view his Lordship wishes to be furnished with a statement of the sums required for these services for the year from April 1840, to April 1841.

I am directed by the Master-General and Board to acquaint you, in reply, for his Lordship's information, that with respect to the works in progress at Kingston, Halifax, and Quebec, the necessary sums required for carrying on these works, during 1840-41, are included in the ordinary Ordnance estimates for the year. The Master-General and Board consequently apprehend that

their answer may be limited to the sum required for the contemplated works at St. John's, Niagara, and Amherstburg, for which it has been stated to Lord John Russell (in the Master-General's letter before alluded to), that it would be desirable to allot at the rate of 20,000*l.* annually, after the commencement of the works shall have been finally approved; but as the plans and detailed estimates have not yet been received, and as some time must elapse before they can be furnished, the Master-General and Board consider the whole of the working season in Canada for the present year will be lost, so far as concerns these services, and that, therefore, no inconvenience is likely to arise by postponing the abovementioned vote of 20,000*l.* to 1841-42, provided it be forthcoming at an early period of that year.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. BYHAM.

No. 6.

The Right. Hon. C. Poulett Thomson to Lord J. Russell.—(Received April 16.)

(Confidential.)

My Lord,

Government House, Montreal, March 26, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a memorandum upon the state of Montreal and its immediate frontier, which I have received from the Commander of the Forces, and a map which will illustrate the observations contained in it, to which I must solicit the earnest and early consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

It would be out of place for me to offer any remark upon the statements contained in this paper, which are of a military character; but I feel it right to say that I am convinced by observation, that it is impossible to over-rate the unremitting care and attention which Sir Richard Jackson has devoted to the consideration of this, and all other subjects connected with the defence of the province, or the great anxiety which he feels to avoid, not merely unnecessary expense, but any outlay which can, with a due regard to the public safety, be dispensed with.

Impressed as I am with this conviction, as well as with the justness of the views of Sir Richard Jackson, contained in the paper I transmit, I trust that Her Majesty's Government will see fit to sanction, without any delay, the outlay proposed, in order that the works may be proceeded with, if after due examination by the military authorities they are approved.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) C. POULETT THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Memorandum upon Montreal and its immediate Frontier.

THE object of this memorandum is to recall attention to the unprotected state of this portion of the frontier of Lower Canada with a view to its improvement, as upon its preservation will very much depend our retention of both the Canadas.

The portion adverted to is the Island of Montreal, and a triangle on the southern side of the St. Lawrence, of which that river may be considered the base, the Isle aux Noix near Lake Champlain, the Apex, the River Richelieu, one of the sides, and the frontier line of the 45° from Sorel to Regis the other.

1. In providing for the defence of so extensive a frontier as that of the Canadas, two considerations will always be borne in mind: 1st, the selection of points, to be vigorously defended; and, 2ndly, the security of the communications between them.

The points selected as of most importance, are Quebec and Montreal in the Lower Province, and Kingston in the Upper Province. The communication between the two provinces is protected by Montreal.

Montreal is therefore a place of primary importance to us.

C

2. That able and scientific officer, the late Sir James Carmichael Smythe, in his epitome of the wars in Canada, terms Montreal the "key and capital of the Canadas," and observes that "in every plan for the invasion of Canada, as far back even as that projected in 1711, to the last attempt by the Americans in 1813, the idea of advancing by Lake Champlain has been uniformly entertained."

This is high authority, both as to the importance of Montreal, and the direction from whence it is most exposed to attack. The American Government in the instructions sent to the General Officer commanding their attempt against the island in 1813, uses the following language:—

"At Montreal, you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and expeditious intercourse.

"At Montreal, you occupy a position which must be gained in carrying your attack to the purposes of the war.

"At Montreal, you hold a position which completely severs the enemy's line of operations, which shuts up the Ottawa, as well as the St. Lawrence, and which, while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself."

3. In order to secure Montreal and its frontier, Sir J. C. Smythe proposed the construction of one fortress at Montreal, of another at the mouth of the Chateauguay River, and of strong (if small) works at St. John's, and Chambly on the River Richelieu, and all of these are in addition to the small bad fort at the Isle aux Noix.

Having obtained information of the estimated expense of the construction of the two fortresses at Montreal and the River Chateauguay, it appears so large as to render it hopeless to expect the sanction of the Government to the undertaking of them.

4. This frontier, in the mean time, remains in the same state as in 1813, with regard to defensive works. It possesses additional barracks for regular troops, lately erected on account of the lamentable events of the years 1837 and 1838, but no additional works of defence.

It may therefore be assumed, first, that Montreal will again be the principal object of attack, in the event of a war; secondly, that it is still unprotected; and thirdly, that the measures for its defence proposed by Sir J. C. Smythe, however good, will not be carried into effect, on account of the expense attending them.

It may also be assumed that our means of repelling an attack are so far diminished, as may result from want of the zealous co-operations of the French Canadians inhabiting this frontier (which was the seat of the late insurrection), whilst on the other hand, the resources and general power of the United States have greatly increased since the last war.

5. Before the proposed plan of defence of this frontier be further considered, it may be well to examine, shortly, the nature of the resources of the United States adverted to, as applicable to an attack on the Canadas, and for this purpose recourse will be had to official documents.

From returns submitted to Congress, it appears that the present regular army of the United States should amount to 12,000 men, which number is stated barely to be adequate to the duties now required from it in Florida, and on the Western and Northern frontiers.

This army could doubtless be rapidly augmented, as in 1813; but the Secretary at War has submitted to Congress a plan, long called for, for the reorganization of the militia of the Union.

According to his plan, 200,000 militia men are to be enrolled and trained, and one-eighth (or 25,000) of this number are to be on permanent duty for four years, and to be available for general service.

Besides this force of 200,000 men for the general duties of the Union, the States' militias are to be retained within their respective territories, as at present regulated by law.

The regular army of 12,000 men is to be chiefly composed of artillery and dragoons. This force is supplied with well-educated officers from the military establishment at West Point; all officers there educated engage to serve four years in the regular army. Those who do not continue in that service are generally employed upon public works in the different States, and are therefore available for military duties within them.

From this numerous class of well-educated men, officers will be drawn to

form the militia, and direct the construction of defensive works, and the formation of communications adapted to military as well as commercial purposes throughout the Union.

The Secretary at War reports to the President, for the information of Congress, that the cannon, small arms, and gunpowder, made at the several national foundries, and manufactories lately established, are of a description equal to any produced in Europe.

If these reports be correct, and if the plan for the permanent duty of so large a militia force be carried into effect, the Americans will have a well equipped standing army, for such, in fact, it will be, of 25,000 militia, and 12,000 regulars, supported by 175,000 trained but sedentary militia, independent of the irregular militia constituted according to the existing laws, in the respective States of the Union.

The Secretary at War has further called for "appropriations" to construct new defensive works, and repair those that have fallen into decay. This recommendation has been partially acted upon during the last two years.

Among the new works proposed is one at the northern extremity of Lake Champlain, for the purpose of sealing up the entrance to that lake from the Richelieu River, another at Covington, near St. Regis, on the St. Lawrence; and he has also recommended the erection of barracks and works at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain.

He also recommends the establishment of four principal stations for the concentration of the troops not required at the frontier forts, or at the forts and works on the sea-board and western frontier.

The 1st Station is at Plattsburg, on Lake Champlain.

2nd at Carlisle, or Harrisburg, in Pennsylvania.

3rd at the head of the Savannah River.

4th at or near Memphis, on the Arkansas River.

On looking at the Map of the United States, these stations or posts of concentration appear well selected both for the support of the troops on the sea-board and western frontier, and also for support of attacks directed against the Canadas.

The troops at the 1st and 2nd stations would move towards the Lakes Champlain or Ontario.

The troops at 3 and 4 towards the Upper Lakes, to both which points all these men and their supplies can be directed with facility, by means of the internal communication lately established.

Such are the projects submitted, and some actually sanctioned (and in progress) by authority of the Congress.

The present financial embarrassments of the United States may check the progress of the measures thus recommended, but it is sufficient for our present purpose to know from authority that they are entertained, and some of them in course of execution, for the purpose of this memorandum is to call attention to the necessity of precautionary measures of defence against attack, whenever it may occur.

6. We have the "choice of difficulties only" left to us.

1st. To leave things to chance, as they have been left since 1813.

2nd. To retain a large military force in the Canadas, to supply the want of permanent works, at exposed points of the frontier, or

3rd. To incur a certain degree of expense in the construction of such works, as with a smaller body of troops may keep down insurrectionary movements in the Interior, and present formidable obstacles to an enemy at the commencement of war, which must be fed by us, at 3,000 miles' distance from our resources.

This memorandum relates only, however, to the security of Montreal and its immediate frontier.

It follows, from what has been already shown, that a fortress on the Island of Montreal, upon the scale proposed by Sir J. C. Smythe, however desirable, cannot be recommended here. The island, with some small but strong works, considering the nature of the country and other obvious advantages, can be then defended for a considerable time by the troops previously employed on the frontier, if that portion of it, constituting the triangle before described, be strengthened as hereafter proposed.

The main defence of this island, and of the communication by the Saint Lawrence with Quebec, will depend further upon the proper employment of armed steam vessels, for the protection and refuge of which, some of the proposed works are intended.

But the triangle adverted to should be strengthened and strongly held, as not only tending to retard the enemy's attack against Montreal, but as affording an opportunity to troops of superior quality to his, to profit by their success in the field.

7. The attention of the Commanding Royal Engineer has been called to the proposed system of defence, which is no otherwise new, than that it will be more strongly and actively defensive on the frontier than those formerly proposed.

It has been observed to him, that the barracks lately erected for one battalion at St. John's afford shelter, but not defence; that the barracks at Chambly, La Prairie, are equally defenceless, and that during those periods of the year when the passage of the St. Lawrence is interrupted, the troops stationed on the southern bank must be left to themselves, in a position that they cannot defend long against a superior force, and from which they cannot easily retreat to Montreal; whilst the enemy, having established themselves in this triangle, can afterwards proceed against Montreal at their own convenience.

With the object of strengthening this frontier, and of enabling us to support or withdraw the troops from it, whilst the St. Lawrence is open, and of defending themselves when unsupported, the Commanding Engineer has been requested to prepare plans and estimates, with due regard to economy, for works at the following points:—

1. Some small works in the Island of Montreal itself, and on points connected with its immediate defence, aided by steam vessels.

2. At St. John's, on the Richelieu River, where there is a bridge, which is the more important to us, as the enemy from Plattsburg and Lake Champlain can, after mastering or turning the small fort at the Isle aux Noix, advance by either bank of the Richelieu.

At St. John's, also, is the terminus of the railroad from La Prairie, at which place all goods and passengers from Quebec, Montreal, and the St. Lawrence, generally, intended for the United States, are landed, and sent by railroad to St. John's, and there transhipped for Lake Champlain.

By this railroad troops could be readily moved from Montreal and La Prairie for the support of the St. John's and defence of the country in front of the railroad, which may be thus disputed, and the fall of the Isle aux Noix retarded.

St. John's is therefore a place of the utmost importance to us to hold strongly. There is a village on the opposite bank of the Richelieu, having stone buildings, that, on emergency, can be easily converted into a tête-de-pont, enabling us to act on either bank of the river according to circumstances.

St. John's will be supported from Chambly, also, and small well-armed steam-boats should assist in the defence of the Richelieu, as well as the St. Lawrence.

The point of next, if not of equal, consequence to us, is the mouth of the Chateaugay River, where a work, as a strong tête-de-pont on the St. Lawrence, should be built; but it is thought a better position for such a work than that pointed out by Sir J. C. Smythe can be selected and erected at less expense.

It is supposed that with St. John's well-protected on one flank, and Chateaugay on the other, troops may safely contest with an enemy the possession of this triangle.

It is proposed, also, to strengthen the post at Sorel on the Richelieu; there is a harbour at this place for steam-vessels, and the position of Sorel is one of importance in other respects.

Small works are also proposed at the Bout de l'Isle on the eastern extremity of the Island of Montreal, with the same object of protecting craft on the St. Lawrence, and one at the cascades on that river for the same purpose.

The communication between the Upper and Lower Provinces will thus be protected, if not absolutely secured.

8. That something promising to be effectual should be done for this object, cannot be doubted.

The expenditure likely to be incurred in the construction of the works proposed upon the present plan is stated in the Commanding Engineer's papers appended to this memorandum.

(Signed) R. D. JACKSON.

Memoranda of the probable expense of defences for Montreal and the Frontier between the Richelieu and the St. Lawrence, having the Line of 45° for the Base and Sorel for the Apex of the Triangle.

Posts.	Expense.		
	No. 1.*	No. 2.†	
Montreal . .	£. 315,122	£. "	According to the projet of the committee. By a chain of posts.
St. John's . .	"	7,000	For restoring the old work, and forming a new river front, exclusive of 1,160 <i>l.</i> for proposed tête de Pont at St. Athanase.
"	"	3,984	Giving casemated cover in a cavalier, or for 300 men, and improving the trace of the old work by placing three ravelins on the land fronts.
"	"	12,613	According to the projet of the committee.
Chateauguay .	40,000	"	Earthen redoubt and batteries on Nuns Island, but no cover for troops or stores.
"	"	2,000	Redoubt with a cavalier, affording bomb-proof cover for 200, and tower and batteries on Nuns Island.
"	"	13,000	No provision is made for the cover of troops or stores in these last posts, as it is imagined they would be temporarily put up in existing buildings, either public or private. The works proposed are field-works of a respectable profile, well palised and fraised; to be executed by military working parties. The value of the land is not included.
Laprairie . .	"	1,200	
Longueuil . .	"	1,200	
Sorel	"	1,500	
Cascades . .	"	1,200	
Bout de l'Isle.	"	1,200	
St. Helen's .	"	150	

* Works not proposed in this Memorandum.

† Works submitted for consideration.

March 24, 1840.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD,
Lieut.-Col. Commanding Royal Engineers.

No. 7.

J. Stephen, Esq., to R. Byham, Esq.

Sir,

Downing Street, April 24, 1840.

I AM directed by Lord John Russell to transmit to you herewith, in original, a confidential despatch from the Right Honourable C. Poulett Thomson, inclosing a memorandum upon the state of Montreal, and its immediate frontier, together with a map, illustrative of the suggestions therein contained; and I am to request that you would move the Master-General and Board of Ordnance to take into their earliest consideration the plan of defence for Montreal and its vicinity, as proposed by the Commander of the Forces, and state that, if the views of that officer meet with the concurrence of the Master-General, it appears to Lord John Russell that it would be advisable to lay an estimate before Parliament, and ask for a sum of 25,000*l.*, in the present year, for this service, independently of any sums required next year for other fortifications.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. STEPHEN.

P.S. It is requested that the inclosures may be returned.

No. 8.

R. Byham, Esq., to J. Stephen, Esq.

Sir,

Office of Ordnance, May 4, 1840.

I HAVE the honour, by desire of the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated 24th ultimo, transmitting a Confidential Despatch from the Right Honourable C. Poulett Thomson (dated 26th March), inclosing a memorandum from Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Jackson, commanding the forces in Canada, relative to the defence of Montreal and its immediate frontier, in order that the question may be taken into the earliest consideration of the Master-General and Board.

And I am to acquaint you, in reply, for the information of his Lordship, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that the Master-General and Board, having been in communication with the Inspector-General of Fortifications on the subject, the following is the result of their deliberations.

It is observed that the great extent of our Canadian frontier, and the unfavourable direction of our principal lines of operation, whilst those of an enemy's corps, moving upon Canada from the States, would be generally advantageous, are military defects which have been invariably pointed out in every report upon the defence of our North American provinces, and as nothing has been done towards the fortifications proposed by the Commission of 1825, except at Quebec and Kingston, both of which are as yet incomplete, it were to be expected that the Commander of the Forces would again, under existing circumstances, call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the subject.

The memorandum of Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Jackson, before alluded to, is one of great interest and value, and the Master-General and Board agree fully upon the great importance which that officer attaches to the Montreal portion of the frontier; but they cannot give any opinion upon the character or construction of the works contemplated in the memorandum without the usual details of a digested project; and as a comparative expenditure has been attempted, which it is feared may either give a very erroneous idea of the ultimate expense or that the works enumerated are of inadequate construction, they cannot recommend the statement which accompanies Sir R. Jackson's memorandum to be laid before Parliament as the groundwork for a vote towards their execution.

Detailed plans and estimates have been called for, on the recommendation of Lord Seaton, for permanent works at St. John's, Niagara, and Amherstburg; and measures are taking to obtain the ground necessary for proceeding with those which have been determined upon for Kingston.

Could the Master-General and Board have contemplated the possibility of still further extending our permanent defences in this, or even the ensuing year, the details of the project for the Chateaugay Harbour, one of the points referred to by Sir R. Jackson, would have been likewise called for, but in their opinion what the Commanding Royal Engineer has already in hand, requiring as it does much judgment and professional skill in adapting the construction for the several works to the objects they are to fulfil, as well as very great attention in foreseeing and estimating their details, will be quite as much as can advantageously be undertaken at present in the shape of permanent works. Certain suggestions, with sketches, which, by a report dated 23rd March last, from the Commanding Royal Engineer, appear to have been offered by him to the Commander of the Forces, may assist the latter if called upon to determine the occupation of those posts on an emergency, but before permanent fortifications are undertaken. The Master-General and Board will require a very different degree of information; a project exhibiting in all the details of the several works the adaptation of engineering science to a well-considered system of defence.

The Master-General and Board therefore think nothing more can be done in the present case than has already been called for. The city of Montreal is no doubt of very great importance, but they are of opinion it will be better

to devote our means to covering its frontier by good works than to attempt surrounding the city itself by a chain of posts such as the statement contemplated.

The inclosures of your letter are herewith returned, as requested.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) R. BYHAM.

No. 9.

Lord John Russell to the Right Hon. C. Poulett Thomson.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Downing Street, May 9, 1840.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your confidential despatch of the 26th of March, inclosing a memorandum which had been submitted to you by the Commander of the Forces on the defences of Montreal and its immediate frontier.

I immediately forwarded this communication to the Master General and Board of Ordnance, desiring their opinion on the plan therein proposed, and stating that if it were approved of, it might be advisable to go to Parliament this Session for funds to defray a portion of the expense incidental to the proposed works. An answer to that reference has now been received, and I have the honour to transmit a copy of it to you for your information. You will perceive therefrom that the Board of Ordnance consider the memorandum of Sir Richard Jackson as possessing great interest and value, but that they could not express any opinion on the character and construction of the contemplated works, without the usual details of a digested project.

Being anxious to have under my consideration such a plan as Sir Richard Jackson has suggested, I should be glad if you would call on him to furnish you with one which shall be more specific and detailed, and also to obtain a scientific report for the Board of Ordnance as to the engineering which will be requisite, and an estimate of the expense of the undertaking.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 10.

The Right Hon. C. Poulett Thomson to Lord J. Russell.—(Received Sept. 2, 1840.)

My Lord,

Castle St. Lewis, Quebec, August 5, 1840.

HAVING communicated to the Commander of the Forces your Lordship's despatch of the 9th of May last and its inclosures, relative to the defence of Montreal and its immediate frontier, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your information a copy of the answer which I have received. The plans and estimates to which Sir R. D. Jackson refers will, of course, be forwarded at a future period.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) C. POULETT THOMSON.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Sir. R. D. Jackson to the Right Hon. C. Poulett Thomson.

Sir,

Niagara, June 16, 1840.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch of the 8th instant, conveying copies of communications from the Secretary of State, and Board of Ordnance, upon the subject of that part of my memorandum upon Montreal and its immediate frontier, which relates to works proposed for its defence.

In obedience to the directions contained in that despatch, I have desired the Commanding Engineer to prepare, with the least possible delay, the plans and estimates required by the Master-General and Board of Ordnance.

Upon the establishment of defensive works generally in the Canadas, I would observe that many points have been occupied as military posts in consequence of disturbances, which bear no relation to a sound system of defence against invasion in force.

In some cases great expense has been incurred in the construction of barracks as points of some importance, but unluckily these buildings are not only indefensible in themselves, but impede the establishment of works required for their defence.

The barracks at St. John's and Amherstburg are of this character, and I do not see how the science of the engineer can overcome this impediment.

I wish also to observe that the memorandum upon the Montreal frontier was written before I was put in possession, by the considerate kindness of Lord Fitzroy Somerset, of the report of the Engineer Commission of 1825.

Its professed object was to draw attention to the present nearly defenceless state of that important part of the frontier which, it appears from Mr. Byham's letter, had been frequently animadverted upon by my predecessors in this command.

It is certainly most desirable that permanent works should be established in this quarter, which has been always deemed the most important and the most exposed part of the frontier; and without works the action of the regular troops will be paralyzed from the necessity of their concentration at this place to supply the want of works, the construction of which in a substantial manner will require more money and time than will perhaps be allowed us.*

I fully concur in the opinion conveyed in Mr. Byham's letter, that works of a permanent description should be established in accordance with a well considered system of general defence; but there are some points which never can be neglected with impunity in any system, and I am yet unacquainted with any one formed by my predecessors; indeed it would be difficult to propose one free from objections, or to provide against future contingencies of war, with a country varying and increasing so rapidly as the United States of America.

Still there are points which must be always defended, and Montreal is, perhaps, one of the most important of these.

My late survey of the frontier from Montreal to Lake Huron has confirmed me in this opinion.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. D. JACKSON,
Lieutenant-General.

No. 11.

Lord Sydenham to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 8, 1841.)

My Lord,

Government House, Montreal, Dec. 24, 1840.

WITH reference to my despatches to your Lordship of the 26th of March and 5th of August last, and to your Lordship's despatch of the 9th of May, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, a further report from the Commander of the Forces on the subject of the defence of Canada; together with a letter inclosing a copy of the communication on the same subject, addressed by the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst in the month of December, 1825.

In submitting these documents to your Lordship, I beg to call your especial attention to the remarks of the Duke of Wellington in regard to the maintenance of communications, in time of war, between Upper and Lower Canada, and between Lower Canada and the Seaboard Provinces. In respect to the former, ample provision has been made, since his Grace's letter, by the construction of the Rideau Canal; but for the communications with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, nothing has been done. They are still in the same unprotected state as they were at the date of his letter, while the course of events has rendered our relations with the neighbouring States of the Union

much more critical, and has consequently increased in an immense degree the necessity for protecting our communications.

I would, therefore, beg to solicit your Lordship's early and attentive consideration to this important point, which, although not embraced in the present report from Sir Richard Jackson, must occupy a prominent place in any scheme for the protection of Her Majesty's dominions in North America, and for preserving the communication between the different provinces contained in them.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) SYDENHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Lieut.-General Sir R. D. Jackson to Lord Sydenham.

My Lord,

Montreal, November 14, 1840.

THE Commanding Royal Engineer communicated to me some time back, an extract from a letter from the Secretary to the Board of Ordnance, dated 21st of August, 1840, stating that Her Majesty's Secretary of State "had declined giving his opinion upon a proposition for building an hospital within the citadel of Quebec, until the general estimate for the fortifications in Canada shall have reached his Lordship."

The Secretary of State, in his despatch to your Lordship of the 9th of May last, requested your Lordship to call upon me, "to furnish a more specific and detailed report upon the subject, than was presented in my memorandum of March last;" and also "to obtain a scientific report for the Board of Ordnance as to the Engineering that would be required, and an estimate of the expense of the undertaking."

The Commanding Engineer has, accordingly, transmitted to the Ordnance such portions of the general report as he has yet been able to complete in the manner required, and it was my intention to defer the report called for from myself, until the general estimate were prepared; but as I understand from your Excellency that Lord John Russell may expect to be in possession, at an earlier period, of such information as I am able to give upon the subject generally, so that, if the report meet his Lordship's approbation, those portions of the general plan that are deemed most essential, in order to place the frontier in a state of comparative security, may be acted upon. I now submit for your Lordship's consideration and that of the Secretary of State, my views, in the shape of a memorandum.

The arrangements for a system of defence, indicated in this memorandum, have certainly been well considered by me, and I have entered into further details than might have been expected, or are required. It may not be necessary to do more than refer to these, in perusing that portion of the memorandum commencing at page 29, to which alone I request indulgent attention.

The principles of the proposed arrangements have been sought for in the letters of the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst, upon the defence of the Canadas in 1819.

I wish to observe, with regard to the works proposed by the Commission of 1825, that I ventured in my former memorandum to attribute their non-execution to their magnitude and cost, and to recommend the adoption, if possible, of a scale more in accordance with the means that would probably be placed at the disposal of the Engineer department.

I consider it due to Colonel Oldfield and the officers of that department serving in Canada, to state that upon this occasion, and every other which I have called upon them, I have met with cordial and very valuable assistance.

I have annexed to this memorandum, Colonel Oldfield's reports upon the four districts into which I have divided (provisionally) the Canadian frontier, with maps of each district.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. D. JACKSON,
Commander of the Forces.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Memorandum upon the Canadian Frontier.

November, 1840.

THERE are certain peculiarities connected with the military position of Canada that I may be permitted to notice here, as they influence arrangements for its defence, although sufficiently obvious to persons acquainted with the country:—1st. "The vast extent of its frontier, and the unfavourable direction of our principal lines of operation, whilst those of an enemy moving from the United States against Canada would be generally advantageous, are military defects that have been universally pointed out in every report" (as remarked in the third paragraph of the Ordnance Minute of the 4th May).

In connection with the above remark, it may be observed, that an enemy's corps so moving can act upon our frontier within a few days after the declaration of war at Washington.

In 1812, the United States declared war on the 18th of June, and an invading corps crossed the Detroit River on the 12th of July, although obliged literally to cut its way through what was then a wilderness to get to the Detroit.

2nd. The Americans have now an overwhelming superiority of steam conveyance upon all the lakes except Ontario.

The upper lakes, with the exception of Lake Erie, are free from the obstruction of ice a month earlier than the St. Lawrence, and consequently an expedition can act upon them some weeks before it be possible to give it disturbance from below.

We have no craft on Lake Champlain, or any chance of acting upon it, at the commencement of a war.

Last year upwards of forty large steam vessels on Lake Erie plied between the American ports and Detroit, capable of containing each from 600 to 1000 men.

3rd. Little reliance can, at this time, be placed upon a large portion of the population of Lower Canada, which was formerly available for local defence, rendering our regular troops disposable for general purposes.

4th. Canada is exposed to a recurrence of desultory attacks (even in time of peace) from the extent and openness of its frontier; this has led to the multiplication of small posts, absorbing our troops, and to the erection of barracks not capable of defence, at points where permanent works should be placed.

5th. During half the year Canada cannot receive support from Great Britain, whilst in that season, when the rivers are bridged over with ice, an enemy's corps, prepared beforehand near the frontier, might attempt to drive our troops from points necessary to forward their future operations on the opening of the navigation.

Works only at those points can prevent this; they are essential to the defence of this country in all seasons. For a short period the troops on the frontier are nearly cut off from all support from those on the left bank of the St. Lawrence.

Before entering upon the main subject of this memorandum, viz. arrangements for the defence of Canada, it may not be superfluous to give an outline of its frontier, which I shall endeavour to compress as much as possible, as it has been often and minutely described.

For the purposes of this memorandum the frontier is assumed to extend from the Rivière du Loup, on the right bank of the St. Lawrence, 114 miles below Quebec, to Port Sarnia, at the junction of the St. Clair River with Lake Huron.

The Rivière du Loup is a post of dépôt for support, and supply of our troops on the Temiscouata road to Fredericton, and an interior line of communication with the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia passes by it, called the Kempt Road, diverging from the St. Lawrence at the Metis River.

It is thought by some officers that the Metis or Kempt Road would become the preferable line of communication by land in time of war, as being less liable to interruption, and because access may be had to it from the sea by

the Bay of Chaleurs, up which transports of 200 tons' burthen can ascend as high as Campbell Town.

The Temiscouata Road could not, indeed, be depended upon in time of war; it would belong to the strongest on its border. If the Metis Road be required, it must be nearly re-opened, at a cost of nearly 30,000/.

It has been suggested that an enemy crossing the St. John's River from Fort Jarvis on the Fish River, might turn our post at the Temiscouata Lake, and advance to the St. Lawrence, after dispossessing us of the disputed Territory, and establish himself on that river near the Traverse, and impede its navigation.

This latter attempt does not appear to me probable, but they may attempt to drive us from the valley of the St. John's River, and that part of the disputed Territory held by us. If this be worth contesting posts must be established on the St. John's, opposite to Fort Jarvis, at the little falls of the Madawaska, and at the great falls on the St. John's.

These form no part of the works recommended for the defence of Canada.

The distance between Quebec and the Rivière du Loup (114 miles) can be traversed by artillery in forty-eight hours, with relays of horses in winter.

In order to assist my attempt to describe the Canadian Frontier, I propose to divide it into four districts, which measure would in reality, I think, facilitate arrangements for its defence in time of war.

1. I propose calling the first the Quebec District, extending from the Rivière du Loup, to the mouth of the Yamaska River, at its confluence with the St. Lawrence.

2. The 2nd district (or Montreal) extending from the Yamaska to the mouth of the ~~Front~~ River in Lake Ontario. *Front*

3. The 3rd (or Niagara District) from the ~~Front~~ River to the mouth of the Ouse, or Grand River in Lake Erie.

4. The 4th (or Western District) comprehends the remainder of the water-bound Frontier, between the Grand River and Lake Huron.

At the present time this extensive line of frontier (nearly 1400 miles) remains without the protection of the works recommended for that purpose. "Nothing has been done (as remarked in the same paragraph of the Ordnance Minute before quoted) towards the works recommended by the Commission of 1825, except at Quebec and Kingston, which are incomplete."

An enemy can consequently attack us when, where, and how it may suit his convenience and views. Our system of defence must be passive and local. We are precluded from acting upon the principles of a sound defensive system, and from deriving advantage from the energy and discipline of our troops; from the risks attendant on leaving one vulnerable point whilst concentrating, in order to repel an attack, at another, or acting ourselves upon the offensive.

Under present circumstances we must regulate our movements by those of an enemy, which may not be ascertained until it be too late to counteract them.

Having offered these general observations, I will proceed with the outline of the frontier. The Commanding Royal Engineer is in correspondence with this department upon the completion of the fortress at Quebec. With regard to the frontier line of this district, it is deemed almost impervious to an enemy in force having a siege in view; the country is well calculated for defence, and he must bring his heavy artillery and materials for a siege, and even for crossing the St. Lawrence from Lake Champlain, and if we retain possession of the Richelieu River, he would be exposed to attack on his flank, and to have his communications with his own country interrupted.

I consider, then, the Frontier of Montreal must be taken from us before an enemy could pass the St. Lawrence below Montreal to besiege Quebec.

It will be prudent, however, to have advanced strong posts in the direction of the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers, and at Sherbrooke, on the St. Francis, as a rallying point and depôt for the militia.

Arnold's march by the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers to Quebec, can only be looked upon as a bold incursion, dependent upon Montgomery's success at Montreal.

2. I consider the 2nd, or Montreal District, as one of the most important of the frontier; and have comprised Kingston (and the intermediate country) within one district, because they should always be held in strict conjunction with each other, although exposed to various and different operations.

In this point of view I shall first notice the immediate frontier of Montreal, extending along our boundary line of 45°.

The left of this line of frontier is nearly bounded by the course of the Richelieu River, the outlet of Lake Champlain; and to show that I do not attach undue importance to its conservation, I take leave to submit the following extracts from official documents of the United States' Government.

The first is an extract from a document presented to Congress in their last Session, entitled a "*Report upon National Defences and National Boundaries*," dated 15th May, 1840.

In page 103, it is stated, "A work here (near the boundary line) on Lake Champlain, may be made to command the pass of the lake, and is considered by far the most important of any proposed in the whole line of frontier.

"The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar, while Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, stretch their whole length along the frontier, (forming, in fact, the boundary;) Champlain extends deeply into our territory, and while its southern extremity reaches almost to the Hudson, it finds its outlet to the north in the St. Lawrence, nearly midway between Montreal and Quebec, the two great objects of attack.

"This is, undoubtedly, the avenue by which the British possessions can be most effectually assailed; while, at the same time, it would afford to the enemy possessing a naval ascendancy equal facilities for bringing the war within our own borders, if it be left unfortified. It therefore becomes necessary to fortify a point as near the line as practicable, so as to shut out the enemy's vessels, and thus effect the double object of protecting the interior shores of the lake from the predatory attacks to which they would be otherwise exposed, and of securing it to ourselves as a channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown forward to the points of attack and defence."

The Officer at the head of the Engineer Department of the United States observes, in his *Report to the Secretary at War*,—

"From the northern end of this lake (Champlain) the forces of the United States should march into Canada, and interrupt the communication by the St. Lawrence, either at or near the mouth of the Richelieu River, at Montreal Island, at some point where the ship-channel of the river could be commanded intermediate between these places, or at any two, or at all of these places, according to circumstances.

"In the case of this offensive movement, the fortified position of Isle aux Noix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be left in the rear, being masked by suitable bodies of troops, and should be subjected to immediate and vigorous attack, so as to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal.

"The unexampled increase of population along our borders, the hundred new ways, already finished or in hand, of connecting these borders with the heart of the country, may so elevate the resources of this region, that, in the event of war, a resistless torrent will sweep the opposite territory from end to end. The military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lake Champlain are so obvious, that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly understood by our neighbours across the border."

Such are the opinions, and such, I may add, are the designs of our neighbours across the border.

The work proposed to close Lake Champlain against us, is among those submitted for the consideration of Congress. This list will be given hereafter in the course of this memorandum.

I will observe here, only, that in the opinion of all naval officers with whom I have communicated, we have no chance of getting an ascendancy upon Lake Champlain.

Every military consideration denotes Montreal as the primary object of an invading enemy. It is a position that severs the line of defensive operations, shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence, and restrains all below, while it withers all above; to gain possession of it, would imply the military possession of the Province.

In the present state of parties, it would be decisive from its moral influence, as the centre and capital of the most populous district, almost exclusively inhabited by French Canadians.

There are two lines of operation against the immediate frontier of Montreal, for an enemy advancing from this "Avenue" of Lake Champlain and the Hudson.

1st. That of the Richelieu River.

2nd. That of the Chateaugay River.

In the line of the Richelieu must be included the two roads on each bank. The river itself is navigable throughout in summer, and passable four months generally on the ice in winter. The road by Napierville and L'Acadie, and that by Hemmingford and Douglasscorner, must be included also in this line, all being nearly parallel, and leading more or less on La Prairie, which is the termination of the railroad from St. John's, and where is situated the wharf for the steamboats plying with Montreal.

2nd. The line of Chateaugay is more circuitous, and does not offer the same advantages as that by the Richelieu.

The water-frontier of Canada commences where the line of 45° strikes the St. Lawrence near St. Regis, and the course of this river from Lake Ontario is nearly throughout controlled by the Americans.

It cannot be depended upon as a communication in time of war.

Another line of operations against Montreal presents itself by a flank movement, upon the supposition that its immediate frontier were protected by strong works, which unfortunately is not the case, is thus pointed out by an officer of high rank in a former administration of the United States. He supposes the army assembled at Ogdensburgh, between which and Plattsburgh there are good communications, used during the last war, and where a railroad is now projected.

Ogdensburgh is an improving place, situated just above the rapids of the St. Lawrence. An army cannot well venture to pass below, on account of these rapids; although batteaux descend them, and stores and materials of every kind might be sent down, protected by an army moving by the left bank.

The reasons given for this mode of acting against Montreal by the above officer are:—

1st. "That the force could be assembled at Ogdensburgh with ease.

2nd. "That a water conveyance is furnished all the way to Montreal.

3rd. "That the British are not fortified on the St. Lawrence side, and have no strong outposts, that must be forced, in order to secure the flanks and rear of those engaged in the main attack.

4th. "By approaching his flank, the British General must change his position, in which case he must do one of four things; either he must occupy the north side, and give up the south,—or he must occupy the south, and give up the north,—or he must confine himself to the island of Montreal, and give up both sides,—or finally, he must occupy both sides and thus expose himself to be beaten in detail."

The Americans propose building a fort at Ogdensburgh, at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, with the object of closing the communications this way, between Montreal and Kingston.

There is a third line of operation against Montreal, diverging also from the Avenue of Champlain and Hudson, by the Erie Canal, from Albany and Troy, which communicates both with Lakes Ontario and Erie. This movement against Montreal would be similar to the last mentioned, but attended with more difficulty. It would better answer as a line of operation against Kingston, or to distract attention from the main attack by the Richelieu. It is not likely that he would repeat his error of attacking by two distinct lines of operations, as in the last war.

As the frontier line of the St. Lawrence cannot be used as a communication in time of war, we must depend upon that by the Ottawa and Rideau.

Our chance of acquiring and retaining the naval ascendancy upon Lake Ontario in war, depends upon the security of Kingston and its harbour.

There is no protection to either at present. Fort Henry, however good in itself as a detached work, is inadequate to this purpose.

Kingston is a place of the greatest importance to us, and should be protected by a system of good permanent works, in order to resist attempts that may be made against it by the following operations:—

1st. From Plattsburgh (on the Champlain avenue) by Ogdensburgh, or from Plattsburgh by Sackett's Harbour.

2nd. From the Hudson by the Erie Canal, by Oswego and Sackett's Harbour.

3rd. By operations directed against it from the Niagara Peninsula, if that fall into the power of the enemy.

The 3rd, or Niagara district, is supposed to extend from the mouth of the Trent River in Ontario to the mouth of the Grand River in Lake Erie.

Besides Kingston, the only natural harbours on the north shore of Lake Ontario are Presqu'Isle, Toronto, and Burlington Bay.

In calm weather troops might land in other small harbours, and there is no safe anchorage in all winds along the coast, excepting the above, and in the Bay of Quinte.

It is very desirable that the long-projected canal across the isthmus that joins Prince Edward's Island to the main land, should be completed. The advantage of this canal would be very great, particularly if the Trent Navigation be finished.

It is also to be desired that the roads between Kingston and Hamilton be kept in order. From Toronto to Hamilton there are two roads: they unite before reaching Burlington Heights, near Hamilton, where there is a wooden bridge across the head of Burlington Bay, which ought to be protected.

It is of the greatest importance to us to have a naval superiority on Lake Ontario.

It would enable us to send troops promptly from Kingston and Toronto to Burlington Bay and Heights, and it would secure the left or eastern flank of the Niagara peninsula.

It would enable us to threaten, and, perhaps, act against the southern coast of the lake, within reach of the Erie Canal.

The improvement, therefore, of the entrance to Burlington Bay is of consequence, and certainly, in a military point of view, the original entrance near Flamboro' Heights is preferable to the present.

The American fort Niagara, at the entrance of the river, commands our small bad fort of Mississauga, and when the enemy shall have driven us from it, he may, if tempted by the temporary command of the lake, as well as river, to throw troops across in this direction, and may convert the abandoned work to use, as a tête de pont; but invasion is more to be apprehended between the Chippewa and Grand Rivers, unless he deprive us of our ascendancy on Lake Ontario.

It has been observed that Lake Ontario is free from obstruction by ice, at least one month earlier than the St. Lawrence; he could (if the navigation be open to him) send his expedition to the northern shore of the lake, or to the eastern side of the Niagara Peninsula, some weeks before reinforcements could arrive to our troops from Montreal.

It seems, therefore, necessary to defend Burlington Heights and Bay by a permanent work, particularly as Hamilton should be one of our dépôts for the Niagara and Western districts.

The most favourable line of operations for an enemy debarred from acting by Lake Ontario, from our naval superiority, would be either from Buffalo, or from his posts in Lake Erie, or from both, in combination, perhaps, with a subordinate force, threatening the Western district from the Detroit River, to engage our attention, and cause a movement of our troops at London in that direction.

The points of departure for his expedition against the Peninsula would be—1st. From Buffalo, drawing the resources of the Eastern States by the Erie Canal, or—2nd. From Port Erie and neighbouring Ports, receiving his supplies from Pittsburg, and even from New York, by the Alleghany Canal, or—3rd. From Cleveland, supplied by the Ohio Canal from the Central States; or lastly, from Landuskey, being in communication with the Western States.

The best landing-places for a large expedition will be found between the

shore opposite to Buffalo, and the Grand River; having established himself here, he would be in short and direct communication with his own country.

If he find no obstacles in his way, he would occupy Burlington Heights and Bay, and separate our troops in the Western district from those below it.

The Commission of 1825 recommended the construction of a fortress on the Short Hills, for the protection of the Niagara Peninsula, to which I do not know that any other objection could be offered, but its expense.

I have said nothing of the intermediate tract of country between the Trent River and Burlington, because I do not consider it much exposed to an attempt of magnitude; or of the line of the Trent; or of the communications between Toronto and Penetanguishene; not because they are not of importance, but from a wish to confine my observations to those points of the frontier that are universally deemed most assailable by an enemy in force.

The 4th, or Western district, comprehends the remaining part of the ~~the~~ Canadian Frontier, encircled by water, between the Grand River and Lake Huron.

On the northern shore of Lake Erie there are some small ports, or harbours, affording landing-places for desultory attacks, but no one well calculated for the debarkation of a large force, considered in connection with the state of the interior country and its communications.

It is, however, understood that the Ronde-Eau Lake is capable of being improved into a good harbour, so as to become a post of consequence from its proximity to Chatham, with which it is said that it might be connected by a canal.

Chatham must become a place of depôt and support to the Western frontier, in time of war.

London is the central post of the Western district, and of support to the whole of its frontier: roads diverge from it in every direction.

It may be scarcely necessary to do more than advert to the bad state of the roads generally in Canada and particularly in the Western district; they would render military operations difficult in this district, except in summer. They either follow the course of rivers and streams, or are cut through the bush, where there are few clearances or settlements. It is therefore a country favourable for defence by a comparatively small force, from these circumstances, and from the paucity of lateral roads by which the retreating party may be turned. An enemy's supplies, if he be in force, must accompany him, if he leave the Lake Road, and communication with his shipping; and on that road even, he would find little cover or assistance from the country.

Amherstburg, with the Island of Bois-Blanc, at the entrance of the Détroit River, form together a good roadstead; it was supposed to command the passage of this river, but it is ascertained that as large vessels as are used in the Lake navigation can pass, out of fire, between Grosse Isle and the American shore.

Amherstburg retains, however, a considerable interest and importance from being a naval station, and from being at present our best rallying point for the militia of the country.

Port Sarnia is situated at the junction of the St. Clair River with Lake Huron; it is a good little port, with a sufficient depth of water; the river here is narrow, and there are rapids near its entrance; the bank on our side commands the entrance of the American Port Huron, and the entrance of the Lake of that name.

It is not supposed that an enemy would attempt invasion, on a large scale, by the Détroit frontier; there are no works, however, at present to retard him an instant.

I do not enter into the question here, which has been often agitated, whether it be likely or not that an enemy may attempt to seize on Penetanguishene, and move in force upon Toronto, thus turning all the western district, and taking in reverse all our defences on that and our Niagara frontier. This appears to me a remote danger, notwithstanding the rapid rise of new states adjoining Michigan, which last had only 5000 inhabitants in 1812.

Having given an outline of the Canadian frontier, I shall proceed to submit my views as to the arrangements adapted to its defence.

It appears necessary to inquire, 1st, what are the points most assailable

an enemy having the great purposes of war in view, and that are of most importance to us.

2nd. The means at the disposal of the enemy moving from the United States, and the probable amount of force that may be brought to act against these points of the Canadian frontier.

3rd. Our means of repelling him.

The Commission of 1823 have very clearly described the most available points of our Canadian frontier.

These are admitted to be Montreal, Niagara, Détroit.

The next subject for inquiry is the means at the disposal of the enemy, and the probable amount of force he may bring against us.

The population of the United States in 1830 was about twelve millions. The census will be taken again this year. It is supposed that the present population, including slaves, amounts to eighteen millions.

The regular army of the United States is small; its establishment is about 12,000, and that is incomplete. It is formed on a plan that will admit of speedy augmentation. It is well officered and equipped, and accustomed to move at short notice from one part of the frontiers to another.

I understand that the officers of their scientific corps are particularly well instructed.

Those of the Engineers and Topography are in constant employment.

There are four regiments of Artillery, of ten companies each, and two companies from each regiment have been lately embodied as a separate corps, and mounted as Horse Artillery.

They have only two regiments of Dragoons; these are well suited for every sort of service on which they are likely to be employed.

In 1835 three companies (as they are termed) under a field officer, marched from Fort Leavenworth, on the extreme western frontier of the States, on the 31st of May, and after moving through 1600 miles of wilderness wood and prairie to the Rocky Mountains, and through the numerous tribes of Indians inhabiting that tract of country, returned to Fort Leavenworth on the 14th of August, with the loss of only one man by sudden illness, and without material injury to any other man or horse.

They took with them a supply of provisions, and two swivel guns.

Authority has been lately given to raise a corps of Sappers and Miners.

The foundries of cannon and manufactories of small arms for the army and militia of the Union, and of gunpowder, have been favourably reported upon.

Great attention has been paid, in the construction of barracks, to the comfort and accommodation of the men; their hospitals are, in particular, in excellent order.

The establishment at West Point is an object of great solicitude, and is, I am informed, as well regulated as any similar institution in Europe.

There is evidently thus a nucleus formed for an efficient army.

The reorganization of the militia of the Union has of late years engaged much of the attention of successive Presidents, and of the Legislature. The certain result of the constant agitation of this question will be an agreement of all parties to some plan for this purpose, as all admit of its necessity.

Several plans have been submitted, but the jealousies of the different states, and popular prejudices, have hitherto prevented action being taken upon any one of them.

A plan for the immediate training of 200,000 militia of the Union, was submitted and approved of, in the last session of Congress, but will certainly not be acted upon, from its unpopularity, which was one of the prominent causes of the overthrow of the Van Buren administration.

This plan provided that the United States be divided into eight military districts. The militia to be organized in each district, so as to have 12,500 men in active service, and 12,500 in reserve. This would give a permanent disposable force of 200,000 militia; the term of service to be eight years: four years in the first, and four years in the second class.

The remainder of the militia to be enrolled and mustered at stated intervals, so that in due process of time the whole mass of the militia would pass through these classes.

The 25,000 men on active service were placed under the orders of the President.

Another plan was submitted, in order to remove the constitutional objection made to the preceding one, by the separate states composing the Union, who claim the right of regulating their respective militia.

It was proposed that 20,000 men be enrolled and trained, but not to leave their states, until called into active service by the Governors, on the requisition of the President.

There is no doubt that some general plan will be devised for the improvement of the militia, with the effect of placing a disposable force under the immediate authority of the executive government in time of war.

In the mean time should war break out, recurrence must be had to the old constitutional system of calling out drafts from the states bordering on the scene of action for a short period of service; but this has been deemed an inefficient and "ruinous expedient."

It is possible that the President would, as on former occasions, be authorized to "accept the services of volunteers," to a certain amount, and these men would be incorporated in the existing corps of the regular army, and in new corps of the same description.

In the late war, after the failures of the first campaign, when militia were principally employed, leave was given to raise fifty battalions; of which many were raised, and conducted themselves in a very creditable manner, under officers taken from the army, and otherwise selected with care. There would be less difficulty now in providing efficient officers.

In like manner when disturbances were apprehended between New Brunswick and Maine a few years since, the President was authorized to "accept the services of 60,000 volunteers."

The establishment of West Point secures an ample provision of well educated officers for the regiment to which such volunteers would be transferred.

I do not anticipate much difficulty in providing for the commissariat and medical departments.

In my opinion there would be no difficulty in collecting a sufficient force upon the frontier, within a very short period, to justify the undertaking of offensive operations.

There might be a deficiency of some of the requisites for long and arduous campaigns; but the season for active operations is short in this country, and the proximity of the United States to the theatre of war, would facilitate the transmission of supplies necessary for the occasion.

It is not likely that a large proportion of their disposable force would be diverted from active operations on this frontier for the protection of the sea-board frontier of the States. It is too extensive for a force of this description, and must be left to measures of local defence.

The sea coast may be harassed and insulted, but no apprehensions can be entertained of invasion by an army upon a large scale. The occupation of Washington, and the destruction of public buildings there, is considered more as an insult than an injury, and not likely to be repeated.

I have already adverted to the superiority of the United States upon all the lakes except Ontario, and they have, it is too probable, ampler means to retain, than we possess to contest it.

There is no doubt that such a contest is contemplated by all parties in the United States, as likely to take place at some time, and perhaps at no distant period.

I prefer seeking for proof of this general feeling, or rather conviction, in the official documents of the Government at different periods, than in any hypothetical proposition of individuals, however well supported by reasoning or appearances.

A stronger proof could not, I think, be produced than from the approved plan, for the construction of fortresses for the defence of the Northern frontier, from whence it is evident the United States have nothing to fear.

These works, from their position and character, are intended to form a basis of future offensive operations against Canada, as will, I think, appear from the following extract from a late Report to Congress from the War Department:—

"The Northern frontier of the United States from Lake Superior o
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Passamaquoddy Bay is a distance of somewhat more than 2000 miles, all the way bounding on the British American Provinces.

"The vast importance of the frontier cannot fail to impress us with the necessity of being prepared, not only for defence along that line, but to act offensively with decisive effect, in the event of our being involved in a conflict with Great Britain.

"Whichever Power shall acquire the mastery of the lakes, will have the means of assailing the enemy.

"Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, the following works are enumerated, merely glancing at the advantages which are likely to result from their establishment, beginning at Lake Superior.

"1st. *Fort at Falls St. Mary.*—A fort here will control the communication between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, which it would do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of the line: in that event, almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, but at least cover our settlements on that part of the line.

"2nd. *Fort at Michillimackinac.*—A fort here, in conjunction with floating batteries, may be made to command the approach to Lake Michigan, thus protecting the entire circumference of the lake from attacks to which it is exposed, even from a small force, and securing to ourselves a safe channel of communication with the rich and productive States in the rear, whose shores it washes.

"3rd. *Fort at the foot of Lake Huron.*—A work here will control the outlet of Lake Huron, and interrupt the navigation between that and Lake Sinclair, and the River Détroit.

"In the event of war, Détroit would undoubtedly be a point of concentration of troops, not merely for the defence of that portion of the frontier, but for such offensive operations as might be deemed expedient in that quarter.

"This is one of the points from which the enemy might be assailed by minor expeditions, if he should relax in his measures of defence, in looking to his safety elsewhere.

"True policy would dictate that our chief efforts should be directed against the vital points of his possessions as low down the line as possible.

"4th. *Field Work and Barrack Establishment at Buffalo.*—It may become a point of concentration of troops, and is, in every view, entitled to much attention.

"An extensive barrack establishment, defended by a field-work, will be sufficient for all necessary objects.

"5th. *Fort Niagara.*—A fort at this position is important; it commands the entrance to Niagara River from Lake Ontario, and a work here will shut the enemy's vessels out of this harbour.

"6th. *Fort of Oswego.*—The growing importance of Oswego, the relation it bears to the great line of internal communication, call for works to protect its harbour, which would probably be made a subordinate dépôt in time of war.

"7th. *Fort at Sackett's Harbour.*—Sackett's Harbour, from its bold water and excellence as a harbour, would become a dépôt of great importance. It is one of the posts at which a concentration of troops may become expedient.

"The barrack establishment there is deemed sufficient; it remains to fortify the approach to the harbour."

These works, in conjunction with that proposed to close the outlet from Lake Champlain, will enable the United States to commence offensive operations against Canada with the greatest advantage.

Their troops can concentrate at the points of attack, and their dépôts will be in security, upon the verge of our frontier.

The third subject for inquiry proposed is:—

"Our means of repelling the enemy's attack."

And here I would first observe, that little analogy presents itself between the actual position of the United States and Canada, and that held by them in relation to each other's means during the last war. I shall therefore scarcely draw any inferences from the events of that period.

I possess, however, the advantage of being able to refer to a letter of

the Duke of Wellington, dated 1st of March, 1819; for the principles upon which the defence of Canada should be based; the letter is addressed to Earl Bathurst, then Colonial Secretary.

1. The Duke concurs in opinion, that Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston, are the points of the greatest importance in Canada, and that they should be fortified.

2. His Grace recommends that the works on the Richelieu River be strengthened, so as to prevent the enemy from getting the command of the navigation.

3. That an interior communication between Quebec and Lake Huron be shortened as much as possible.

4. That we collect our craft upon one of the lakes, so as to obtain a superiority upon one, as he considers it impracticable to acquire it upon all.

5. Estimating the probable amount of our regular force, of all arms in Canada, to be the same as at the commencement of the last war, viz. 13,000 men, he suggests that a field force of 10,000 men be divided into two corps, and the remaining 3000 be distributed in garrisons.

All of these to be supported by drafts from the militia.

6. He considers it undesirable to attempt any attack upon the United States from Canada.

The nearer we can make our measures approximate to those recommended by the Duke the better.

With respect to our present means of repelling attack, I must first observe that we have at present, in Canada, a regular force of all arms, of about 11,000 men, and about 2500 embodied militia; and it is thought practicable to augment the latter force by the incorporation of volunteers enlisted for a limited period, so as to raise our disposable force to 20,000 men; and that volunteer corps, for local defence, might be raised at Quebec, Montreal, Kingston, and Toronto.

The militia establishment of Canada requires revision. It is not now generally available for service throughout the province, although it is probable that a portion of it might be induced to follow the noble example set by the loyal militia of New Brunswick, 1200 of which, I understand, have been enrolled and trained, in readiness to move wherever their services might be required.

We should be careful not to let loose an unorganized mass, however well-disposed, as that would prove (as termed by the American Government) "a ruinous expedient," and the expense would be the least evil attending it.

A mass of this kind would be exposed to privations they are ill calculated to bear; the inhabitants would suffer, also, and be soon disgusted and impoverished, and ready to submit to any change promising quiet.

It might be deemed hazardous to place arms in the hands of the French Canadians, as a militia, for some time to come; but it may be practicable to raise small independent corps from this class, under officers possessing their confidence and that of the Government: corps of this description did good service during the last war, and the French Canadians possess some valuable military qualities.

Small corps of cavalry might be raised for general service within the province: those now existing are of a very useful description, and there is no country, however close and wooded, in which small bodies of cavalry are not of use.

It was with a view to call out gradually and effectually the strength of the population, and avoid the embarrassments attendant on a general forward movement, as well as to facilitate other arrangements, that I proposed dividing the Canadian territory and frontier into four districts, and to place each, so far as military measures are concerned, under a judicious officer, who, acting in concert with the civil authorities within the district, might carry into effect many of the arrangements made in Great Britain when invasion was expected, and are applicable to every country, such as the removal of cattle, destruction of bridges and communications, &c.

Having provided for the garrisons of the existing works, I would recommend the adoption of the Duke of Wellington's suggestions, and disposal of the field force in two corps.

But no dependence upon the decided superiority of our troops or arrange-

ments made for defence connected with them, should lead us to neglect the construction and completion of permanent works, calculated for the protection of the points of most importance to us.

Having well considered the works proposed in the annexed Report of the Commanding Royal Engineer, I submit them for favourable consideration.

I have no sort of objection to offer to the system of fortification proposed for Canada, by the Commission of 1825, and in its favour I am inclined to urge that it appears to me judiciously calculated to place this country in a state to resist at a future period the wonderfully increasing power of our restless and ambitious neighbours.

I can ascribe its not having been more extensively acted upon, solely to the cost of the works, arising partly from their position (1st. The Short Hills —2nd. The Mountain of Montreal) and magnitude.

The Report of the Commission appears to me founded on sound principles in every respect, and I deeply regret that circumstances may thwart the execution of its recommendations.

It is only under such apprehension that I recommend works of less expense, though, probably, less likely to meet, adequately, future contingencies.

And I should not do justice to the present Commanding Royal Engineer if I did not add my conviction that he fully concurs with me in opinion of the value of that Report, and regret that its recommendations have not been carried into effect.

The object of the works proposed in the annexed Reports are sufficiently detailed therein, and their positions marked on the district plans that accompany them, and I shall but have occasion, therefore, to remark (briefly only) upon them.

1. No doubt can exist as to the necessity of completing the fortress of Quebec.

2. With regard to those proposed for the defence of the Montreal frontier and district, I would observe, that the command of the Richelieu River, by the works at Sorel, St. John's, and Isle aux Noix, will enable us to defend not only that immediate tract of country, but that which is in front of Quebec, especially if the passage of the troops can be secured across the St. Lawrence at all times.

Upon Kingston, and the works proposed, I need not offer any further remarks, its importance being properly estimated.

3. Upon the works proposed for the Niagara district, I wish to observe, that in my opinion some substitute must be provided for the fortress recommended for the Short Hills by the Commission, if that be deemed too expensive.

In this case, I would suggest a further investigation of the Niagara Peninsula, with the view of providing some other mode of permanent defence nearer to the Welland Canal, (perhaps near Port Robinson,) to defend that work, and the western flank of the Peninsula, and give time for the arrival of troops to occupy the favourable ground in the rear.

Burlington Heights and Bay, and the town of Hamilton, should be secured—they are of importance to the supply of our troops, and to their safe concentration on the line of communication between Bransford and Burlington Heights.

4. With respect to the Western district, I would remark principally upon the works proposed at Windsor and Port Sarnia; as the objects of all the other works are sufficiently obvious.

It has been shown, in this memorandum, that the American Government propose building two forts on the Detroit frontier, to command the passage between Lakes Huron and Erie; one at the "foot of Lake Huron," opposite to Port Sarnia, the other near the city of Detroit.

It has been ascertained that a work at Windsor would counteract this measure, or at least neutralize it, which Amherstburg will not.

Windsor is the only healthy situation on this frontier, a consideration of great importance; it will also command the city of Detroit and fort, being on the commanding bank.

A work near Port Sarnia will command or neutralize the passage of the Sinclair River.

If by the establishment of these two works we can reduce the naval superiority of the United States on Lake Erie, we shall contribute to the safety of the Niagara peninsula; and if, in addition, we obtain, through the effect of these works, an influence and control over the "rich and productive states in rear of Lake Michigan," whose produce passes chiefly through this channel, the expense attending their construction may not be considered too great for these advantages; but I recommend these works conditionally only, upon this being clearly proved.

Until the most important of the proposed fortifications be completed, the defence of Canada must chiefly rest upon the efficiency of our military and naval force (and their zealous co-operation), the amount of which must be regulated by the deficiency of other protection.

At the present moment our frontier is uncovered, except at Quebec, Fort Henry, at Kingston, and the Isle aux Noix.

There are, however, several smaller posts of defence, for a few hours only, against an organized force, such as Mississauga and Fort Wellington, &c.; these are calculated only to resist desultory attacks from rebels and their supporters.

After providing for the necessary garrisons, I would propose dividing the field force into two corps, placing the right of one at London, and its left at Toronto; the right of the other at Kingston, and its left at Montreal, with an advance occupying its immediate frontier, and a small reserve and good dépôt at Bytown.

It will always be necessary to retain a force at Montreal itself, and we should, consequently, be obliged to regulate the amount of that station in advance, by what we may be obliged to withdraw from thence for concentration higher up.

In this position of the two corps, we must await the movements of the enemy.

It has been observed that the three assailable points are Montreal, Niagara, and Détroit; and the last of these may be considered of least importance with relation to the conquest of Canada.

The two lines of operations against the other two points are; 1st, by the "avenue" of Lake Champlain against Montreal; 2nd, by the posts on Lake Erie and Buffalo against Niagara.

Our line of communication and defence will be from Quebec by the St. Lawrence to Montreal, thence by the Ottawa River and Rideau Canal to Kingston, and by the Lake, or the road by the Lake side, to Toronto, and thence by the Lake to Burlington Bay, or by land to Hamilton, and thence by Brantford to London.

It is very desirable that the canal across the Isthmus be completed and connected with the Trent navigation, and the land communication between London and Kingston be improved.

Hamilton will become a place of dépôt, and Burlington Heights and Bay should be secured; and it is recommended that a work of consequence and armed with heavy guns be placed in rear of, but not distant from, the Welland Canal, to protect the western side of the Niagara peninsula.

It will be recollected that the United States propose to strengthen their harbours and posts on Ontario; namely, Sackett's Harbour, Oswego, and Niagara, at the head of the Lake; and it is understood that they intend to form a ship canal between that Lake and Lake Erie, when there will be a severe contest for Ontario, upon the possession of which so much depends.

In conclusion, I beg to repeat that if Canada have not the protection of the works recommended by the Commission of 1825, or others of less magnitude and cost, as submitted in the annexed reports of the Commanding Engineer, its security must depend upon the number and efficiency of the force in the field.

This is so obvious that I would not hazard the indiscretion of stating it at all, still less repeating it, were it not to support the opinion I ventured to express in my memorandum of March last, upon the immediate frontier of Montreal, that nothing but their expense could have caused the construction of those works to have been deferred. They are certainly better adapted to resist, at a future period, the increasing power of the United States, than those proposed upon a reduced scale, recommended by myself; but without

works of one kind or the other, the Canadas cannot be considered safe. Well disciplined troops may defend a land frontier against a very superior number of troops of inferior quality, when the communications are sufficiently good to admit of concentration with celerity and accuracy of time; but the Canadian frontier resembles a maritime frontier, and our communications cannot be depended upon.

The proposed works would be bulwarks, behind which our small but superior force might move and act with promptitude and full energy.

This frontier resembles at present a long weak line of battle, liable to be pierced or turned, and overwhelmed at points decisive of the struggle.

The works proposed by the United States are evidently calculated to form a basis of offensive operations. What have they to apprehend from us on this frontier?

If permanent works on this border were proscribed on either side by treaty, or regulated as to number and quality, like the vessels of war on the lakes, the advantage would be wholly on their side; defensive works are absolutely necessary for the weaker party against such disparity of force.

I have scarcely mentioned the important subject of interior communications, or the positions, (according to the ordinary acceptance of the term,) because the former are changing every year, in an improving country, and positions vary with them. Neither have I adverted to the assistance to be derived from the Indians. It is a description of assistance that, from all I have heard of it, ought not, if possible, to be employed; but I understand that the Indian will not be quiet in war, and we may be obliged to submit to this necessity.

(Signed) R. D. JACKSON.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield to Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Jackson.

Sir,

*Commander Royal Engineer Office, Head Quarters,
Montreal, November 14, 1840.*

IN obedience to your Excellency's commands as communicated in your minute of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to submit a rough general estimate for the fortifications in Canada, as a sort of guide for the Secretary of State, made out as your Excellency recommended in reference to the proposed military districts, the outlines of which, agreeably with your desire, have been prepared.

2. With respect to the Quebec and Montreal districts, I have no observations to offer, beyond what I have submitted in Appendices 3 and 4, and upon the general insufficiency of barrack accommodation for the present force in Canada, a remark which applies to the four districts; if the present strength is continued in the Canadas, a considerable expense must be incurred in permanent or temporary expedients, to preserve the health and discipline of the troops.

3. I have not provided in my abstract for No. 3 district, any sum for Penetanguishene; the estimate would be nearly 60,000*l.* for permanent defences; a smaller sum might suffice for Goderich. In No. 4 district, I have endeavoured to meet your Excellency's views for the command of the passage between Lakes Huron and Erie. I have made inquiries as to a site for a barrack station in the vicinity of Chatham, and am assured that Chatham itself, from being more cleared of wood and bush, is less unhealthy than any site in its immediate neighbourhood.

4. I need not observe to your Excellency, that to prepare detailed projects, with the necessary plans, sections, and estimates, would be a labour of many months; that the summer is the only season in which sections can be taken, or accurate information of the country obtained, and that the present strength of my department is insufficient for such a duty; I trust, however, that the information which I have now the honour to submit, will be found sufficient "as a

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
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REFERENCES.
Western District.

Amherstburg (Old Fort) 150 Men. Prop^d Fortness.
Beaumont (Blackhouses) proposed Tower.
Sandwich (Barracks) 200 Men.
Windsor (Barracks) 100 Men. (Prop^d Work of Defence.)
Sarnia. Prop^d Tower and Battery.
Mouth of the River Thames do.
Chatham (Barracks) 100 Men. Prop^d Work of Defence.
London (Barracks) 1000 Inf^y by 1000 1/2 Horses
Proposed Work of Defence

Toronto.
Penetang
St. Catharines
Niagara
Queenston
Whippoorwill
Short Hills
Hamilton

No. The Temporary posts &c. are not included.
Proposed posts are tinted "Green". Existing "Red".



Niagara District.

Fortress.
ver.
k of Defence.)
ork of Defence.
45 Horses
t included.
existing, "Red."

Toronto. 500 Infy 100. Art. Prop^d Tower & Battery.
Penetanguishene Barracks 150 Infy.
St. Missisquoi 170 Infy.
Niagara. 80 Men. 170 Horses.
Queenston. 60 Men.
Chippawa. 80 Men.
Short Hills prop^d Fortress
Hamilton or Burlington. 710 Prop^d 1st^h Barracks
for 700 Men and Depot.


Montreal District.

Fort. 100 Men prop^d Tower, Battery & Off^s Barracks.
Fort de L'Isle Prop^d Tower & Battery.
Montreal. 150 Cavalry. 100 Infy. 150 Art. 250 Horses.
prop^d Citadel or 1st^h Barracks for 700 Men
and a chain of posts.
St. Helens 100 Men. 10 Horses. Magazine & Stores.
Bouquet prop^d Tête de Pont.
Chumby. 300 Cavalry. 400 Infy. 500 Horses.
prop^d Depot Work.
St. John. 500 Men (old French Work) prop^d Fortress.
St. Henri. prop^d Tête de Pont.
Philippsburg Blockhouse.

Sherrbrooke. prop^d Fort & T^h
St. Louis. 100 Cavalry & 100
Chatham. 100 Cavalry & 100
Concordia. prop^d Tower & Barracks.
Coburn the Sec. Fort. 150 Art.
Mowat. 100 Cavalry & 100 Horses.
Garnet. 100 Cavalry & 100 Horses.
Kingston (Fort Henry). 500 Cavalry.
prop^d Tower & Barracks.
Franklin Island. Fort.

Military Works on the Hudson Canal

By Town. 100 Men prop^d Fortress & Depot.
Barracks Hills. Blockhouse.
"Harris" " do
"Warrens" " do
"Johnson" " do
Jones' Falls. Guard House.
Whitefish Dam do
Kingston. Hills. Blockhouse.




100 90 80 70 60 50

SKETCH OF THE CANADA

MILITARY POSTS

To accompany Report by Lieut. Vildesius
Comm^d Royal Engin^s the Cann^y





Lith^d at the W^l Engⁿ Press.
Montreal 26th Nov^r 1840.

MILITARY POSTS.

[illegible]

dated.
18th Nov 1840





guide for the Secretary of State as to the probable sum that may be required for fortifications in Canada," and that I have had the good fortune to accomplish the object of your Excellency's wishes.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

Rough General Estimate of the probable Expense of Fortifications for Canada, prepared in obedience to the minute of his Excellency the Commander of the Forces, dated 31st October, 1840.

District.	Estimate as per Appendix No. 1.	Estimate as per Appendix No. 2.	Remarks.
	£	£	
Quebec - -	199,679	109,937	These amounts are principally taken from actual estimates in the Engineer office.
Montreal - -	1,330,000	477,000	
Niagara - -	502,000	51,000	
Westen - -	275,000	156,000	
	2,306,679	793,937	

14th Nov., 1840.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

APPENDIX No. 1.

Abstract of rough Estimate of the probable Expense of Fortifications in Canada, in reference to orders of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, or based upon the Report of the Committee of 1825, and the projects prepared in reference thereto.

Quebec, or No. 1 District.

(For Report, see Appendix No. 3.)

Completing the defences of the Citadel.

Rendering bomb proof existing store-houses - - - - -	£4,500	
Additional store-room - - - - -	5,000	
Traverses - - - - -	2,000	
Scarping and removing rock to prevent escalade - - - - -	3,000	
Two tanks - - - - -	1,500	
Hospital, bomb proof - - - - -	8,683	
Prison do. - - - - -	3,196	
Guard-houses and expense, magazines for ravelins, and counter-guards - - - - -	2,000	
Advanced guard-room - - - - -	600	
Deepening ditch of king's bastion - - - - -	800	
Forming glacis in front of Dalhousie counter-guard - - - - -	800	
Forming glacis towards the town to isolate the citadel - - - - -	1,200	
Ditch in front of loopholed scarp - - - - -	900	
Levelling, or partial reform of the old French works, to be considered and detailed in project now preparing - - - - -	8,000	£42,179
To retrench barrack bastion - - - - -		7,500
	Carried forward	£49,679

	Brought forward.	£49,679
Levelling town works between barrack bastion and citadel		28,000
Occupying advanced line by casemated redoubts as proposed by the Inspector-General of Fortifications, say	£90,000	
Purchase of lands for ditto	7,000	97,000
Tower on left bank of the St. Charles, including purchase of land		5,000
Occupation of the Point Levy side of the St. Lawrence, say		20,000
Total Quebec or No. 1 District		199,679

2
Montreal, or No. 2 District.
 (For Report, see Appendix No. 4.)

Sorel tower and batteries	9,000
Montreal fortress	485,000
St. Helen's Island, permanent defences	42,000
Chambly fortress	198,000
St. John's ditto	80,000
Isle aux Noix } Repairing Fort Lennox, and providing additional burnt proof cover for officers and sick	16,000
Chateaugay, mouth of River Fort	43,000
Cascades, tower and battery	5,000
	878,000

To complete Fort Henry, including Commissariat stores in advanced battery	12,000
No. 1 Redoubt	25,000
No. 2 ditto	35,000
A, Tower	10,000
B, ditto	8,000
C, ditto	5,000
No. 3, Redoubt	25,000
No. 4, ditto	45,000
No. 5, ditto	25,000
Tower and battery at Murney's Point	8,000
Tower on Cedar Island	5,000
Battery, Point Frederick	3,000
Tower on Snake Island	6,000
Purchase of land	100,000
By Town Fortress	312,000
	140,000
Total Montreal or 2nd District	1,330,000

Niagara, or No. 3 District.
 (For Report, see Appendix No. 5.)

Toronto Fortress	152,000
Short Hills ditto	350,000
Total Niagara or No. 3 District	502,000

Western, or No. 4 District.
 (For Report, see Appendix No. 6.)

Sarnia Tower and Battery	8,000
Amherstburg Fortress	105,000
Bois Blanc Island, 2 towers	6,000
Carried forward	£119,000

	Brought forward	£119,000
Chatham Fortress	-	115,000
River Thames, mouth of, Tower and Battery	-	8,000
London defensible Barrack	-	33,000
Total Western or No. 4 District	-	275,000

N.B. This Appendix does not include provision for the usual wear and tear and repair to defences, brought forward in the annual Estimates for field-works, or the occupation of public buildings; and which, as contingent on circumstances, must be considered of a temporary nature, or for Barrack accommodation, not immediately connected with the fortifications.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

14th November, 1840.

APPENDIX No. 2.

Abstract of rough Estimates of the probable Expense of Fortifications in Canada, according to projects submitted by the Commander Royal Engineers in Canada.

Quebec, or No. 1 District.

(For Report, see Appendix No. 3.)

Completing the defences of the citadel as Appendix No. 1.		£42,179
Placing the town works in a good and efficient state :—		
Scarping rock to prevent escalade	£7,000	
To remove casemate, and make loopholed wall in left flank St. Lewis Bastion	976	
Repairs of escarp, counterscarp, and partial restoration of covertway, and expense of magazines	7,622	
Revetment of parapet of covertway	3,600	
Two Tenailles to cover the escarp of the curtains St. John's and Barrack, which are exposed very low down	4,600	
Deepening ditches to give a respectable escarp	3,200	
54 Traverses, viz., 27 for rampart, and 27 for covertway, at £40	2,260	29,258
Occupying the advanced line of towers :—		
2 Redoubts round towers, Nos. 2 and 3, with respectable profile, bomb-proof, barracks, reverse fires, at £6,000	12,000	
Scarping away, and levelling round towers, No. 1 and 4, round which the ground does not admit of forming redoubts	1,500	13,500
Tower on left bank of the St. Charles river, as Appendix No. 1		5,000
Occupying Point Levi side of the St. Lawrence, as Appendix No. 1		20,000
Total Quebec or No. 1 District		109,937

Montreal, or No. 2 District.

(For Report, see Appendix No. 4.)

Sorel tower and batteries, as Appendix No. 1	9,000
Montreal defensible barrack	40,000
St. John's fortress, as Appendix No. 1	80,000
Isle aux Noix, as Appendix No. 1	16,000
Carried forward	£145,000

	Brought forward	£145,000
Chain of posts round Montreal city, with posts at St. Helen's, Longeuil, Laprairie, Chateaugay, Cascades, Isle Penault, St. Anne's, Bout de l'Isle, &c.		20,000
Kingston, as Appendix No. 1		312,000
Total, Montreal or No. 2 District		477,000

Niagara, or No. 3 District.

(For Report, see Appendix No. 5.)

Toronto Lake, battery, and tower	6,000
Burlington Heights, defensible barrack, store houses, &c.	45,000
Total, Niagara or No. 3 District	51,000

Western, or No. 4 District.

(For Report, see Appendix No. 6.)

Sarnia, as Appendix No. 1.	8,000
Windsor, Wellington tower for 200 men	50,000
Amherstburg { Completion of present work	2,000
{ Redit in side ditto	45,000
Bois Blanc Island, as Appendix No. 1.	6,000
Chatham, redoubt with splinter-proof cover for troops and stores	4,000
River Thames, entrance of, as Appendix No. 1.	8,000
London defensible barrack, as Appendix No. 1.	33,000
Total, Western or No. 4 District	156,000

N.B. This Appendix does not include provision for the usual wear and tear and repair to defences, brought forward in the ordinary annual Estimates, for minor field-works, or occupation of public buildings; and which, as contingent on circumstances, must be considered of a temporary nature, or for barrack accommodation, not immediately connected with the fortifications.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
14th Nov., 1840. *Royal Engineers, Canadas.*

APPENDIX No. 3.

The first, or Quebec District, extends from Rivière du Loup en bas to the Yamaska; the principal military feature in this district is the fortress of Quebec; by a minute of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, dated 2nd June, 1840, No. 1632, in consequence of the great expense of repairing the present town works, it is proposed, "not to attempt to repair the old line on its present construction, that the citadel should be completed, and a position taken up across the heights of Abraham, on the line of the present towers, by casemated redoubts, and the barrack bastion of the present town works inclosed. A work should also be constructed on the Point Levi side of the St. Lawrence."

2. In Appendix No. 1, provision is made for the defences of Quebec in reference to this minute of the Inspector-General of Fortifications: in Appendix No. 2, a project is, with every deference, submitted by the Commanders Royal Engineers in the Canadas. Detailed plans, estimates, and reports, upon these two projects are in preparation; in many points they are essentially the same; the first project contemplates the neglect or removal of the town works, by which it is humbly conceived a bad moral effect would be produced, the strength of the place and its security as a military dépôt diminished, without any adequate

saving of expense; indeed it appears from the estimate of the district Engineer, the probable expense of levelling the town works, between the citadel and barrack bastion, would nearly equal that of their repair.

3. The inclosing barrack bastion, including the necessary purchase of land and buildings, would cause an expense of about £7500; the altered circumstances of Quebec, since the last survey of the town was sent to the Inspector General's office, has, I apprehend, caused advantages to be contemplated in the occupation of the barrack bastion, which, unfortunately, now cannot be accomplished; as it is seen into by churches and several substantial stone buildings in the neighbourhood, and also excludes the Artillery park magazine, &c., in the St. John's bastion, with a portion of the ordnance stores.

4. In Appendix No. I. provision is made for casemated redoubts in the line of the present towers; those now proposed are on the plan of those approved by the Engineer Committee for Kingston in 1829.

I had contemplated the maintaining the existing towers in perfect order, and covering them by redoubts, to be thrown up when required, or scarping the rock round those where the ground would not admit of a redoubt; levelling or partially restoring the old French works in front of the citadel; holding and strengthening the Marine and general Hospitals, as points d'appui on my advanced line, to which field-works might be added if necessary.

5. From the left bank of the St. Charles, the right of the Quebec works can be seen into at a distance of 650 yards; I have in both projects provided for a tower to occupy this site, and strengthen our advanced line. I have also included works for the Point Levi side of the harbour, in reference to the minute of the Inspector-General of Fortifications before quoted.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut. Colonel,*
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

14th Nov. 1840.

APPENDIX No. 4.

The Second, or Montreal District, extends from the Yamaska to the River Trent. The principal military points to be considered are the covering of the Montreal Frontier, the protection of Kingston, and of our communications by the River St. Lawrence, and by the Rideau and Ottawa Canals.

2. The Engineer Committee of 1825 have reported most fully and ably on the Montreal Frontier. The services enumerated in Appendix No. I. are based upon this report, and upon subsequent estimates and reports in reference thereto.

3. To fortify the Montreal or No. 2 District, upon this principle, would incur an expense of at least one million. Upon the expediency of incurring such an expenditure it is not my province to observe.

4. In Appendix No. 2 I have for the Montreal Frontier included such services as are more immediately necessary, and which are in general accordance with the views of the Committee.

5. Montreal, a large, straggling town, about four miles in circuit, is difficult of defence: it can best be accomplished by a chain of posts, and then perhaps but imperfectly. A defensible barrack is, under any circumstances, necessary, as a rallying point, and a place of security for the Government and official archives, in case of tumult or popular commotions, and also for barrack accommodation. Buildings for the accommodation of troops and stores will from time to time be required at St. Helen's: they should be constructed with reference to the defence of the island.

6. It is only at Montreal, St. John's, and Isle aux Noix, that I have in this part of the district provided for any considerable expenditure. To cover the frontier, however, it would be necessary to establish posts at the mouth of the Chateaugay River, at Chambly, and other points laid down upon the sketch of the Montreal District.

7. Sorel, at the confluence of the Richelieu and the St. Lawrence, although not included in the posts enumerated by the Committee, I, with great deference, consider a most important one.

8. In the eastern townships, also, I consider a post should be established at Sherbrooke as a dépôt and rallying point for the militia and inhabitants of that

populous and wealthy section of the district. All these points may be subsequently taken up; but even if permanent works are not constructed, it will be essentially necessary that an efficient engineer establishment of officers and sappers should be maintained. A pontoon train, to secure our communication across the Richelieu, is indispensable. A trestle bridge, or some other expedient, would be also required between St. Helen's and the opposite bank of the St. Lawrence, at all times when the navigation was open to secure our communication.

9. To secure the navigation of the St. Lawrence, we should require a post on the small island at the Cascades. We have posts at Coteau du Lac, Prescott, and Gannanoque, and occupy Kingston.

10. For the protection of the Rideau and Ottawa Canals, we should strengthen our posts at Carillon, Kingston Mills, and at the White-fish Dam. Whatever might be required at Bytown for the accommodation of troops or stores should be in reference to the defence of that important post, the site of which is so admirably calculated for a fortress or a depôt, and which must, at some period perhaps not very remote, become a place of the first consequence in Canada.

11. Appendix No. 1 includes the several services required for Kingston to carry out the project of defence approved by the Engineer Committee of 1829; a project, I humbly conceive, well calculated to accomplish the defence of the town, harbour, dockyard, and arsenal. It is only to be regretted that, the system of defence decided upon, the necessary sites were not immediately purchased; if from the impracticability of obtaining land, except at a great pecuniary sacrifice, or from contemplated political changes, it should be considered expedient to deviate from the Committee's project, the redoubts Nos. 3, 4, and 5, must be given up, and field-defences, contingent upon circumstances, be substituted for them. The works proposed for Cedar Island, and the defence of the harbour, should, under any circumstances, be constructed forthwith.

If a field-battery is retained at Kingston, they must have barracks; a hospital is also required for infantry and artillery: the contemplated removal of the arsenal to the vicinity of the dockyard is not provided for.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut. Colonel,*
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

14th Nov. 1840,

APPENDIX No. 5.

The Third, or Niagara District.

THE military points to be considered in this district, which extends from the embouchure of the Trent river in the Bay of Quinte, to the entrance of the Ouse or Grand River on Lake Erie, including the peninsula of Niagara; are Toronto, Penetanguishene, Niagara, Queenston, the Short Hills, Burlington Heights, the Ouse or Grand River, and the protection of the Welland Canal.

2. The defence of this district, in common with the Canadas in general, has been so ably reported upon by the commission in 1825, that it is unnecessary for me to do more than offer a few observations, arising from a change in the circumstances of the country.

3. At Toronto, the barrack establishment now constructing for 300 infantry, with the Bathurst-street barrack for 100 artillery or infantry, may possibly afford sufficient barrack accommodation; at the last a trifling acquisition of land will be necessary, with stabling, gunsheds, &c.

In the way of defence, a battery with a defensible guard-room, or a tower on the principle of a Napoleon tower of the second class on the lake shore, near the old barracks, is all I would submit.

4. At this port are portions of a considerable naval and military establishment, but as the commander of the forces is of opinion that the consideration of this station may be deferred, I have not at present gone into it.

5. Of the five forts constructed for the defence of this frontier, one only that of Mississauga now exists, it was restored during the insurrection, and may be permitted to remain in its present state; no outlay for its reform is recommended.

6. There are barrack stations at Niagara, Queenston, and Chippawa, which if retained must be kept in order and accommodation provided for officers.

7. The Short Hills, about fifteen miles west of Niagara, is the site selected by the committee of 1825, for the stronghold of the district; detailed plans and estimates for a fortress on the scale recommended by the committee are in preparation; on a rough estimate, the expense of this work may be calculated at not less than 350,000*l.*; should this sum be considered too large for the object to be obtained, we must look to the temporary occupation, in times of danger, of the principal points on the Welland Canal, by troops from the existing posts in its vicinity, and construct at Hamilton, or rather on Burlington Heights, a defensible barrack and dépôt for the district, which would have the advantage of water communication, or good winter roads with Kingston, and thus maintain the communication of the Western with the Montreal and Quebec districts; a dépôt and rallying point for the militia and loyal inhabitants in the Niagara district is indispensable, and for this purpose Burlington Heights seem to be well calculated.

8. Any port on the Ouse or Grand River would be contingent on naval operations; a force retiring upon Burlington Heights would throw up such defences on the banks of the river, as circumstances might require; consequently no provision has been made for a permanent work; moreover, the sites at the embouchure are reported to be too unhealthy for permanent occupation.

(Signed)

J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*

Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

14th Nov., 1840.

APPENDIX No. 6.

The fourth or Western District extends from the Ouse or Grand River, to the line of the Détroit and St. Clair Rivers, having its head quarters in London; new communications are opening, and the circumstances of this district are rapidly changing; the present points for consideration are, the command of the communication from Lake Huron and the upper lakes, and with Lake Erie, the roadstead between Amherstburg and Bois Blanc Island, and the line of the Thames.

2. The provision for services in this district, in Appendix No. 1, is based upon the report of the committee of 1825, and subsequent reports and estimates in reference thereto, and in Appendix No. 2 for services, which with every deference are submitted, in reference to existing circumstances.

3. To command the channels of communication between Lakes Huron and Erie is of primary importance to secure this object; a post near Sarnia at the head of the St. Clair River is indispensable; without this precaution the Americans might pass between Grosse Isle and their own shore, out of fire from Amherstburg, or Bois Blanc Island; as this channel appears to have been unknown to the committee of 1825, I annex a chart of the channel made by Captain Owars, R.N., which almost entirely coincides with a recent report from Captain Biscoe, R.E. I am also disposed to submit the occupation of Windsor by a tower and battery; the site is reported healthy, a great desideratum on this frontier; it would, moreover, command the American town of Détroit, the width of the river here being only 900 yards.

On the map, Fighting Island appears to be a most eligible site for disputing the passage of the Détroit; but it is represented to be very unhealthy, and that difficulties would exist in obtaining a foundation for any work of masonry, the whole island being a swamp with the exception of a small spot ineligible as the site for a post.

Occupying Sarnia and Windsor for the command of the communications, I would protect my roadstead between Amherstburg and Bois Blanc Island, by completing the enceinte of the present work at Amherstburg, removing all the wooden buildings from its interior, and building within it a réduit in masonry. On Bois Blanc Island I would replace the two block-houses at the extremities of the island by towers. A detailed project for Amherstburg is in preparation, by order of the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

4. The Thames is navigable for steamboats as far as Chatham, and from

thence to London by bateaux. Chatham is well calculated for a dépôt and port of defence, were it not unfortunately an unhealthy site; it is a point, however, which must not be neglected. Had it been occupied in 1813 the disastrous consequences of that campaign would not have occurred. Should it not at present be considered expedient to carry out the project of the committee of 1825, in the event of hostilities, a respectable field-work, with splinter-proof cover, must be constructed; the drainage and improvement of the country may, in the mean time, render it more healthy; and in conjunction with the works at Chatham, I would recommend a post near the light-house at the entrance of the Thames.

5. At London, barracks for a battalion of infantry and a half battery of artillery, formed of wood, were built by order of Lord Seaton; some log-huts were subsequently added, and the head quarters and four companies of a second battalion sent to the post; the barracks are in consequence over crowded, and the troops in want of many of the conveniences usually afforded. The cantonment unfortunately is not compact or susceptible of defence. As London is to be the head quarters of the Western District, and must always be an important military post, its consequence increasing with the rapid improvement of the country, it is proposed to replace the log-huts by a defensible barrack, which will serve as a dépôt at all times; a place of defence in time of insurrection, to be strengthened by field-works in case of invasion. If the present force is retained at London, a considerable expense must be incurred to cover the troops; the expenditure of a large sum on temporary expedients would be almost a waste of public money.

I am consequently disposed to recommend that a permanent barrack should be forthwith commenced, and the artillery barracks made complete for a battery.

6. Goderich is a point subsequently to be considered, but it must be so in reference to local improvements, the plans for which are not yet matured.

(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Commander Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Jackson to Lord Sydenham.

My Lord,

Montreal, December 21, 1840.

SINCE I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the memorandum upon the defence of Canada, called for by Lord John Russell, I have been put in possession of a copy of the Duke of Wellington's letter to Earl Bathurst, dated the 6th of December, 1825, that accompanied the Report of the Commission of Engineers, to which such frequent reference is made in the above memorandum.

It appears to me desirable that a copy (herewith inclosed) of his Grace's letter should be communicated to Her Majesty's Secretary of State on the present occasion.

His Grace attaches much importance to our retention of the communication hitherto enjoyed by us between Canada and New Brunswick.

But this is a subject requiring further investigation than it has yet received; for, even if it be secured to us by treaty, it will be necessary to place posts of communication upon the road adopted, in order to make it available for the passage of troops; and these posts should be rendered defensible, at least against marauders, in proportion to their exposure.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. D. JACKSON,
Commander of the Forces.

Inclosure 5 in No. 11.

The Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst.

My Lord,

London, December 6, 1825.

I SEND herewith the Report of the Committee of Engineers appointed in the month of April last to proceed to His Majesty's dominions in North America, under instructions of which a copy was forwarded to your Lordship, on the 25th of that month.

In considering this subject, I entreat your Lordship to observe, that it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw from these dominions. Whether valuable or otherwise, which can scarcely be a question, the honour of the country would require that they should be defended in war, and an attentive perusal of this Report will show what it is necessary should be done beforehand in time of peace, to enable His Majesty to defend these dominions at the least possible burden to the military resources of this empire in time of war.

The first object for the observation of your Lordship is the communication with Upper Canada.

Your Lordship will see, in the Report, what progress has been made in the completion of the system suggested to your Lordship, in my letter of the 1st of March, 1819, and how far the detailed plan therein suggested has been found upon examination to be practicable.

It is quite clear that, unless some system of communicating with Upper Canada, besides the use of the River St. Lawrence, should be carried into execution, such communication will be impracticable beyond Montreal in time of war.

Indeed, if His Majesty should ratify the arrangement made by His Commissioner under the Article of the Treaty of the United States, and the Island of Burnhart should pass to the United States, (see page 34 of the Report,) the communication with Upper Canada by the River St. Lawrence will be impracticable, even in time of peace, excepting by the permission of the Government of the United States.

The next object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention in the Report of the Committee is the communications between Lower Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.

The establishment of these communications is but a little less important in a civil and commercial, than in a military point of view. But it is in the last, principally, that it is my duty to urge the importance of these communications upon the attention of His Majesty's Government. There can be no doubt that these communications are necessary, in any view that may be taken of the defence of these provinces, and that by facilitating the concentration of all the military means of His Majesty's Government upon any point that may be threatened or attacked, they will tend to the general security of all His Majesty's dominions in that part of the world.

The third object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention is the importance attached by the Committee to the possession of Rouse's Point, on the River Richelieu, and to the fixation of the frontier of New Brunswick on the line in which it has hitherto been considered to have been originally fixed.

The fourth object to which I would wish to draw your Lordship's attention is the military works proposed by the Committee to be executed in His Majesty's dominions in North America.

Your Lordship will observe that the system of defence of these dominions is founded principally on the means of communication to be established, to which I have already adverted.

There are besides some capital points on which it is necessary to complete or to establish works, such as Quebec, Halifax, Montreal, Kingston on Lake Ontario, and a work on the Niagara Frontier, and others, to render still more difficult the approach to those above mentioned, such as the works proposed on the River Richelieu or Chambly, to protract an enemy's advance upon Quebec; and as the works upon the island at the mouth of the River Chateaugay, with

the same view in relation to Montreal, and others, for the protection of naval stations, such as those at Penetanguichine, Amherstburg, and a work on the Ouse, and one at Chatham.

As, on the one hand, I do not entertain the smallest doubt that if the communications and works proposed by the Committee are carried into execution, His Majesty's dominions in North America ought to be, and would be, effectually defended and secured against any attempt to be made upon them hereafter by the United States, however formidable their power, and this without any material demand upon the military resources of the country; so on the other, I am convinced that if these, or some measures of this description, are not adopted, and if measures are not taken at an early period, to manifest the determination of the King's Government to hold this dominion at all events, we cannot expect the inhabitants, upon whose loyal and gallant exertions we must in the end depend for their defence, will do otherwise than look for the security of their lives and properties to a seasonable submission to the United States.

Even by the greatest exertion of the military resources of His Majesty's Government in time of war, these dominions could not be successfully and effectually defended, without the adoption of the greatest part of the measures proposed; but if they are all adopted, and attention is paid to the militia laws in these countries, and care taken to keep alive a military spirit among the population, the defence of these dominions ought not to be a more severe burden upon the military resources of the empire in war, than such defence as was made proved to be during the late war.

I earnestly entreat, then, your Lordship's attention, and that of His Majesty's Government, to the inclosed document, and that I may be authorized to have the measures proposed to Parliament in the next session.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) WELLINGTON.

No. 12.

R. Byham, Esq., to J. Stephen, Esq.

Sir,

Office of Ordnance, January 19, 1841.

I HAVE the honour, by command of the Master-General and Board of Ordnance, to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that they have received sundry representations from the Commanding Royal Engineer in Canada of the necessity of acquiring possession of certain portions of ground on the western side of Kingston considered requisite for the efficiency of the defences; but the sum required for the purchase of this land is so considerable, and the subject is of so much importance, that the Master-General and Board think it desirable that the whole case should be laid before Lord John Russell for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, before any further steps are taken.

It appears that the Commanding Engineer estimates the value of the several lots of land required at about 97,848*l.* sterling, including the property of the Reverend W. Herchmer, which has formed the subject of special correspondence. This property is, however, here valued at 10,000*l.*, whilst that gentleman, according to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, dated the 9th instant (a copy of which is inclosed), demands for it the sum of 25,000*l.*, thus increasing the estimate to 112,848*l.* (exclusive of about 4000*l.* for the eastern side of the harbour, on which an application has already been made to the Treasury); and it is apprehended that it cannot be stated with any degree of certainty that the demands of other proprietors may not in like manner be in excess of the estimate, although the Officers of Engineers on the spot express a confident opinion that the total sum estimated will not be exceeded.

The Master-General and Board request you will submit to Lord John Russell the inclosed copies of letters from the Inspector-General of Fortifications, dated 16th ultimo, and their inclosures, and request his Lordship's

attention to the strong opinion expressed by the Inspector-General as to the absolute necessity with a view to the efficiency of the defences of the greater part of the land in question being in possession of this department, as well as to the rapidly-increasing value of land in the vicinity.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) R. BYHAM.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Wright to the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

*Royal Engineers' Office, Chatham,
January 9, 1841.*

Sir,

IN obedience to the directions of the Master-General and Board, in Mr. Byham's letter of the 30th ultimo, forwarded to me for my guidance, and to your instructions of the 1st and 5th instant, I have the honour to report, that I proceeded to Shipton on Cherwell, when I had an interview with the Rev. Mr. Herchmer, and endeavoured to ascertain from him the amount he would be willing to accept for the lot of land he owns in front of the redoubts Nos. 4 and 5, proposed to be erected in advance of Kingston.

I represented to him that his ground was not required for the sites of the works; but, being immediately adjoining them in front, it was desirable that the Ordnance should have it entirely under their control, to prevent the erection of buildings that might be an obstruction to the defences; that, although the whole of his lot might not be absolutely necessary for this purpose, it was considered that it would most probably be more desirable to him to part with the whole than to retain any small portions of it that might not be absolutely essential to the Ordnance; and that I was, therefore, instructed to ascertain for what sum he would be willing to dispose of the whole of the lot of 200 acres.

I urged upon him that the prosecution of the works would most probably depend upon the Ordnance being able to obtain the ground required for them at a fair and reasonable rate; and, should the expense of the ground be found to be immoderate, it was to be apprehended that Government might determine to abandon them altogether.

Mr. Herchmer did not evince any desire for the immediate disposal of his land, and seemed to be fully impressed with the opinion that it would eventually be much more to his advantage not to part with it at present.

He has been in England since the autumn of 1839; and, as he intends returning to Kingston in April, he was very reluctant to name any price for it until he could ascertain on the spot the present prospects of the place and the rise of property since he left it, which, from the accounts he had received, he understood to be very great. He stated that he had received, within these few days, a letter from his uncle, Mr. Kirby, at Kingston, acquainting him that Government had just purchased of the Messrs. Munney eighteen acres of land at the price of 10,550*l.* Halifax currency.

I am much surprised at this information, as I had no intimation of such a purchase having been made, or in contemplation; and, from its situation, I was well aware it could not be by the Ordnance.

The land alluded to, belonging to the Messrs. Munney, is situated very little nearer the town than the land purchased by the Ordnance for the site of No. 4 redoubt; and, if Government have purchased eighteen acres at that rate, which is nearly 600*l.* per acre, it must have the effect of raising the value of land at Kingston very considerably.

This information I have no doubt had an unfortunate bearing on the object of my visit in raising Mr. Herchmer's views of the value of his property; as, after a rather long conversation with him with regard to the sales that had been recently made adjoining his land, and the building lots into which it could be divided, and their probable value, he informed me that, although wishing to meet the views of Government, and without any desire to seek an extravagant price, the lowest sum for which he would be disposed to part with his lot of 200 acres was 30,000*l.*, Halifax currency.

The lot is No. 23, extending from the shore of the Bay to the Concession

L

Line. The grant is for 200 acres, more or less; and it extends not only beyond the high road from Kingston to Toronto, but also beyond an old road which I believe was formerly the high road before the present one was opened.

I am induced to mention this, because I have not observed, in any of the sketches of the ground required to be purchased that have been lately sent from Kingston, that the exact extent of Mr. Herchner's lot has been shown.

From the explanation he gave me, I understood that the lot extends about as far as the dotted line I have marked on the tracing inclosed.

It is most probable, I think, that, instead of being less, it may be rather more than 200 acres; as, in all grants of lots adjoining the shore, there is generally a small broken front belonging to the lot.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. R. WRIGHT,
Lieut.-Colonel Commanding Royal Engineers.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Sir F. W. Mulcaster, Esq. to R. Byham, Esq.

Sir, 84, Pall Mall, December 16, 1840.

I LOSE no time in putting the Master-General and Board in possession of a report No. 187, dated the 5th November, and received this day from the Commanding Royal Engineer in Canada, with an assumed valuation of the property on the western side of Kingston, which the Committee of 1829 considered it desirable to obtain, by exchange for portions of the military reserves in Canada, for the proper control of the defences recommended by them, and now in progress at that place.

That mode of obtaining the land is no longer available, and whatever is done, must, I apprehend, be by purchase. The amount, however, is so considerable, that it appears to require immediate attention and orders, for although I might suggest the omission of many of the town lots within the contour of the lines of defence, it is evident that such has been of late years (and still continues) the advancing value of property at Kingston, that if the works are to proceed, Her Majesty's Government must be prepared to meet a very considerable outlay in the purchase of land, and that any further delay would only tend to enhance the outlay.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) F. W. MULCASTER.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Oldfield to the Inspector-General of Fortifications.

*Commanding Royal Engineers' Office, Head Quarters,
Montreal, Nov. 5, 1840.*

Sir,

IN reference to my communications No. 41, 15th August, 1839; No. 120, 18th December, 1839; Nos. 36, 133, and 185, of the 5th March, 14th August, and 27th October, 1840; I have the honour to transmit a plan of the several lots of land required to be purchased at Kingston, to carry out on the west or Kingston side of the harbour, the system of defence approved by the Engineer Committee of 24th October, 1829, together with remarks and references giving the names of the proprietors, the ~~contracts~~ ^{tracts}, and the probable value of the several lots; I hope by the next mail to be enabled to forward similar information as to the land required for the defence on the east side of the harbour.

In addition to the information afforded by the documents transmitted, I have, only with every deference, to submit my opinion, that not a day should be lost in acquiring such property as it may be decided to purchase.

I am much indebted to Captain Whitmore for the zeal and intelligence with which he has carried out my instruction, in obtaining the important information conveyed by the plan and report herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) J. OLDFIELD, Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding Royal Engineers in the Canadas.

Inclosure 3 in No. 12.

Sir F. W. Mulcaster, ~~Esq.~~, to R. Byham, Esq.

Sir,

84, Pall Mall, Dec. 16, 1840.

I RETURN the papers which were referred by the Board's minute of the 14th, relative to the purchase of the land belonging to the Reverend W. Herchmer for the defences of Kingston in Canada.

I thought the best chance of getting an early opinion as to the probable value of this land, was to refer to Colonel Wright, who was for many years stationed in command at Kingston, and who returned about two years since from Canada. I therefore did so, and I inclose his report of the 15th. The valuation of the property, even at the lowest price, probably about 50*l.* currency per acre, is a very serious consideration, and it may, perhaps, now be regretted, that the land required for the defences of Kingston was not obtained in the manner recommended by the committee, or as soon as those defences were determined upon.

The Reverend Mr. Herchmer's property is only a portion of what will be requisite in order to the necessary command the defences should have, but it being immediately in front of the works on the western side of the town, the purchase of it appears inevitable, for although parts of it might possibly not be obnoxious, the gross amount would not be much affected, and it is presumed the Ordnance will receive a rent corresponding in some degree to the increasing prosperity of the place, at all events I cannot recommend works of defence to be proceeded with, unless the land necessary for affording those works or proper control be obtained.

I shall immediately put the Master-General and Board in possession of a general valuation of the property on the west of Kingston, which has been this day received.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) F. W. MULCASTER.

P. S.—I think it proper to transmit, in addition to Colonel Wright's letter above adverted to, a private one dated the 16th, just received, suggesting a personal negotiation with Mr. Herchmer, and I beg to say, that if the Master-General and Board deem it expedient to adopt that course, I consider Colonel Wright himself the person to whom the Ordnance interests may be very safely entrusted.

No. 13.

Sir Hussey Vivian to Lord John Russell.

My Lord,

Office of Ordnance, February 18, 1841.

HEREWITH I have the honour to return the report of the Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Jackson, respecting the defence of the Canadas, and the other documents which were transmitted to me after the conversation I had with your Lordship on the subject.

In returning these documents, I send copies of the minute with which I submitted them to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the letters of that officer in reply.

The Duke of Wellington, in his letter of the 6th December, 1825, states that "it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw from those dominions (the Canadas); whether valuable or otherwise (which can scarcely be a question), the honour of the country would require that they should be defended in war." In the principle thus expressed, I entirely concur; but the

extent to which the Parent State is to be called upon to incur an expense, with a view to such defence by means of fortifications, is necessarily a matter of great importance, and one requiring much consideration.

Were the recommendation of the committee of 1825, or the measures proposed by Sir Richard Jackson, to be carried out to the fullest extent, there can be no doubt that the means of resisting invasion would be much increased; but it is still impossible to conceal from ourselves that, fortify as we may, there will remain many points from which the Canadas must be open to attack; and this Sir Richard Jackson himself admits when, in his letter to your Lordship of the 5th August, 1840, speaking of "the erection of works established in accordance with a well grounded system of general defence," he adds, "indeed it would be difficult to prepare one free from objections, or to provide contingencies of war with a country varying and increasing so rapidly as the United States of America."

The successful defence then of the Canadas must, after all, depend on the spirit, the loyalty, and the exertions of the people of that country, (in conjunction with the army in the field). If they are heart and hand with us, it may fairly be hoped and expected, that any attempt at invasion would be defeated, as such attempts already have been. If, on the other hand, the inhabitants are not disposed to join us in endeavouring to repel an invading force, no extent of fortifications would afford a certain security.

I am, therefore, I confess, very much inclined to think that, for the present at least, it would be advisable to confine ourselves to carrying out the fortifications at Kingston and Quebec, as proposed by the Inspector-General, and to erecting works at St. John's, Niagara, and Amherstburg, on a scale such as appears to have been contemplated by Lord Seaton, when on the 3rd December, 1839, he addressed a letter to your Lordship on the subject. At the same time, a general system of defence should be sketched out, and plans prepared, so as to be ready to occupy with field works other important points, in case it should be requisite to do so.

Sir Richard Jackson quotes at length from a report to the Congress of the United States from the Secretary of State for the War department. In this document, the construction of several works (nine altogether at different points) is recommended, such as, Sir Richard Jackson says, "will enable the Americans to commence offensive operations against Canada with the greatest advantage." I do not understand that this report has been acted upon (at Niagara, one of the points named, the Americans already have a small fort); when it is, and when the American Government begin constructing the proposed works, it then assuredly will be necessary for us to take further measures to counteract them.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HUSSEY VIVIAN.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Copy of Minute, with which the Reports on the Defence of the Canadas, by Lieutenant-General Sir R. Jackson, and received from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, were transmitted by the Master-General of the Ordnance to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, 3rd February, 1841.

THE documents named in the margin and which accompany this minute*, were transmitted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Master-General in consequence of an interview which the Master-General had with Lord John Russell.

They are now submitted to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, in order

* Letter from Lord Sydenham to Lord John Russell, 24th December, 1840, with Letter from Sir R. Jackson, 14th November, 1840. Memorandum on Canadian Frontier, and Letter from Colonel Oldfield, 14th November, 1840. Copy of Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 6th December, 1825. Mr. Byham to Mr. Stephen, 19th January, 1841 (with inclosures).

that the Master-General may have the advantage of his opinion on the several most important proposals, contained in the letter of Sir R. Jackson, and the report of the Commanding Royal Engineer, Canada, before he makes a communication to the Secretary of State in reference to them.

The Master-General would particularly direct the attention of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, to the question of fortifications around the town of Kingston, and on the side of the dock yard. The very large sum that will be required to purchase the ground in order to enable us to complete the fortifications according to the plan partially executed, renders it absolutely necessary, if possible, to make some alteration in order to avoid incurring so heavy an expense; and this the Master-General hopes may be practicable, from the minute of the Inspector-General of the 11th ultimo, wherein he says, "Taken as a whole, if the works on the western side of Kingston are ever to be constructed, the control of the land should, at least, be under the Ordnance, so as to prevent any building being erected upon it;" and also from the letter from Colonel Wright, of the 9th January, 1841, wherein he speaks of the possibility of Government abandoning altogether the works on the west side, if the ground could not be obtained at a reasonable rate; from which the Master-General is led to infer, that those officers may have contemplated the possibility of some change, whereby works on a smaller scale than those now contemplated, but such as would secure the town against any attack excepting by siege, might be erected on ground already in our possession, or that may be procured without the expenditure stated in the letters from the Master-General and Board to the Treasury and Secretary of State for the Colonies, of 8th and 19th January, 1841.

In reference to the very detailed and very able letter of Sir Richard Jackson, and the Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield, the Master-General is desirous that the Inspector-General of Fortifications should take into consideration the means of defence for the Canadas therein proposed, comparing them with those of the Committee of 1825; and having, at the same time, regard to the opinions expressed in the letters of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, dated 6th December, 1825, and Lord Seaton, dated 30th December, 1839, (and inclosed in that of the Secretary of State of 13th January, 1840,) and furnish the Master-General with his observations.

The Inspector-General of Fortifications will observe, that in some important points the fortifications proposed by the Committee of 1825, and also the views entertained by the present Commander in Chief in Canada, most materially differ from those of Lord Seaton; who, in his letter above referred to, suggested fortifications at Amherstburg, Niagara, and St. John's, the expense of which was altogether calculated to amount only to the following sums, viz.:-

	£
Niagara - - -	70,000
St. John's - - -	40,000
Amherstburg - - -	70,000
With the addition of	60,000 for barracks.
	£240,000

Having well weighed and considered the question, the Inspector-General of Fortifications will be pleased to give his opinion as to the advantages of fortifying all or any of the points proposed in the various communications referred to, and the nature of the fortifications he would approve, that is, whether a permanent and regular fortification, or merely a work defensible against a coup de main, and sufficient to serve as a Place d'Armes, and as the point of assembling for the militia of the country; when considering this question, the Inspector-General of Fortifications will not fail to recollect that the whole frontier to be covered extends over 1400 miles; that it is admitted that the command in Lake Erie, (on which there are 40 steamers capable of carrying from 500 to 600 men each,) cannot be disputed with the Americans; that the mass of adventurers and daring population of the United States, immediately on our frontiers, is already very great and daily increasing; whilst on our side many of those difficulties which would oppose invasion, such as bad roads and impracticable

forests, are fast decreasing, and consequently that it is only such posts as must of necessity be occupied by an enemy before they would attempt to advance into either Upper or Lower Canada (if such posts there be), that permanent fortifications could be found really effective; fortifications in positions where they could be turned and left in the rear would be rather more disadvantageous than beneficial, from its being necessary to employ a number of troops in their occupation, who might otherwise be engaged in active operations in the field.

In adverting to the proposals for fortifying, as set forth in the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield, and further explained in that of Sir Richard Jackson, the Inspector-General of Fortifications is requested shortly to describe the nature, and extent, and state of such fortifications as already exist on any of the points named, and the number of men they are competent to contain; the number of men that would probably be required for the defence of each of those proposed by Colonel Oldfield, as well according to the greater as the lesser scale of fortifications.

In respect to the barrack accommodation and the comfort of the troops being consulted, a point very properly adverted to in the letter of Sir Richard Jackson, the Inspector-General of Fortifications will be pleased to notice the existing state of the barracks, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary, and consider how far it may be desirable, in the event of determining to fortify, to combine the two objects of defence and accommodation for troops, by erecting barracks capable of resisting a coup de main on points where works capable of standing a siege may not be required.

(Signed) HUSSEY VIVIAN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Sir F. W. Mulcaster, Esq., to Sir Hussey Vivian.

Sir,

84, Pall Mall, February 4, 1841.

I HAVE attentively perused the documents transmitted with and named in the margin of your minute of the 1st instant, on the subject of the fortifications of Kingston, and on the frontier of the two Canadas towards the United States. The former no doubt forms a part of the general subject which is involved in the latter part of your minute; but, as it is a question comparatively of detail, (the importance of occupying Kingston, and of protecting it with adequate works of defence, having been universally acknowledged in all military reports, and sanctioned by the measures taken in Parliament,) I have thought it advisable to make Kingston the subject of a separate letter, and to report my opinion that the fortifications proposed by the Committee in 1828, and sanctioned by His Majesty's Government in 1831, for the defence of that place, its harbour, and dockyard, cannot be diminished with any security to those objects. Whatever character might be given to the works, if they are to be fortifications, and such alone could I recommend at this important post, they must, I conceive, have a complete control over all ground and buildings that would, if not under command, be prejudicial to a good defence. I, therefore, cannot suggest any modification of the character of the works already sanctioned for Kingston, nor can I recommend relinquishing the suggestions of the Committee, for obtaining the control over the land in front or upon the collateral lines of defence of those works. But, with a view to reduce the great expense which the purchase of buildings erected of late years within these lines of defence would occasion, I think the omission of some of the lots enumerated in the valuation list which accompanied my letter of the 16th December last, would be least objectionable; and this would reduce the contemplated purchase for the western and eastern sides of Kingston to the valuation of 69,782*l.*, which includes the Rev. Mr. Herchmer's property at 25,000*l.* sterling, according to the inclosed list, instead of the valuation assumed in the Master-General and Board's letters to Mr. Stephen, of 8th and 19th January last, which is brought out at 116,848*l.*

I have further to observe, that my former minute, to which you have been pleased to allude, did not contemplate the substitution of any inferior description of fortifications, as an expedient which, in my opinion, would be inapplicable at

so important a position as Kingston, but had reference to the alternative of protecting Canada by a superior army in the field, whenever war should unfortunately occur, if Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake the precautionary expense of constructing in a proper manner the fortifications which were recommended upon the report of the former commission.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. W. MULCASTER.

Statement to accompany the Inspector-General of Fortifications' Letter of 4th Feb. 1841, to the Master-General, on the subject of the Fortifications of Kingston.

STERLING.				STERLING.						
Lot	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	Lot	£	s.	d.
1 -	541	13	4				Br. forward			18,291 13 4
2 -	666	13	4				115 -	541	13	4
3 -	208	6	8				116 -	333	6	8
4 -	208	6	8				117 -	166	13	4
4½ -	208	6	8				118 -	208	6	8
5 -	62	10	0				119 -	291	13	4
6 -	208	6	8				120 -	166	13	4
7 -	83	6	8							1,708 6 8
				2,187	10	0	230 -	-	-	1,612 10 0
232 -	625	0	0				121 -	250	0	0
233 -	5,000	0	0				122 -	250	0	0
234 -	1,666	13	4				123 -	166	13	4
				7,291	13	4	124 -	208	6	8
37 -	62	10	0				125 -	125	0	0
38 -	41	13	4				126 -	166	13	4
39 -	291	13	4				127 -	208	6	8
				395	16	8	128 -	208	6	8
52 -	208	6	8				129 -	83	6	8
53 -	208	6	8				130 -	104	3	4
54 -	125	0	0				131 -	83	6	8
55 -	250	0	0							1,854 3 4
56 -	208	6	8				132 -	312	10	0
57 -	62	10	0				133 -	41	13	4
58 -	125	0	0				134 -	41	13	4
59 -	145	16	8				135 -	208	6	8
60 -	41	13	4				136 -	500	0	0
61 -	41	13	4							1,104 3 4
62 -	166	13	4				198 -	250	0	0
63 -	166	13	4				199 -	208	6	8
64 -	500	0	0				200 -	625	0	0
				2,250	0	0	201 -	125	0	0
79 -	125	0	0				202 -	1,041	13	4
81 -	62	10	0				203 -	350	0	0
82 -	62	10	0				204 -	166	13	4
83 -	250	0	0				205 -	166	13	4
				500	0	0	206 -	166	13	4
103½ -	-	-	-	1,041	13	4	207 -	125	0	0
102 -	125	0	0				208 -	208	6	8
103 -	166	13	4				209 -	208	6	8
104 -	250	0	0				210 -	291	13	4
105 -	250	0	0				211 -	41	13	4
106 -	291	13	4				212 -	416	13	4
				1,083	6	8	213 -	166	13	4
107 -	750	0	0				214 -	229	3	4
107½ -	250	0	0				215 -	125	0	0
108 -	416	13	4				216 -	187	10	0
109 -	250	0	0				217 -	166	13	4
110 -	250	0	0				218 -	166	13	4
111 -	291	13	4				219 -	83	6	8
112 -	291	13	4				220 -	83	6	8
113 -	625	0	0				221 -	208	6	8
114 -	416	13	4				222 -	166	13	4
				3,541	13	0	223 -	333	6	8
Carried forward				18,291	13	4	Carried forward			

STERLING.						STERLING.												
Lot	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	Lot	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.					
Brt. forward						Brt. forward												
224	-	-	62	10	4		194	-	-	41	13	4						
225	-	-	41	13	0		195	-	-	108	6	8						
226	-	-	250	0	0		196	-	-	166	13	4						
227	-	-	Clergy Reserve			2,083	6	8	197	-	-	41	13	4				
228	-	-	785	16	8													
229	-	-	2,675	0	0													
						10,123	6	8				358	6	8				
154	-	-	41	13	4		181	-	-	62	10	0						
156	-	-	166	13	4		182	-	-	416	13	4						
158	-	-	41	13	4		183	-	-	83	6	8						
159	-	-	166	13	4		184	-	-	291	13	4						
160	-	-	416	13	4		185	-	-	205	6	8						
161	-	-	166	13	4		190	-	-	333	6	8						
162	-	-	208	6	8		191	-	-	83	6	8						
163	-	-	41	13	4							1,479	3	4				
164	-	-	166	13	4		235	-	-	-	-	25,000	0	0				
						1,416	13	4										
165	-	-	166	13	4		Total assumed value for purchase of land on the western side						65,781	13	4			
166	-	-	166	13	4		Add, assumed value of land to be obtained on the eastern side						4,000	0	0			
167	-	-	166	13	4													
168	-	-	250	0	0													
						750	0	0										
Carried forward												Total				£69,781	13	4

Inclosure 3 in No. 13.

Sir F. W. Mulcaster, Esq., to Sir Hussey Vivian.

Sir,

84, Pall Mall, Feb. 8, 1841.

I RETURN the documents which you did me the honour to transmit with your minute of the 1st instant, upon the subject of the fortifications at Kingston, and on the frontiers of the two Canadas towards the United States.

In my letter of the 4th instant, I submitted my opinion upon the first point, and have now to report upon the other parts of the subject, upon which your minute requires my observations and opinion.

I have taken into consideration Lieutenant-General Sir R. Jackson's memorandum, with reference to the recommendation of the Engineer Commission of 1825; the Duke of Wellington's letter of the 6th December, 1825, and Lord Seaton's letter of the 30th December, 1839; the first and last of these documents relate to the Canadas only; the report of the commission, and the Duke of Wellington's letter, embrace the frontier, the communications and defences of the whole of the North American provinces; I shall, however, confine myself, so far as the intimate connection of the other provinces permit, to the subject of the two Canadas, to which your minute is limited.

Sir R. Jackson's memorandum upon the Canadian frontier, adopting the principle in the Duke of Wellington's letter, and the observations of last year from this office, of the 29th April, appears to be based upon the Commissioners' Report of 1825, adding pointed extracts from American reports, confirmatory of the correctness of the general views taken in those documents. The Lieutenant-General's memorandum may therefore be considered as a valuable revision of what had formerly been recommended, suited to the increased importance which the subsequent extension of settlement, and other causes, have given to some parts of the frontier; and combining therewith the results of his own observations, after a careful inspection of his command. This command, however, not extending to New Brunswick, and the adjoining frontier line being yet undefined, I think it would be premature to consider any of the posts lately established below Quebec, as of a permanent character. That part of the country must, until the Boundary Question be settled, depend for protection upon temporary posts, and the army in the field, although, whatever may be the result of that question, it will be essentially necessary for the maintenance of our North American provinces, that the United States be at all times wholly excluded from the banks of the St. Lawrence below Quebec;

and that we establish a secure communication with Halifax, which must be the only port of intercourse with England, for several months in the year.

The importance of Quebec to our dominions in Canada, has been forcibly dwelt upon in Sir Alexander Bryce's report of the 22nd December, 1831; on Colonel Dumford's letter No. 62, of 9th November, 1831; and I am of opinion that the citadel should be completed, with its necessary barrack and store accommodations, and the site of the old advanced works occupied, or brought under command.

Eventually it will probably be necessary to establish works on Point Levi, and at the mouth of the St. Charles, and to strengthen the advanced position on the heights of Abraham. These works were recommended by the Commission of 1825; but I have not yet received the plans and estimates to which Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield refers in his letter of the 14th November, with the inclosed papers.

Whatever be done at Quebec, I recommend should be fortifications of a permanent character, with bombproof cover within the works for troops and stores, capable of resisting a siege that may give time for the relief, even from the mother country, of this important and vital fortress. Under the existing state of the country, no serious attack, however, upon Quebec may be apprehended, if our Montreal frontier be secure: and therefore, after completing the citadel at Quebec, I think we may safely postpone any other permanent works there, until the New Brunswick frontier be defined, and that of Montreal secured by the necessary works. I am aware that the settlement of, and the opening communications through "the Eastern townships," is yearly rendering more feasible a military movement from the United States, by the line of the Connecticut; and, ere long, it may be expedient to occupy permanently some post to check an advance by that route, but at present, I think this should be left to such temporary occupation as circumstances may call for.

The importance of the Montreal frontier, which Sir R. Jackson dwells upon, has already been urged in every military report, and there can be no doubt that it is especially necessary to fortify very strongly the position of St. John's, situated as it is on the direct water communication by the Hudson and Richelieu rivers, from New York to the St. Lawrence, and having the only bridge across the Richelieu. The Commission of 1825 recommended for this frontier, the completion of Fort Lennox on Isle aux Noix, the restoration of the fort at St. John's, and the erection of fortresses at Chambly and Montreal, with a strong work at the mouth of the Chateauguay River. Sir R. Jackson omits the two fortresses, and I am of opinion they may be dispensed with, provided the position of St. John's be fortified, so as effectually to secure that pass, which must ever be the most important line of operation from the United States, although there are many practicable roads, as described in the report of the committee of 1828, which lead upon the city of Montreal. The plans and estimates for this position are now preparing, but I expect the amount will exceed that stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield.

The work at Isle aux Noix will probably be secured for the sum stated by him; these works, one at Sorel and one at the mouth of the Chateauguay, I am of opinion will be required. These should all be fortifications of a permanent character.

I also concur with the present documents that secure posts should be established at or near Longueuil, St. Helen's, and Cascades, to cover the immediate approaches to the Island of Montreal. But if these and the works on the frontier be constructed, I do not at present consider that it will be necessary to surround Montreal itself by a chain of permanent posts; to effect which, with any degree of military security, would involve a purchase of land to a considerable amount, and prevent the extension of a large commercial city, which it is desirable in all cases to avoid if possible.

In respect to the Frontier Line on the St. Lawrence, between Montreal and Kingston, the Commission of 1825 recommended no permanent posts. But the events of the late revolt have sufficiently shown that the territory is liable to irruption; and I concur with the Committee of 1828, that the protection of our frontier population, and the security of our communication, (especially the canal works of the Rideau,) require that secure posts for that purpose be permanently established; this, however, forms no part of any estimate already contemplated,

the present documents only assuming a sum for the eventual occupation of Bytown by a fortress.

Kingston is justly described by Sir R. Jackson, as well as in all previous reports, as a place of the greatest importance; and I concur with him that it should be protected by a system of good permanent works. The Commission of 1825 recommended a fortress on Point Henry. The Committee of 1828 suggested substituting a chain of works which should cover and protect the whole position; and a project for that object has been approved and commenced upon. Its further progress awaits the purchase of land, which, as already reported, it had been expected would have been obtained at an earlier period, by exchange of the reserves, which have now been ceded to the Colonial Government.

At Toronto, where the Commission of 1825 recommended a small fortress, a defensible barrack, now in progress, and sea defences to protect the harbour, will suffice; this is in accordance with the present documents.

On the Niagara Frontier the Commission of 1825 proposed a fortress four miles in rear of the Welland Canal, which connects Lakes Erie and Ontario, and fifteen or sixteen miles from Niagara; and no permanent works of defence were contemplated by those officers, nor are any provided in the present documents for the immediate Frontier Line of this District. In my opinion we must construct such works to prevent any aggression on our territory, and to prevent the mouth of the Niagara River becoming, as, if not occupied at all by us, it will be, an American harbour. The Niagara River is, no doubt, a formidable natural barrier, but the events arising from the late revolt in Canada have shown how insecure was our frontier, until a considerable body of troops were collected for its protection; I, therefore, am of opinion that, instead of constructing, at so large an expense, a single fortress, remote from our shores, and in rear of our canal communication, we should, as suggested in my minute of the 26th December last upon the subject, "maintain certain forts on our River Frontier secure from assault, and having a place d'armes for a moveable corps in some position from whence it shall readily support the frontier, cover the communications between Lakes Ontario and Erie, and be readily relieved, should it be unable to keep the field." The Commanding Engineer has, however, been ordered to prepare and send home plans and estimates for this frontier, in accordance with the Master-General and Board's order of 13th ultimo.—^{E.}_{2116.}

Although, as described in the present documents, we cannot look forward to contest the naval supremacy on Lake Erie with the Americans, I think it very desirable that we should construct some work at the southern entrance of the Welland Canal, the navigation of which is open some little time earlier than the American canal at Buffalo. The Commission of 1825 contemplated a work on the Ouse River, to protect a naval dépôt formerly established there. But I do not think it likely we shall ever again re-establish such a dépôt at this river, which has little more than four feet water on its bar. I, therefore, do not recommend works of such magnitude as were proposed in 1825; and the present papers do not propose any permanent post at all for this Lake, but recommend protecting our roadstead and Frontier Line at Amherstburg on the Detroit River, near its debouche into Lake Erie. I think this is also necessary, and it is in accordance with the Commission of 1825. I likewise concur with Sir R. Jackson, that we should construct other works for the protection of this part of the frontier, and to command the navigation from Lake Huron, adopting Point Sarnia, at the northern end of the St. Clair River, as our right flank for the present. The Commission of 1825 contemplated fortifying Penetanguishene Harbour, adopting this more retired post as the right of our military occupation; but Sir R. Jackson does not propose this at present, and I think it may be postponed.

As the rendezvous for the militia of this district, and as a support to our frontier posts, it will be necessary to establish permanently a defensible cantonment, of similar character to that suggested for the Niagara District; and, from the tenor of the present reports, I am disposed to think that London on the Thames will be the best position for the corps charged with the duty. The Commission of 1825 proposed Chatham on the same river, as the site for a fortress, having this object in view; but, as it is stated not to be a healthy situation, and although more advanced towards the Western Frontier than London, I am disposed to consider the latter as more centrally situated, and more readily brought into co-operation with the Niagara corps.

These are the general reservations which occur to me upon what has been proposed in the several documents referred to upon the general selection of sites for permanent posts for the defence of Canada; and I trust they will meet the objects you have in view.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. W. MULCASTER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 13.

From F. W. Mulcaster, Esq., to Sir Hussey Vivian.

Sir,

84, Pall Mall, February 8, 1841.

IN addition to my report of this day's date respecting the defences of Canada, I have, in reply to paragraphs six and seven of your memorandum, dated the 1st instant, on the subject of the fortifications of the frontier, to state that in regard to the nature and extent of such of the fortifications set forth in Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield's letter to Sir R. Jackson as already exist, those works are at present limited to the following.

NO. 1 DISTRICT.

Quebec.—A citadel of a permanent character, with casemated accommodation for 700 men in a commanding position, connected with a line wall surrounding the upper town, and in advance of this line, at the distance of 900 yards on the Heights of Abraham, are four strong towers, which may form the keeps of an intrenched field position.

NO. 2 DISTRICT.

Isle aux Noix.—A small bastioned fort, with timber revetement, containing accommodation partly casemated for 400. The revetement is in a progressive state of decay, and the interior buildings are not arranged with a view to defence. The other remains of old fortifications on the Montreal Frontier, are at *St. John's, Chambly, and St. Helen's*; but these cannot be considered defensible.

Côteau de Lac.—The remains of an old work partially repaired on the occasion of the late revolt, but not adverted to by Lieutenant-Colonel Oldfield.

Kingston.—A good casemated redoubt for 300 men, Point Henry forming part of the authorized project for this position; and an old inclosed battery at Point Frederick near the dock-yard.

NO. 3 DISTRICT.

Toronto.—An old earthen fort, not defensible, and a small permanent work at Mississauga point, at the mouth of the Niagara river in good repair.

NO. 4 DISTRICT.

Amherstburg.—An old earthen fort, which was stockaded on the occasion of the late revolt.

There are also some other posts which have been temporarily entrenched, together with many temporary barracks, which have been constructed in consequence of the late revolt, by order of the Commander of the Forces, of which I have no specific returns; but the permanent accommodation, which is understood to be in good state in Canada, is as follows:—

Quebec	-	-	-	1700 men
Three Rivers	-	-	-	200
Sorel	-	-	-	450
Montreal and St. Helen's	-	-	-	2200
Isle aux Noix	-	-	-	420
St. John's	-	-	-	136
Côteau de Lac	-	-	-	280
Bytown	-	-	-	190
Kingston	-	-	-	814
Toronto	-	-	-	380
Penetanguishene	-	-	-	30
Amherstburg	-	-	-	120
				6920

I have, &c.,
(Signed) F. W. MULCASTER.

No. 14.

Lord John Russell to Lord Hill.

My Lord,

Downing Street, Feb. 22, 1841.

I REQUEST your Lordship's attention to the important subject of the accompanying papers.

Having desired the Governor-General of Canada to call upon Sir Richard Jackson for an outline of the plan necessary to be executed for the defence of the province in case of war, I lately received from him a despatch transmitting very full and able reports from the Lieutenant-General, and from Colonel Oldfield, commanding the Engineers.

The objects to be kept in view are those stated by the Duke of Wellington, in his letter to Lord Bathurst, in 1825, and of which Lord Fitzroy Somerset, with my consent, transmitted a copy to Sir R. Jackson. These are, 1. The defence of the province, with no greater demand upon the military resources of this country than were made during the last war with the United States of America.—2. Such a disposition of our military means as may encourage and call forth the spirit of the loyal inhabitants of the Queen's North-American Provinces.—3. Such support to the peaceable population as may induce them to rely on the continual protection of the Queen, and the exertion of the resources of the British Empire in case of invasion.

It cannot be disguised that the accomplishment of these objects is attended with great, though by no means insuperable, difficulties. In Canada alone have we to defend a land frontier against a civilized nation. That frontier is 1400 miles long, and the population of the neighbouring country is 18,000,000, with every quality fitting them for war, courage, intelligence, riches, science. During several months of the year, reinforcements can reach Canada only by very great exertions, and the maintenance of a communication, which is itself threatened, and may in war be cut off.

Nor is the danger of disaffection, though of a minority, of the Queen's subjects in Canada, to be omitted.

Still, with the Duke of Wellington's sanction to the opinion that these provinces may be defended without any material demand upon the military resources of the country, I have no hesitation in saying that we are bound in honour, and entitled in reason, to maintain the Queen's authority by all the means most likely to be successful.

In estimating, however, the policy of large and costly works, it is of the greatest importance not to construct forts which will require large garrisons, and weaken the army in the field.

This is a question which is at the same time of so much importance, and so peculiarly military, that I must request your Lordship not only to consider these papers yourself, but to invite the Duke of Wellington, whose services are always promptly given on any occasion where the interests of his Sovereign and of his country are at stake, to review the whole matter, and communicate to your Lordship, or to me, his deliberate opinion on the proposed plans.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 15.

Lord Hill to Lord John Russell.

My Lord,

Horse Guards, April 8, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 22nd February, with the inclosures named in the margin*; the three last of which being in original, are herewith duly returned according to desire.

The importance of the matter under discussion, and the number and variety

* Lord Seaton, 30th Dec. 1839.—Lord Sydenham, 26th March, 1840.—Lord John Russell to ditto, 9th May.—Lord Sydenham, 5th August.—Ditto, 24th December, 1840.—Ordnance, 19th January and 18th February, 1841.

of documents to which it was necessary to have reference, will amply account for the time that has elapsed from the date of your Lordship's letter to the present period.

Having, in compliance with your Lordship's request, invited the Duke of Wellington to give his deliberate opinion on the proposed plans, his Grace, (as your Lordship had justly anticipated,) promptly acceded; and I am now enabled to send for your information a copy of the letter which the Duke yesterday addressed to me, with the paper containing his sentiments upon the whole of this important subject; and I cannot better put your Lordship in possession of my own opinion upon the matter, than by transmitting copy of my letter to his Grace, inclosing such observations on the defence of Canada, as occurred to me from an attentive consideration of all the documents before me.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Hill.

My dear Hill,

London, April 7, 1841.

I SEND you a memorandum upon the defence of Her Majesty's dominions in North America.

I was in hopes that I might have been able to write upon this subject without mixing up with it any political opinion, and I have avoided to give such opinions as much as I could; but my own former reports, the observations upon them and upon my opinions by others, and the reliance expressed by the Secretary of State that the force which I deemed sufficient in 1819 would be found sufficient hereafter, and the new matter which I had to consider, viz., the sea defences of the Atlantic Provinces, have rendered it necessary that I should consider some of the political relations of the question.

I should not have done justice to the public, or have acted fairly by the Government, if I had not stated what I really feel upon the subject.

Believe me, &c.,
(Signed) WELLINGTON.

Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington.

March 31, 1841.

I HAVE perused the papers sent to me by Lord Hill in respect to the defence of Her Majesty's dominions in North America, upon which my opinion is required by Her Majesty's servants.

It is not easy to separate the mere military question from the political considerations connected therewith.

My opinion is not required upon the latter. I had given it generally in the former discussions upon this subject.

It is not altered, notwithstanding that many circumstances are altered which must and would affect military operations carried on in that part of the world; but political opinions not being required, it would be impertinent and useless to give them, excepting in elucidation of some military point which I may have to discuss in this paper.

I observe, however, that my political opinions given heretofore, have been discussed in these papers.

It will be observed from a perusal of the papers which I wrote heretofore upon the defence of these same provinces, that I considered the most important point of all, to be their communication with Quebec and the sea.

Much has been effected that was at that time projected and recommended, and, for the expense, Estimates were prepared and submitted to parliament.

The water communication between the Ottawa and Kingston in Upper Canada is complete, by what is called the Rideau Canal; but I do not believe the water communication is complete from Montreal and the St. Lawrence

to the entrance of the Rideau Canal at Bytown on the Ottawa as projected and recommended, or executed at all events as conveniently as it ought to be, in order to carry into execution the system of operations suggested heretofore in my letters and other documents, and to rely upon their success.

Yet it will be observed that the whole question of the defence of Canada, turns upon the facility of the water communication, and upon the more or less of time which will be required to move the troops, and their stores, and equipments from one part of the country to the other.

The province of Canada, as at present circumstanced, is all frontier and nothing else; with the exception only of the communications from Montreal to the Ottawa, and from the Ottawa to Kingstown upon Lake Ontario.

The front of this frontier is the River St. Lawrence, from Quebec to Montreal and Lake St. Francis. Lake Ontario, from the fall of its waters into the St. Lawrence to the Niagara River.

The Niagara River, from its junction with Lake Ontario, to the fall of the waters of Lake Erie, into the same Lake Erie from its junction with the Niagara to the junction of the waters of the River Detroit with that lake.

The waters above-named separate the frontier of the territories of the United States from those of Her Majesty's province of Canada.

Her Majesty has no communication with her province, at least to Montreal, excepting by the navigation of the St. Lawrence. Above Montreal she can communicate with Kingston, on Lake Ontario, by the canals to the Ottawa, and thence by the Rideau Canal: but it is obvious that the River St. Lawrence is co-terminous with both frontiers to Lake Ontario.

That that river cannot be used as a military communication by either State, excepting by permission of the other State, above the island of St. Regis, at the extremity of Lake St. Francis above Montreal, and that the use of the communications of that part, below Lake St. Francis to the Sea, must depend upon continued possession by Her Majesty of Her dominions upon the right bank of the River St. Lawrence, and upon Her Majesty having the naval superiority at sea and in the mouth of the River St. Lawrence.

The Government of the United States have great advantages in all naval operations upon the lakes co-terminous of the two States. On account of the vicinity of their naval and military arsenals, the ease with which communication can be kept with them; the improvement and multiplication in recent times of all these communications; their numerous ports upon the lakes, particularly upon Lake Ontario.

The improvement made in Canada in the communication with Kingston, has diminished the disadvantages, under which British operations laboured during the late war; they are great, indeed it is wonderful that they could be carried on at all, and I should doubt the possibility of their being carried on in the existing state of the military establishments of the United States, of the instruction of their officers and the military spirit of the country.

The disadvantages are still great, and in respect to naval operations on the lakes, I should think it impossible for Her Majesty to be on an equality of naval force with the United States on all the lakes, after all that can be done has been carried into execution, so as to be able to rely upon the use of the navigation thereof, for the communications of the army stationed in the upper part of the United Province.

It is for this reason, that I recommended at a very early period, after I had been desired by Government to consider of the defences of the provinces, that endeavour should be made to open a communication by canal, rivers and lakes, from the Rideau, or even from the Ottawa, to Penetanguishene on Lake Huron; and from this line laterally by the Black River; the River Trent, Hollands River, Mohawk River, and the Ouse or Grand River, with Lake Ontario by the River Trent and the Black Rivers, with Lake Erie by Hollands River, the Mohawk River and the River Rice or Grand River, and by the Severn and Gloucester Bay with Penetanguishene and Lake Huron.

I recommended that, if it should be found that these communications could not be established, as proposed, by water, that such should be established, or at all events completed, from one water communication to another by railway.

The measures proposed by me at the period at which I proposed the establishment of the communication with Kingston by the Ottawa and the Rideau

Rivers, in 1819 and 1825, are only the adoption of the same principle in other similar cases.

However expensive the works upon the Rideau, nobody now doubts the wisdom of the plan, its efficiency, and, above all, its economy.

The advantages resulting from these measures to the defence of Her Majesty's dominions by Her Majesty's military force, can be easily shown. The communication from Quebec to Kingston by the River St. Lawrence is certainly impossible above the Island of St. Regis, and is in length 320 miles; of that distance, 100 miles from St. Regis to Kingston.

The communication from Quebec to Montreal by the St. Lawrence is 150 miles; thence, by the canals, to the mouth of the Rideau, 115 miles; thence, by inland navigation from the mouth of the Rideau, to Kingston, 145 miles.

An army, then, posted at Kingston, could be supported to a certainty from Quebec, at a distance of 380 miles of secure water communication; of which, 230 miles inland and canal navigation.

If, under existing circumstances, in relation to the communications by the Lakes, and to the existing state of the farther inland navigation in the upper part of the Province, it should be necessary to move the army from the neighbourhood of Kingston to Toronto, Burlington Heights, or still more to the defence of the Frontier of the Niagara, the communication of the army with Kingston, and consequently with Montreal and Quebec, may be entirely cut off.

If the inland water communication was completed, as originally proposed by me in my letters to the Secretary of State, and my instructions to the Committee of Engineers, sent in the year 1825 into the Province of Canada, that is to say, from the lower parts of the Rideau River, or the great River Ottawa, to the Rice Lake, and thence to Penetanguishene, cannot be carried into execution, it is clear, from the reports of the Committee of Engineers, that a water communication can be carried into execution from the Bay of Quinte on Lake Ontario to Lake Simcoe, by the Balsam Lake, the Talbot River with Lake Simcoe.

The execution of this measure would bring the water communication of the army by inland navigation to within a reasonable distance of about forty-five miles from Toronto, about sixty from Burlington Heights, and about seventy even from the Niagara Frontier, and this in the unfavourable hypothesis that the inland navigation could not be carried further than Lake Simcoe.

If the water communication can be carried further, even as far as Penetanguishene, I recommend that the measure should be adopted.

Its completion will facilitate, if not render certain, all military operations, at an expense trifling in comparison with that now incurred in the same.

It will tend to extend the occupation of the Province and its settlement, and certainly to its prosperity.

But it is not the expense only which must be considered in this case; we must likewise consider the efficient military protection of the Province.

I will now suppose the case of the army assembled on the Rideau Canal, and an enemy's army embarked in Sackett's Harbour, or even on Lake Ontario.

It would be essentially necessary, under existing circumstances, to provide for the security of Toronto, whether fortified as proposed or not. The army and its stores and equipments, instead of being kept to the last moment in a central position, to be employed in operations where required, must be moved to a station between Kingston and Toronto; or, in truth, there ought to be another army, of the same strength and efficiency, and possibly two, in order to provide for the defence of Her Majesty's dominions further to the westward.

It will be seen, therefore, that expense incurred now in providing for the facility and celerity of the communications, and for the military security of the posts necessary to be maintained, will ensure the success of the operations of the defending army, and enable Her Majesty's Government to carry on such operations with smaller numbers.

The expense estimated by the Committee of Engineers for carrying the inland navigation from the Bay of Quinte to Lake Simcoe is 183,000*l.* sterling; to which ought to be added the sum of 17,000*l.* for a canal to communicate between Kingston and the Bay of Quinte, near Presqu'isle Harbour.

The tolls of the Rideau Canal produced in the year 1840, 10,500*l.* sterling.

It would be more than sufficient to defray the expense of the formation of the inland navigation to Lake Simcoe.

There can be no doubt that the extension of the system of inland navigation so as to communicate with Penetanguishene, would increase the produce of the tolls on all the canals, and these would cover the expense of their construction.

It must be observed, that I have always considered it desirable that Her Majesty should have a water communication with each of these great lakes, and particularly with Lake Huron at Penetanguishene.

They each of them afford very important means of internal navigation and commerce in time of peace, and I was anxious if possible by the concentration of all our naval means upon one of them, to maintain an equality of force with the United States, upon that one of them that might be thought most proper, as it might be apprehended that if we could not appear at all upon the lakes in war, we might be required to abandon the navigation of them in time of peace.

Then the secure possession of Penetanguishene appeared to me to be important, not only as an excellent harbour upon Lake Huron, but as protecting from attack the right and rear of our military position in the province of Canada.

The completion of the extended plan of inland navigation originally suggested by me, must depend upon the result of the survey of the country, of which I have no means of obtaining information.

But considering that the extension of the inland navigation will require on the part of this country only an advance of the capital, of which the produce of the tolls already received will defray the expense of the interest in the first instance, and the produce of the tolls of the works first constructed will defray the expense of the interest on the capital expended on the works required to complete the execution of the plan, I should conceive that there will be no objection on the score of expense.

It is certainly true, that a country is best defended, and with most ease, by the troops employed in its defence, of its ordinary means of communication, but such means must exist. That is to say, the country must first be generally if not fully settled and inhabited, and the population must have constructed for their own use and convenience, means of communication between distant parts of the country; and those means of communication must not be under the command of the fire—certainly not at the exclusive disposal of the forces of the Power, against whose attack upon the territory in question it is necessary to provide a defence.

It may, and it would be desirable, to combine views of private and commercial convenience with those of military expediency, in the formation of the lines of these communications.

And on this ground, I suggest that these advances should be made by Her Majesty's Government to the province of Canada for the completion, under the superintendence of the Officers of Engineers, of these several lines of communications, the repayment thereof to be secured upon the tolls of the several communications completed.

Before I proceed to consider of the communications between the province of Canada, and Her Majesty's other dominions in North America, I will proceed to the discussion of what may be necessary in the way of works.

I understand that the works of Quebec are complete, and that that town is in a state of security as far as relates to its works.

The next point is Montreal.

It is obvious that this is a most important position.

It is the centre of all our communications with the Ottawa and the upper part of the province of Canada.

It is much, indeed, more exposed to attack than any other point on the whole frontier.

It is only forty miles from Lake Champlain, which lake is entirely in the possession of the United States, on which they must have the exclusive navigation, and with which they have ample means of communication from New York and others of their Naval and Military Arsenals.

They may move upon Montreal from Lake Champlain, by the Richelieu River, or by the Chateauguay.

It is apprehended that the works on either river at Isle aux Noix, St. John's, Chambly on the former, or at the mouth of the Chateauguay, are not

of strength sufficient to do more than delay the operations of a formidable attack, and to support and facilitate the operations of Her Majesty's defensive force. Neither would the works in the Island of St. Helen's, in the St. Lawrence, opposite Montreal, give effectual protection to that city and central point of all our communications with the upper part of the province.

At the termination of the last war, the works upon the rivers above mentioned, and at St. Helen's, might have been sufficient, but in the existing state of the United States, and of the means at their disposition for an attack upon Her Majesty's dominions in North America, and considering the importance of the position of Montreal in a military view, I conceive that it would be absolutely necessary to give further security to that point, by the construction of a citadel upon the site proposed by the Committee of Engineers in their Report of 1825.

The next point for consideration is Kingston, and I understand from the perusal of the papers sent with Lord Hill's letter, that attention has been paid to that post, and that the works suggested and proposed by the Committee of Engineers in 1825 are in progress.

Kingston has become a military post of still greater importance since that Report, as the terminus upon Lake Ontario of the Canal of the Rideau.

The other terminus is at Bytown, on the Ottawa, and it appears to me that it would be desirable to establish a good work at that point, to give protection to the Establishments and Deposits, which must there be formed for the ordinary purposes of carrying on the transport service, and the communication with the establishment-troops and services in progress in advance.

This post would be the centre for the assembly of the militia in that part of the country, and would give security to the navigation of the canal.

With the same view of protecting this important line of communication, I would recommend the repair and improvement of the works at each of the forts—Fort Prescott and Fort Wellington.

If Toronto should continue to be the capital of the Province of Canada, or should be the seat of the Government of the Lieutenant-Governor, it would be necessary to secure the possession of that town, by a work on the height on which the work existed in the last war, as proposed by the Committee of Engineers in their Report.

Indeed, considering its riches and importance, and its communications with all parts of the United Province, particularly with Lake Simcoe, and its exposure to attack from Lake Ontario, the navigation of which lake will probably be in the exclusive possession of the enemy, even if the water communication with Lake Simcoe should be completed, it would still be desirable to secure the possession of Toronto by a work.

The strategical importance of that town will be increased by the increased use made of Lake Simcoe, and, whether the internal navigation is completed or not, it would be very desirable for the general interests of the defence of the country, that the army should not be under the necessity of moving to the relief of Toronto, whenever a vessel with a few stragglers embarked in her should appear on the lake.

The next point for consideration is the Niagara frontier, upon which there is much discussion, as well in my former Reports as in the Report of the Committee of Engineers.

Since the Report of the Committee of Engineers was made, the Welland Canal has been constructed, and has carried on the communication between Lakes Erie and Ontario.

Indeed this canal has been so successful, and its position has been considered so important, that its existence has caused great commercial jealousy in the neighbouring countries of the United States.

I apprehend that the canal cannot now be used on account of want of repairs, which have been neglected in the recent contests in Canada.

But the damages can be repaired, and it will again become a work of great importance.

There can be no doubt of the necessity of Her Majesty's troops maintaining their position on the Niagara frontier.

In my former reports I stated my opinion of the necessity of constructing a fortress on the Chippawa, in order to support those operations, and as a central point for the collection of the militia of that part of the country, the

lodgement and protection of their arms, and to cover the country generally against the invasion of straggling parties from the United States.

The report of the Committee of Engineers fully supported my opinions and views in respect to this frontier, and the Committee suggested the choice of a position for the intended fortress on the Short Hills behind the River Chippawa.

The importance of this frontier, and of the adoption of these measures for its defence, induced me to think at one time that the construction of the proposed fortress upon the Short Hills was more urgent than the construction of the Citadel at that time likewise proposed on the heights behind Montreal.

Considering the strategical importance of Montreal, augmented as it has been by the construction and completion of the inland communication with Kingston, and by the growth of the means of attack upon that place by the growth of the military power of the United States, and of their means of annoyance of all descriptions, particularly at the point of Montreal, I should now say that the security of that place was the most important point—that the means of attack upon it were greater than those upon the Niagara frontier, and that the defence of this last would depend upon the secure possession of Montreal.

The strength of Montreal must therefore be the first provided for; but that of the Niagara frontier ought not to be lost sight of.

The facilities of attacking each of these posts now in the hands of the United States, are so great, and the attack upon each so certain, that I should not perform my duty if I did not inform the government of my opinion that the proposed work upon the Short Hills should be constructed at as early a period as possible, as well as the Citadel at Montreal.

The Welland Canal is understood to be carried from the mouth of the Ouse River, which falls into Lake Erie, to the River Chippawa, which falls into the River Niagara, about eight miles above the junction of the Chippawa with the Niagara River. Thence up the Channel of the Chippawa for eleven miles, and thence to what is called the Twelve Mile Creek, on Lake Ontario.

The security of this great work would be greatly increased by the construction of the proposed fortress on the Short Hills, and at all events the enemy supposed to have the exclusive naval possession of the navigation of both lakes, would not acquire a navigable communication from the one to the other.

I would recommend to the serious attention of those destined to carry into execution the measures for the defence of the province of Canada, that part of the Report of the Committee of Engineers upon Amherstburg and the Island Bois Blanc, upon the mouth of the Thames, on Lake St. Clair, and upon the expediency of providing for the security of this distant part of the province by the construction of a respectable work at Chatham.

It may be relied upon that all these measures of defence will facilitate the operations of the troops when the time for action arrives, and will enable those charged with the conduct of the defence of the country to provide for the same with a smaller body of men than they could if these defensive works and means of communication should not be carried into execution.

I now proceed to the consideration of the communications between the Province of Canada and Her Majesty's other dominions in North America.

In the existing state of the question still undecided of the Boundary between Her Majesty's dominions in North America, on the Atlantic, and the United States, it is impossible to do more than provide for the communications between them and the Province of Canada, and for the defence of the principal points, as far as may be necessary, whatever may be the ultimate state of the Boundary.

I request those who have to consider of the defence of Her Majesty's dominions in North America hereafter to peruse with attention the Report of the Committee of Engineers from paragraph 46, page 102, to paragraph 51, page 134*.

It is absolutely necessary to make provision for an inland communication from the St. Lawrence through these provinces.

* For more easy reference these paragraphs have been extracted from the Report of the Committee of Engineers, and now accompany this Memorandum.

The communication by sea is in the winter months impossible. They will see in this report detailed statements of the difficulties, inconvenience, and expense, attending the establishment of any mode of communication, and comparatively of each mode, and finally the recommendation of two lines.

The one from Quebec to Fredericton by the River St. John's; the other between Halifax and Quebec by the Miramiche. I entirely concur in the opinion of the Committee of Engineers, that both lines ought to be carried into execution.

They will both be useful as military communications: both will tend to the prosperity of the country through which they may be carried.

It will be observed that whatever may be the final decision on the boundary between the two States, and however that decision may affect the security of Her Majesty's dominions, these communications will be desirable and necessary.

In the same report will be found detailed suggestions in respect to the defensive works to be constructed, as well on the coast as in the interior.

I recommend that all these should be carried into execution.]

The popular hostility against Great Britain which prevails throughout the United States, and pervades all ranks of society, cannot have escaped the attention of those who will have to decide these questions.

It has been manifest throughout the rebellion in Canada, which, if not fomented, was encouraged, aided, supported, and even the operations carried on by citizens of the United States, with the knowledge, under the view and connivance of persons in authority in the Government of the several States bordering upon Her Majesty's dominions, with arms taken from the State arsenals, if not by the Government of the Union.

There is a subject of national dispute open with the State of Maine, in relation to the frontier of these very provinces, which it would appear cannot be settled according to the supposed received notion of the constitutional relation of the Government of the particular State with the general Government of the United States, excepting by a concession of Her Majesty's Government.

In my opinion the officers of the Committee of Engineers are in error, in supposing that the whole Union would not be involved in war, in support of the pretensions of the State of Maine, in case acts of hostility should be committed on the frontier, in consequence of the disputes resulting from this question.

The decision would depend upon the chances of success; and it is for this reason that I am so anxious to have the whole frontier part in a state of defence; the communications with all parts thereof facilitated and secured; and that in relation to the province now more immediately under consideration, I recommend attention to the sea defences, and to the detailed suggestions of the Committee of Engineers thereupon.

Since the late war, the United States have become not only a great military power with the armies, means and ambitious objects of such a one, but likewise a naval power almost second in the world only to Her Majesty.

They possess several ships of the line of the very largest dimensions, and of the first class; and I observe that latterly their popular writers had proposed that a squadron of these should be sent into the China seas, in order to make a clean sweep of the British fleet there engaged in operations.

It is not very probable that such an enterprise would be undertaken. There must be persons in the United States who would reflect that a squadron of ships of the line must have it in their power to return, in which they might fail; even after the most complete early success in their enterprise in the China seas.

But it must not be supposed that if any event, such as the murder of Mr. Macleod, or the invasion of New Brunswick by the State of Maine, should occasion hostilities, this squadron of ships of the line would not be immediately fitted out and directed to the attack of these very provinces whose defences and communications I have now under consideration.

Such is the degree of coveting of the possessions of these provinces and their maritime and naval resources throughout the Union, that there is no risk that would not be incurred in the hope of acquiring the possession.

I earnestly recommend, therefore, that the maritime defences of these provinces, particularly of the harbour of Halifax, should be attended to, and never lost sight of.

I am aware that it is a popular notion in this country, that sea-coasts and harbours ought to be defended by naval means.

Admitting the principle, it will be admitted that these naval means ought to be on the spot.

Such, for the defence of Halifax, would be of no use for that purpose, if in the Mediterranean, at Lisbon, at Plymouth, Portsmouth, the Downs, or Sheerness.

In the mean time security can be given by works and troops. But even if the fleet was on the spot, it might be expedient to use it elsewhere, on another part of the coast, against the same enemy; and here again these suggested works would be of use.

The operations of the late war not having been very active in these Atlantic provinces, I had but little to observe upon them in the reports which I made to the Secretary of State in 1819 and 1825, but they have been fully reported upon, under my instructions, by the Committee of Engineers; and I earnestly recommend these reports to the attention of those who now have to direct the adoption of a defensive system for Her Majesty's dominions in North America.

I have upon more than one occasion given my opinion that if the system proposed in my correspondence with the Secretary of State, of December, 1819 and 1825, and in my instructions to the Committee of Engineers, of April, 1825, was carried really and fairly into execution, it would be in the power of this country to defend Her Majesty's dominions in North America, without the necessity of materially increasing the burthen upon the military means and resources of the empire by undertaking such defence. I have always, as appears by these papers, contended that it was essential to the honour of this country, and of Her Majesty's crown, that these countries should be defended, whatever might be the burthen upon Her Majesty's military means and resources.

It is true that the relative force and power of the two States ^{has} greatly altered.

The means and power and resources of the United States, as well in material as personal means, also in resources physical and moral, have increased enormously. The mind of the whole country has been directed to the discovery of the means of annoying, attacking, and possessing, Her Majesty's dominions in North America; and it may be relied upon that the attack upon them will be made, and will be a most serious one.

I still contend that they must be defended. Even if nothing had occurred in recent times to render such defence necessary, Her Majesty can no more withdraw from the defence of her dominions in North America with honour, at the moment at which they are threatened with attack by the United States, than the Emperor of Austria could withdraw from his dominions in Italy, or the King of Prussia from his on the Rhine, when threatened with attack by France.

Her Majesty stands in North America in the position of a continental power. She has an option whether she will employ her armies in hostilities in Spain, Italy, Germany, or the Netherlands, but she has none in relation to hostilities in North America. Her dominions must be defended or abandoned, and they will be abandoned with disgrace and dishonour, if, at the moment at which an attack is threatened; and more particularly, if the necessity for abandoning them should be occasioned by the want of foresight in adopting the measures necessary to put the country in a state of defence, and by the want of the military resources and means of communication and others, to enable Her Majesty to defend this important portion of her dominions.

I have already adverted to the vast increase of the power and means of the United States in the last quarter of a century, since the peace of Ghent.

I will now advert to the alteration which has taken place on the other side of the frontier.

The population of Her Majesty's dominions has increased enormously, not by natural means only, but by encouraged emigration.

Families have gone out from this country, and have settled themselves

in those countries, in the hope, amounting to an assurance, that they would continue to live under the protection of Her Majesty, and be governed by the British laws, and under the influence of the British Constitution.

Very recently a revolution has been, in fact, effected in the Government of each of the provinces. I do not mean by the union into one province of the two provinces of Canada, but by other measures rendering more nearly complete the analogy between the Government of the mother country and the Government of each of these provinces.

I believe that I am not mistaken in asserting that an attachment to the monarchical principle of the British Constitution prevail throughout the men of property, the instructed and governing classes in all these provinces.

It is curious to observe, that while Europe has been generally at peace, —and it has been the anxious desire of every individual of influence to prevent the spreading of the contest as between men professing extreme principles of civil and constitutional Government for the purpose of forcing the adoption by the adverse party of those principles,—such a contest should have prevailed of late years, even previous to the Canadian Rebellion, along the whole line of the frontier of Her Majesty's Provinces and of the United States, having for its object, on the part of Her Majesty's subjects, the maintenance of the monarchical principle of the British Constitution, against the democratic-republican principle of the government of several States of the Union, bordering upon them, by whose hostile efforts they apprehended that their institutions might be revolutionized.

Yet these are the people who are to be abandoned to their fate by Her Majesty when threatened with attack.

It would be by far a better, a more wise, beneficent, and fairer course, at once to abandon this dominion. Leave them to their own resources! to seek protection elsewhere, if unable to defend themselves, or even to submit to the yoke, and make for themselves the best bargain with those desirous of overrunning them, rather than leave them to their fate at the moment at which they are to be attacked.

I am aware that these are political views, and I have stated them in this place only because they are a conspicuous part of my first letters and instructions upon the subject of these provinces, and because I observe that the Secretary of State and all who have considered this subject have relied upon the demand upon the military resources of the country in time of war being small.

At all events, the preparations suggested are required, and I must add, that there is a vast resource in respect to them throughout these provinces in the military qualities, disposition, habits, and, in some degree, experience, of its inhabitants.

At least let us have the material defences prepared; this resource of personal means organized, and in a state of efficiency, as a military body; the means of secure communication established, before it is decided that the Government of these provinces must be abdicated, and Her Majesty's Forces withdrawn, because Her Majesty cannot defend them against the enormous power of the United States.

I will now advert to the expense of the system originally proposed, and show how that matter stands at the present moment.

The original estimate of the Committee of Engineers acting under my instructions was as follows:

To finish and complete the canals from Montreal to the Mouth of the Rideau 70,000*l*.

I am not certain that that work has been completed, but I believe it has, and, at all events, the expense thereof provided for.

For the canal from the Ottawa to Kingston, by the Rideau, 169,000*l*.

This work has been completed.

It has, I believe, cost more than the sum estimated; but the expense has been provided for, and the tolls of the canal produce 10,500*l*. a-year.

The estimate of the expense for the canal of communication between Kingston, the Bay of Quinte, and Lake Simcoe, is		Required to be provided for: Canal to Lake Simcoe		£200,112 10 0
Add the canal into the Bay of Quinte from Presqu' Isle harbour	£183,112 10 0			
	17,000 0 0			
	200,112 10 0			
The estimate of the proposed road of communication from Quebec to Frederickton	40,475 0 0	Road from Quebec to Frederickton		40,475 0 0
That by Miramichi not estimated.				
	£240,587 10 0			240,587 10 0
The works at Fort St. John's on the Richelieu were estimated to cost	50,000 0 0	To be provided for works at St. John's		50,000 0 0
The works at Chambly	50,000 0 0	To be provided for works at Chambly		50,000 0 0
The works at the Mouth of the Chateauguay	55,000 0 0	To be provided for works at the mouth of the Chateauguay		55,000 0 0
The works in the Island of St. Helen's opposite Montreal were estimated	43,000 0 0	To provide for works on the Island of St. Helen's		43,000 0 0
The citadel at Montreal was estimated	250,000 0 0	To be provided for the citadel of Montreal		250,000 0 0
The proposed works at Kingston were estimated to cost	251,000 0 0	To be provided for Kingston		31,000 0 0
The House of Commons in 1826 granted £220,000.				
The estimate for the fortress on the Niagara frontier was	250,000 0 0	To be provided for the fortress on the Niagara frontier		50,000 0 0
The estimate for the fort at the mouth of the Ouse was	50,000 0 0	To be provided for fortress at the Mouth of the Ouse		50,000 0 0
The estimate for the fort at Chatham, was	50,000 0 0	To be provided for fort at Chatham		50,000 0 0
The estimate for the fort at Amherstburg and Bois Blanc, was	62,000 0 0	To be provided for fort at Amherstburg and Bois Blanc		62,000 0 0
Estimate for the fort at Penetanguishene	30,000 0 0	To be provided for fort at Penetanguishene		30,000 0 0
Estimate of the repairs of Fort Wellington	50,000 0 0	To be provided for repairs at fort Wellington		50,000 0 0
Estimate for fort at By Town	50,000 0 0	To be provided for fort at By Town		50,000 0 0
Estimate of the fort at Toronto	50,000 0 0	To be provided for fort at Toronto.		50,000 0 0
Estimate of works proposed at Halifax, Nova Scotia	206,000 0 0	To be provided for Halifax, Nova Scotia		30,200 0 0
Granted by Parliament in 1828, £175,800l.				
Estimate of works at Annapolis	30,000 0 0	To be provided for works at Annapolis		30,000 0 0
Estimate for works at Windsor	30,000 0 0	To be provided for works at Windsor		30,000 0 0
		Remains to be provided		£1,201,787 10 0

The estimate of the expense of all these works was brought under the view of the Finance Committee in 1828, amounting to 1,771,145l., including the Rideau Canal.

The Committee gave no opinion upon them.

But in the month of July, the House of Commons granted the sums above stated.

I would beg to observe, that of the sum to be provided, the produce of the tolls of the Rideau Canal would defray the expense of the interest of 250,000l., and leave a surplus for a sinking fund to discharge the principal.

Signed) WELLINGTON.

Extract of a Report to His Grace the Duke of Wellington, Master General of His Majesty's Ordnance, &c., &c., relative to His Majesty's North American Provinces, &c., &c., 1825.

Paragraph 46. From Quebec to Frederickton, the distance is 365 miles. During the first 110 of these, the road runs along the banks of the St. Lawrence, through a highly cultivated and populous country, and is as good as most roads in England, and certainly equal to any thing that can be desired. The road at this distance leaves the St. Lawrence, and is conducted in an easterly direction, through a very difficult and intricate country, for about 36 miles to the Lake Temiscouata, from whence, at present, the only communication with Frederickton is by means of the Lake, and along the beds of the Rivers Madawaska and St. John's, with canoes in summer, and upon the ice in winter. The communication may therefore be divided, as it at present exists, into three parts, namely, 110 miles of good road, 36 of very bad, and 219 of water conveyance.

The most obvious method of facilitating the means of transport, would in the first instance appear to be, to improve the navigation of the St. John's and the Madawaska, and if possible, to connect Lake Temiscouata with the St. Lawrence by a canal; thus reducing the whole of the communication to 110 miles of good road, or of navigation on the St. Lawrence, and to 255 of canal or river. We are afraid, however, that it is impossible to improve the navigation of the St. John's so as to answer the purpose in view.

This River is full of rocks and beds of gravel, affording but very narrow passages or channels with not more water than is required to float a canoe: canoes, and those but very small ones, seem to be the only sort of boat or craft likely ever to be made use of on this river. Neither does the country between the St. Lawrence and the Temiscouata Lake appear calculated for a canal, being a succession of abrupt wooded hills having swamps and morasses between them, but which do not afford sufficient water for any useful purpose or object.

Under these circumstances, and in obedience to your Grace's commands, we turned our minds to the possibility and convenience of establishing a rail-road, if not the whole length, yet at least for the 36 miles from the St. Lawrence to Lake Temiscouata, across that space which is now called the Portage. After giving the subject, however, our best attention, we cannot venture to recommend one. The lowest estimate of a rail-road we have been able to make is at the rate of 3,000*l.* per mile. A rail-road cannot be made with a greater angle of ascent than one degree, which gives 92 feet only of rise in one mile. The very frequent rises and falls of the hills between the St. Lawrence and the Temiscouata would require a rail-road to be conducted over a space of certainly three times the direct distance. If our observations and calculations are correct, we take the liberty respectfully to observe to your Grace, that in this instance, there would be required 108 miles of rail-road, and which at 3,000*l.* per mile would amount to 324,000*l.* a sum, as we humbly conceive, totally out of the question.

In our report upon the proposed water communications in the Canadas, we had not occasion to advert to the subject of rail-roads, or to draw any comparison as to the relative advantages or expense between rail-roads and canals: there having been found, fortunately, sufficient water for the latter in all the essential situations where they seem to be required; and the question of the preference to be given to the canal not appearing to admit of a doubt, where one can be established, keeping in view the circulation of gun-boats. We, therefore, avail ourselves of the present opportunity of respectfully observing to your Grace, that even putting the conveyance of gun-boats entirely on one side, a canal, where it can be made, will be found, in point of economy and utility, the best calculated for His Majesty's service in these provinces. A canal of 4 feet deep and 20 feet wide, independent of the slopes, can be excavated at 1,860*l.* per mile. The rail-road cannot be made at less than 3,000*l.* If the expense of the locks of the canal and the additional quantity of rail-road required to wind up the same ascent, are put against each other, and which appears to us may very fairly be done, the canal will have the advantage, in point of economy in construction, of 1,140*l.* per mile. In point of economy in the means of transport, it will also be found to be preferable, as on

the canal one horse will draw 25 tons; but on the rail-road, the same animal cannot with ease move more than five. There is also another consideration we beg respectfully to submit to your Grace, as a reason against the general adoption of rail-roads in His Majesty's North American provinces, arising from the severity of the winter, and the quantity of snow on the ground for so many months in the year.

To have the full benefit of the rail-road, the snow must be removed, whereas the canal is not only useful in the summer, but in the winter it becomes in fact a rail-road, along which, on sledges, articles of any weight or bulk can be transported. From every information we have been able to acquire, we have come to the conclusion that a rail-road ought only to be made in these provinces, in those situations where great weights are required to be removed very short distances, where but small means of transport are to be obtained, and where water for a canal cannot be procured.

If we are correct in our views with respect to the difficulties of the navigation of the Madawaska and the St. John's, the impossibility of connecting Lake Temiscouata and the St. Lawrence by a canal, and the very serious expense of a rail-road, we respectfully submit to your Grace, that a good military road seems to be the only eligible mode of communication left to be adopted. We beg leave to offer the following observations respecting the probable expense, and the best mode of executing it.

Although the amount of the total length of road required from the right bank of the St. Lawrence to Frederickton, is 255 miles, yet it by no means follows that it would be necessary for Government to incur the entire expense of making such an extent of road from local circumstances, which we will have the honour to explain. From the bank of the St. Lawrence to the River Loup, the country has been granted in Seigneuries, the Censileurs or tenants of which are bound to construct and keep up a good road. This part is, in fact, very tolerable, and would, doubtless, be soon made as good a road as that on the banks of the St. Lawrence, if there was more traffic upon it, or it became an object, from the improvement of the remainder, to enforce the law with respect to this proportion. This gives a diminution of $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The remainder of the Portage road as far as Lake Temiscouata, amounting to $31\frac{1}{2}$ miles, must, we are afraid, be made entirely at the expense of the Government, as the country on both sides is but bleak and inhospitable, offering no advantages to the settler. At intervals, four wooden huts have been constructed, in which four old soldiers are living, with their families; but to whom rations are obliged to be issued, from the impossibility of their raising any crops on which they can depend. We think that these $31\frac{1}{2}$ miles cannot be improved in a permanent manner, under an expense of 250*l.* per mile. We would recommend that the road should not be made less than 16 feet broad; that the wood should be cut down and burnt, to the distance of 30 yards on each side of the road, so as to admit the air and sun. With respect to the morasses, we do not apprehend any better method can be adopted than that already in practice in this country; namely, that of laying rows of cedar trees parallel to, and piled upon, each other, to the height required, across the morass, as a foundation to the road. These cedar trees will last 30 years. In the course of that time, many of these morasses, from the action of the sun and wind, will be very considerably diminished. Drains, of course, will not only require to be made on each side of the road, but occasionally at right angles to it, availing ourselves of the fall of the ground on each, or either side, so as to carry off the water as much as possible.

There is no road whatever along the shore of the Lake Temiscouata, and a mere path upon the bank of the Madawaska, cut for the use of the courier conveying the mail from Frederickton, when, from the state of the river, he cannot use his canoe, nor yet travel on the ice.

The total of these two distances amounts to 45 miles. As far as this space the road would be to be made entirely, and the country cleared of wood for the breadth of the road itself, as well as for the 30 yards on each side; we do not think that it can be done under an additional 100*l.* per mile more than what we have estimated as necessary for the reform of the Portage road. We are of opinion that 350*l.* per mile will be required for these 45 miles. We are now arrived at the junction of the St. John's and the Madawaska Rivers, close below which is situated the Madawaska Settlement, in a very beautiful and plentiful country.

We take the liberty of observing to your Grace, that from this point we think it would be highly advisable that the military line of communication should be established on the left side of the St. John's, keeping that river between our proposed road and the American frontier, which at one spot (Mar's Hill, as already explained in the preceding paragraph) approaches to within 5 miles of the St. John's River. We would have adverted to this line sooner, but from the impossibility of passing the Temiscouata Lake, and also as it is of less consequence between the St. John's and the Madawaska Rivers, the country in that direction being very intricate, a good deal divided by rivers and lakes, and considerably removed from the frontier, as we hope it will be established. The banks of the Madawaska, before it joins the St. John's, offer every facility for the construction of a bridge, which we respectfully suggest should be built with stone piers and abutments, and that the wooden part should be covered by a shed, as is practised by the Americans to prevent the snow from lying upon it. A bridge constructed with these precautions, would last a very considerable time. From the spot where we propose to construct a bridge over the Madawaska, for twenty-nine miles on the left bank of the St. John's, the country is settled and cultivated, more or less, and a road exists. This we only recommend to be improved. For seven miles above the great falls of the St. John's to a distance of eight miles below these, the country is uninhabited, and a road must be cut through the forests. Seventeen miles of very thinly inhabited country is then met with, through which the present road might be improved. The remaining 113 miles to Frederickton, is through a tolerably populous and well-settled country, the road only requiring to be enlarged. We take the liberty of laying, with the utmost deference, before your Grace, the following recapitulation of our observations on the communication between the St. Lawrence and Frederickton, and accompanied by an estimate of the probable expense of improving the same.

1. From the St. Lawrence to the River Loup, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles of tolerable road kept in order by the tenants.
2. From the Loup River to the Lake Temiscouata, $31\frac{1}{2}$ miles to be enlarged and reformed at 250*l.* per mile, 7,675*l.*
3. Forty-five miles of new road to be cut through the woods, and made in a permanent and efficient manner, along the banks of the Lake Temiscouata and the River Madawaska, at 350*l.* per mile, 15,750*l.*
4. A bridge over the Madawaska, 3,000*l.*
5. Twenty-nine miles of road already existing on the left of the St. John's River, through the Madawaska settlement, to be improved at 50*l.* per mile, 1,450*l.*
6. Seven miles of new road above the great falls, and 8 miles of ditto, below them to the Salmon River, making a total of 15, through a forest, at 350*l.* per mile, 5,250*l.*
7. From the Salmon River to 2 miles below the Tubique, 17 miles, the country is very thinly settled, and the road to be improved will consequently require more expense, say 100*l.* per mile, 1,700*l.*
8. From 2 miles below the Tubique River to Frederickton, a tolerably well-settled country, 50*l.* per mile to improve the road, 113 miles at 50*l.* per mile, 5,650*l.*

Total required to establish a good military communication between the St. Lawrence and Frederickton on the St. John's in New Brunswick, being a distance of 255 miles, 40,475*l.*

It may be proper here to observe to your Grace, that there is a very good wooden bridge over the River Loup; constructed, as we understood, at an expense of 1,500*l.* during the war, from funds furnished by the military chest. This bridge requires some repairs, and a roof ought to be thrown over it to prevent the snow from lodging and injuring it. The great weight of the considerable quantities of snow which fall in this country, very seriously injures the bridges, if permitted to remain and accumulate. If this bridge is suffered to be destroyed, it will add to the expense of the proposed communication between the St. Lawrence and Frederickton.

As we had left Quebec, before we had had an opportunity of seeing this bridge, we were not able to ascertain under which department or in whose charge it is understood to be placed; we, however, thought it our duty to communicate

the circumstance to Major-General Darling, the Military Secretary, in order that it may be remedied without delay.

NEW BRUNSWICK.

47. The population of New Brunswick amounts to more than 70,000, including women and children, and affords a militia of about 11,000 men, regimented and embodied, but not armed, with the exception of a few companies at St. John's. The settlements are principally confined to the banks of the River St. John's, and those streams running into it, beginning at the Salmon River, about 8 miles below the Falls, and becoming thicker until they approach Frederickton, (in the first instance,) and afterwards the town of St. John's, situated at the mouth of the river of that name, in the Bay of Fundy.

The settlement of Madawaska above the Falls, belongs also to New Brunswick, although now claimed by the Americans, as already explained. The boundary of New Brunswick to the west, is the St. Croix River; and to the east, the Gulph of St. Lawrence. At the mouth of the St. Croix River in Passamaquoddy Bay, is situated the small town of St. Andrew's, containing about 500 inhabitants, separated from the inhabited valley of the St. John's River by immense forests. A road of about 70 miles in length has been cut from Frederickton to St. Andrew's, but upon which very few inhabitants are to be met with, and which is represented as worse than the Portage road between the St. Lawrence and Lake Temiscouata, described in the preceding paragraph.

St. Andrew's can also be approached by land from St. John's town, by a road running nearly parallel to the coast. Upon this communication, there are some settlers, although not numerous. On the Eastern Frontier, in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, several very rising settlements have been formed, particularly at Miramichi Bay, which last is stated to consist of 5,000 souls.

There is a barrack for 200 men and their officers at Frederickton, and a barrack for 300 men with officers at St. John's, together with a tower and five batteries for the defence of the harbour, including one upon Partridge Island, situated at its mouth. At St. Andrew's there are three block houses with three batteries.

We cannot say we attach much value as a military post to St. Andrew's. We respectfully submit to your Grace, that instead of incurring any expense in repairing, it would be far preferable to abandon these works, and to withdraw the small garrison from so very remote and unconnected a situation, upon the same principle that we have ventured, upon the Niagara frontier, to suggest the withdrawing from Fort George and the other detached works, which only expose His Majesty's troops to be overpowered and beaten in detail, in time of war, and to be debauched and desert, in time of peace. We humbly conceive, that the militia of the country are the proper people to employ for the defence of such detached towns or settlements, the capture or destruction of which would not have any effect upon the general result of a war.

Independent of the additional number of regular troops thus rendered disposable, a spirit of rivalry and angry feeling would be more easily generated on the frontier, between His Majesty's Provincial subjects and the Americans.

In the present instance, in a military point of view, we submit with the utmost deference to your Grace, the great use of the Province of New Brunswick, is as a connecting link between Canada and Nova Scotia. The line of defence is evidently the St. John's River. Any thing beyond that, appears to us, misplaced. We presume to suggest that every encouragement ought to be given to loyal and well-behaved people to settle between the St. John's River and the Gulph of St. Lawrence, but that on the right of the St. John's River between that and the St. Croix, the less the ground is cleared and cultivated, and the fewer the communications that are permitted to be made, until at any rate we have a dense population between the St. John's and the St. Lawrence, will be the more advantageous to His Majesty's service. Upon this principle, and keeping in view the military object in retaining the Sovereignty of New Brunswick, we attach much more value to the possession of Frederickton, or to a post in that neighbourhood, than to that of the town of St. John's.

We think the batteries at present existing, if put in order, and with some little improvements as detailed in the report upon the fortifications in the Appen-

dix, fully equal to the defence of the harbour of St. John's. At Frederickton, however, there is nothing, and we venture to suggest to your Grace, that when once the frontier is clearly defined, it may be perhaps advisable that a work should be established on the St. John's River, in the neighbourhood of Frederickton, as a rallying point for the country, and to serve as a secure depôt for the arms and ammunition of the militia.

Major General Sir Howard Douglas spoke to us respecting some batteries supported by a small keep which he wished to have constructed upon the Island of Grand Manan, situated about ten miles from Passamaquoddy Bay, at the entrance of the Bay of Fundy, and about eighteen from the Nova Scotia shore.

Had the wind permitted, it was our intention, as it doubtless was our duty in our passage across the Bay of Fundy, to have visited the island, in consequence of the Major-General's wishes or ideas upon the project. With, however, every respect for the acknowledged talents and acquisitions of Sir Howard, we submit, with the utmost deference to your Grace, that coast defences ought only to be established for some avowed, important and specific object.

Kingston, St. Helen's, York, Amherstburg, St. John's, and Halifax Harbours, must have sea batteries. With these exceptions, we humbly conceive, the Sovereignty of His Majesty's Provinces in North America will best be preserved by the occupying of important points within the country, and not by scattering the disposable force or incurring the expense of constructing batteries for the defence of a coast or shore of such a length. In time of war, if protection is wanted either at Grand Manan Island, or any other point, for the coasting trade of the country, there would be no difficulty in supplying a few guns, which may be placed in battery and manned by the militia of the neighbourhood, as occasion might require.

NOVA SCOTIA.

48. From New Brunswick we proceeded across the Bay of Fundy to the Province of Nova Scotia.

This Province is composed of Peninsula, about 250 miles in length, by 75 upon an average in breadth. It is connected with New Brunswick by an Isthmus of low, marshy land, not more than 15 miles in breadth, extending between Cumberland Basin, at the head of Chignecto Bay; one of the inlets at the head of the Bay of Fundy, on the one side; and Bay Verte in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, on the other.

The Peninsula is indented, on almost every side, with deep and capacious harbours and bays. Thriving towns and villages are to be met with not only at most of these posts, but in many places remote from the coast. There are excellent roads crossing the Province in almost every direction, affording great facilities for such military movements as may be necessary for its defence.

The population of Nova Scotia is computed at 86,000. Every male inhabitant from 16 to 60 is a militia man, but the efficient militia, composed of men from 18 to 45, is reckoned at 12,000. They have 8,042 stand of arms in their possession. They are divided into battalions, and are called out by law for four days in each year. They are understood to be very loyal and well disposed, and in superior order and discipline to the militia in any of the Sister Provinces.

The military points at present occupied in Nova Scotia, are Halifax, Annapolis, Windsor, and Cumberland Fort.

Halifax is upon the east coast of the Peninsula. Here is situated the Seat of Government. There is a most excellent and capacious harbour; a dock yard, ordnance establishment, and public offices, have been constructed at Halifax.

This, of course, is the principal point to defend, and would be the ultimate object of any attack upon Nova Scotia.

The entrance into Halifax harbour is protected by six very good sea batteries: namely, Fort Clarence on the eastern side of the harbour; Fort Charlotte on George's Island; the Grand, Ogilvie, Point Pleasant, and the North-West Arm, batteries situated on different points to the southward of the town. There is also a battery supported by a tower, considerably in advance of the harbour, called the York Redoubt.

The batteries of Point Pleasant and of North-West Arm defend the entrance into an inlet called the North-West Arm, as well as the mouth of the harbour.

This is of the utmost consequence, as an enemy, by entering the North-West Arm, would be enabled to turn all the coast defences of Halifax, and if in superior force, might take possession of the town and dock-yard forthwith. Point Pleasant and the North-West Arm Battery are protected in the rear by a tower: but as this is so very essential an object to guard, we venture to suggest to your Grace that the North-West Arm Battery should be augmented, and as a further defence contributing equally to the security of the harbour, and to impede any attempt at a *coup de main* or surprise by the North-West Arm, that Sherbrook's Tower, commenced upon the Manger Rocks, should be completed.

Fort Clarence, which is left to itself on the opposite shore, and could not be easily supported from Halifax, in case of attack, ought, we presume to remark, to be strengthened.

Fort Charlotte, on George's Island, has never been finished. It is admirably situated for the defence of the harbour; it appears to us that this work should be completed.

With these additions, we think nothing more required for the sea defences of Halifax harbour.

An enemy either foiled in his endeavour, or not thinking it advisable to attempt to force the entrance into the harbour of Halifax, would, of course, land on some unprotected part of the coast. The numerous harbours and bays, which cannot all be defended, would afford him every facility. Having disembarked at St. Margaret's or Mahone Bay, or at any other landing-place, he must approach Halifax by the confined space between Bedford Basin and the North-West Arm. This ground, which is not more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile in width, offers very great facilities for a defensive position, and is well calculated to arrest an enemy's further progress.

In the rear of this position, at about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile distant from the narrowest part between the head of the North-West Arm and Bedford Basin, and close above the town, is the Citadel Hill.

It appears (we presume to observe to your Grace) self-evident that this Hill should be held as a protection to the town, as a support to the sea batteries, to give confidence to the troops and militia employed to meet an advancing enemy, and to enable the general officer in command to move to any other part of Nova Scotia with his disposable force (should circumstances require it) without exposing his stores and supplies of every description to be taken or destroyed.

There is another point called Needham's Hill, above the dock-yard, which we are of opinion should also be occupied. We venture, with the utmost deference, to remark to your Grace, that a very slight inspection of the plan will shew, as we humbly conceive, the justice of our reasoning.

If the position between Bedford Basin and the North-West Arm should be forced, a very excellent and prolonged defence might still be made from the Citadel and Needham Hills, which would mutually assist and prevent the complete investment of each other. They might be considered as the flanks of a second position to be taken up in front of the town and dock-yard, and which could be strengthened by such redoubts, thrown up on the spur of the moment, as occasion might require.

We have agreed with Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls, the Commanding Engineer, as to the principles upon which Citadel Hill ought to be occupied, and detailed plans and estimates will be forwarded by that officer as soon as possible.

We beg leave respectfully to refer your Grace to the Memorandums we have thought it our duty to leave with Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolls, under Letter C.

The Barracks at Halifax are of wood. They are very good, and will last a considerable time. We, however, perfectly agree in opinion with Lieutenant-General Sir James Kempt, that whenever any extensive repairs may be required, it will be more advisable to construct a new barrack, of stone, at Point Pleasant, for one Battalion at any rate. There will be additional barrack room at the Citadel and Needham's Hill, in the event of these points being occupied in the manner we have ventured to suggest.

This is all that has occurred to us as necessary to be laid before your Grace with respect to Halifax.

Annapolis is evidently the point an enemy would select, of invading Nova Scotia, from the Bay of Fundy. It is, moreover, important, as being the port

of Nova Scotia on the Bay of Fundy, and the place from which all naval communications with New Brunswick must be carried on. The entrance of the harbour, or what is called the Gut of Annapolis, might easily be secured, if circumstances required it, in time of war, by a heavy battery on each of the points forming the entrance.

At Annapolis itself, is an earthen, square-bastioned fort, of about 400 feet each front. This work is in a neglected state, but is, upon the whole, in better repair than most of the works in the North American provinces. It is susceptible of being put in good order. There are decayed wooden barracks, and a brick barrack very much gone to ruin, of two stories high, raised upon the foundations of a building formerly constructed by the French, when in possession of this country, within the fort, and various wooden buildings without the fort, all more or less in a state of ruin. We submit, with the utmost respect, to your Grace, that it would be advisable that the whole should be removed, the fort itself put in order, and a substantial fortified barrack placed within it, as a keep. A work seems required in this part of Nova Scotia, as a secure dépôt for the arms and ammunition of the militia; and to serve as an alarm post and a rallying point, where they could be assembled, in case of any attack, from the Bay of Fundy.

As Annapolis is so far removed from Halifax (133 miles), a work here appears the more requisite, to give confidence and support to the inhabitants.

Windsor is situated in the centre of the Province of Nova Scotia, 42 miles from Halifax, at the head of one of the branches of the basin of Minas, having communication by it, with the Bay of Fundy.

There is an earthen, square fort here, which has never been completed, having a wooden block-house, and wooden barracks for 150 men, in an uninhabitable state, with the exception of one or two rooms, occupied by a subaltern, and a detachment of the 81st Regiment. A plan and estimate for a new barrack at Windsor, has been approved of, and which was to have been built this year. As, however, the work has not been commenced upon, we venture to submit to your Grace, that it would be more advantageous to His Majesty's service, that a fortified barrack should be constructed, which might serve as a keep to the present earthen redoubt, which we think ought to be repaired and completed, thus furnishing a defensible post for the security of the arms and ammunition of the militia in that neighbourhood, and contributing to give confidence to the country generally.

In the inclosure letter A, (which is a detailed state of the fortifications and barracks), we have detailed to your Grace the reasons which have induced Lieutenant-General Sir James Kempt to direct the Commissariat not to advertise for tenders for the proposed new barracks at Frederickton, until your Grace's orders with respect to the alterations we have thought it our duty to submit can be received. As no delay can arise to the service (as the building could not now be commenced until the Spring), we venture to express our hope that your Grace will not disapprove of this step. The same reasons have induced Sir James Kempt to take similar measures with respect to the barrack at Windsor. The barrack as already ordered, or the fortified barrack, in lieu of it, can equally be commenced in the ensuing Spring.

Cumberland fort is a very small and insignificant earthen hexagon, without any revetment, having wooden barracks for 150 men (with their officers) within it. It is situated at the head of Cumberland Basin, an inlet from Chignect's Bay, at the head of the Bay of Fundy,

From Cumberland Fort there is a very good road to Halifax by Truro, 120 miles distant. A road also leads from Cumberland Fort, or at least from its vicinity, to Bay Verte, across the Isthmus (15 miles), and another to Frederickton, 149 miles distant, having a branch from this last by which it is practicable to go to St. John's, by travelling round the Bay of Fundy.

The circumstance of so many communications branching off from the neighbourhood of Cumberland Fort, seems at first to point it out as an important station, and as one where a work ought to be continued to be kept up. After having, however, given the subject every due consideration, we respectfully submit to your Grace, that we have come to a different conclusion; and that the disadvantages of the expense and inconvenience of being obliged to maintain another work, which must be occupied by another detachment, are

not counterbalanced by any benefit which can accrue to His Majesty's service from putting Cumberland Fort in a state of defence.

Cumberland Basin, at the head of which Cumberland Fort is situated, is dry, or nearly so, at low water. The tide at Cumberland Basin rises 45 feet upon usual occasions, and 30 feet at Spring tides. Cumberland Basin is not, therefore, likely to be selected as a place of debarkation.

It appears to us, that an enemy would never attempt to make any attack upon Nova Scotia by the head of the Bay of Fundy, without being previously master, if not of the whole of the province of New Brunswick, at least of St. John's. If in uncontrolled possession of the Bay of Fundy, and at liberty to choose his points of debarkation, with a view to a serious invasion of Nova Scotia; surely he would select the Gut of Annapolis, or the inlets of the Bay of Minas, which would, either of them, carry his armaments a considerable way into the province, and much nearer the main object, (Halifax,) than landing at the remote basin of Cumberland, supposing in other respects even it was equally convenient. It appears, therefore, that if the armament against Nova Scotia was to be conveyed by water, Cumberland Fort could afford no protection. But the enemy may propose to advance by land, and to march round the head of the Bay of Fundy, which operation is practicable. Such an enterprise bespeaks a very superior force on the part of the enemy. Cumberland Fort, which guards no pass, and which could easily be turned and avoided, would, in such a case, of course be blockaded and passed. An invasion of the nature we have supposed, we respectfully submit to your Grace, could not be made with such rapidity, (having New Brunswick previously to take possession of,) but that there would be sufficient time to assemble the militia and disposable force of Nova Scotia, and to occupy the passes in the hills over which the road from Cumberland Fort towards Halifax is conducted. These hills, called the Cumberland Hills, offer every facility for defence. An enemy would not be able to force them, and is more likely to attempt to turn them by the inlet of the Bay of Minas, which has its head near Truro. This renders the occupation of Windsor, and the maintaining there a defensible post with a depôt of arms and ammunition for the militia, as we have already had the honour to submit to your Grace, of the more consequence. As a central situation, upon very strong ground, and at the head of that branch of the Bay of Minas nearest to Halifax, we attach considerable importance to Windsor. Upon the principle your Grace has laid down in our instructions for the Niagara frontier, and which we have endeavoured to apply on every other line of defence where it could be acted upon, we think your Grace will be of opinion, that next to the defence of Halifax, the possession of Windsor is of the greatest importance for the preservation of Nova Scotia. Cumberland Fort, we submit with deference to your Grace, may with propriety be abandoned.

We have added in our Appendix (letter A) to the state of fortifications, a return of the provincial batteries of Nova Scotia. These works are kept up by the province, and manned by the militia, for the defence of the different bays and harbours.

49. In a printed abstract of a report of a Committee of both Houses of the Provincial Legislature of Nova Scotia, presented to the Governor in 1819 (which we accidentally met with), we read a recommendation of a communication to be opened with Canada by means of a military road, to commence at that point where the road from Halifax to the head of the Peticodiac turns towards Frederickton, to proceed by the heads of the Nashwark, the Miramichi and the Ristigouchi Rivers, until it should meet the road on the right bank of the St. Lawrence opposite the Isle of Bie. This road (it is stated in the report alluded to) would open a fine country for settlement, and connect Halifax and Frederickton with Quebec; would avoid all interruptions by water; and being so distant from the frontier on the St. John's, would give support to that line, in case of war, without danger of interception from the enemy.

We were struck with the apparent good sense of these remarks, and had already made some inquiries as to the actual state of the country through which it was proposed to conduct this road, and committed some memorandums upon the subject to writing, when, upon Lieutenant-General Sir James Kempt's arrival at Halifax, we found that he had, during his absence in England, had the honour of conversing with your Grace upon this proposed communication; that

your Grace approved of the idea, and wished us to acquire whatever information we might be able respecting it.

We take the liberty of observing to your Grace, with the utmost deference, that with whomsoever the idea of this communication originated, it is unquestionably the conception of a great mind. We humbly conceive that it ought not to be lost sight of by His Majesty's Government; and although it may not be either practicable or advisable to carry it into immediate execution, yet, by encouraging settlers on this line, and by affording assistance, in establishing a post for letters in the first instance, to the different settlements and between them, the country will, in a few years, be sufficiently cleared so as to allow it to be carefully explored, and the communication in question judiciously established. We do not, however, conceive that this proposed new line of road ought by any means to do away that which we have detailed to your Grace in Paragraph 46, from Frederickton to the St. Lawrence, by the left bank of the St. John's River and the Lake Temiscouata. On the contrary, we submit, with the utmost deference, that when once the boundary with the American Government is clearly established, the more the country contained between the St. John's River and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the River St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy, is settled, and the more communications that are made between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia with Canada, the greater will be the facilities for defending these provinces.

The total distance from Quebec to Halifax by Ramousky on the St. Lawrence, the Bay des Chaleurs, Miramichi, and Cumberland Fort, is estimated at 660 miles. From this amount, the road from Quebec to Ramousky, 180 miles, and that from Halifax to Dorchester Court House, in the province of New Brunswick (where the road to Miramichi separates from that to Frederickton) 155 miles, may be subtracted, as both these roads are excellent. There remain 325 miles either to be made or improved.

Of these 325 miles, 125 (being the distance between Dorchester Court House and Miramichi) are travelled by the post (a man on horseback) lately established from Halifax to Miramichi, and about 30 of them (as far as Locagne) are represented as being practicable for a carriage.

From Miramichi, which is a very thriving settlement, consisting of about 5,000 souls, and where 300 square-rigged vessels are stated to come annually from Europe and the West Indies for timber, it is in contemplation to make a post road to the head of the Bay des Chaleurs, for the convenience of the settlers in that neighbourhood, a distance of 45 miles.

From the head of the Bay des Chaleurs, across the country to the last settlement on the Ristigouchi (80 computed miles), and from thence alongside the Metapediac River and Lake to Ramousky (75 miles), a perfectly new road will require to be opened. Of the whole of the communication in contemplation, it would appear from the above premises that there are already 335 miles of very good road made; that a bridle road exists, or shortly will, to the extent of 170 miles, and that the remainder, being a distance of 155 miles, must be made entirely.

In a country so new, and as yet so very imperfectly explored, being covered with wood in every direction, we beg leave, with the utmost respect, to observe to your Grace, that it appears to us it will be advisable not to make this road in too great a hurry, but rather, as we remarked in the first part of our report upon this subject, to recommend the Provincial Legislature to open this communication for the convenience of their post, not only from Miramichi to the Bay des Chaleurs, which we understand will shortly be done; but from the Bay des Chaleurs to the head of the settlements on the Ristigouchi River. The last 80 miles from the Ristigouchi River to the St. Lawrence through the district of Gaspé, will, we are afraid, be that part of the line on which it will be most difficult to induce settlers to remain, from what we ourselves saw of a similar country, but more to the westward, between the St. Lawrence and the Temiscouata Lake. This country is not, however, sufficiently known, nor has it as yet been examined, as far as we have been able to ascertain, by any competent person: so that a decided opinion can hardly be formed as to its nature and capability of cultivation.

CAPE BRETON.

50. The Island of Cape Breton is separated from the Province of Nova Scotia by the Gut of Canso, not more than from one to two miles broad. The population is estimated at 20,000. The militia has not been embodied lately, but are stated to amount to 3,000 men from sixteen to sixty years of age. There are 440 stand of arms (at Sydney) in charge of a Major Leonard, who formerly commanded the *1st* Battalion. Muskets and bayonets are in possession of one of the battalions.

The Island of Cape Breton was of very great consequence to the French at the time they were in possession of Canada; as from the Port of Louisbourg they were enabled to guard the entrance into the Gulph of St. Lawrence. From Cape North, on Cape Breton, to Cape Ray, on Newfoundland, the distance is not more than sixty miles, and of course could be easily watched by one or two cruisers from Louisbourg, the harbour of which afforded safe anchorage for the fleet.

By the treaty of 1763, which ceded Cape Breton permanently to Great Britain, it was stipulated that the fortifications of Louisbourg, which were very complete, should be destroyed. This has been very effectually performed. The town has been removed from Louisbourg to the head of a very deep and secure inlet, called the Spanish River, and is now named Sydney. It is a small place, principally frequented by fishing vessels and colliers, there being extensive coal-pits in the vicinity. A very trifling earthen redoubt, and two batteries, one for four guns, and the other for two, have been constructed for the defence of Sydney; also a block-house at the coal-pits, now dismantled. These are all the fortifications, and they are nearly in ruins. There are wooden barracks for eighty men and their officers at Sydney, in tolerable repair.

The superiority of our navy during late wars, has rendered the re-construction of any works at Louisbourg unnecessary. Should we, however, ever unfortunately lose that advantage, and have to apprehend the co-operation of a superior naval force from Europe in an attack upon the Canadas, combined with an invasion from the United States; Louisbourg may again be a very important point, and require to be fortified, in order to shelter the men-of-war employed to defend the entrance into the Gulph of St. Lawrence. It may also be necessary (should we lose our naval superiority, even putting any attempt at Canada out of the question,) to occupy Louisbourg, to prevent an enemy taking possession of it, and establishing his cruisers at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. Should circumstances require it, the harbour of Louisbourg could easily be placed in a respectable state of defence, by constructing a tower and battery on Light House Point, and another on Goat Island, at the entrance of the Bay.

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Lord Hill to the Duke of Wellington.

My Dear Duke of Wellington,

Horse-Guards, March 5, 1841.

THE Secretary of State having requested of me to invite your Grace to give your deliberate opinion upon the accompanying paper upon the defence of Canada, and having founded that request on the conviction that your Grace's services are always promptly given on any occasion where the interests of the Sovereign and the country are at stake, I should in any case have offered as an excuse for thus addressing your Grace upon this matter; but having in my own person received, upon so many occasions from your Grace, the most valuable support upon every question connected with the interests of the army, I could not have been satisfied without having again taken the liberty of applying for it in this instance, had not the Secretary of State made it so imperatively a part of my duty to do so.

In the hope of affording some assistance in the consideration of this important subject, I have annexed to this letter a paper containing those observations which have occurred to me from the best information in my power to

obtain; and in addition to the several documents contained in the letter from the Secretary of State, I have inclosed herewith a map of Canada.

Copy of the Report of the Commissioners, 1825.

Copy of a Letter from your Grace to the Secretary of State in 1819.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HILL.

Considerations on the Defence of Canada.

March 5, 1841.

The Frontier Line of Canada may be thus traced, viz.:

From Malden on the River Detroit to Kingston, about 400 miles including the Lakes of Erie and Ontario;

From Kingston to Cornwall on lake St. Francis, about 100 miles;

From Cornwall to Montreal, about 80 miles;

From Montreal to Quebec, about 160 miles;

From Quebec to the Rivière de Loup, about 120 miles:

Thus making the whole extent of the Canadian Frontier about 860 miles.

The whole of this extent of Frontier has been computed in British statute miles, at 60 to the degree, and in a straight line; but if the sinuosities of the shore be followed, the extreme length of boundary would be considerably enlarged.

The Canadian territory, situated on the right bank of the River St. Lawrence, between the Rivière de Loup and the Isle of Orleans, is a strip of land averaging about 20 miles of depth, and cultivated and inhabited chiefly along the banks of the river, and comprised between the river and what is now called the disputed territory.

From Quebec to Lake St. Francis, the territory on the right bank widens to the extent of from 60 to 100 miles; and narrowing again towards Montreal, renders that town not more than 40 miles distant from Lake Champlain, and the boundaries of the States of Vermont and New York.

From the Lake St. Francis upwards to Malden on the River Detroit, the British possessions are wholly restricted to the left bank of the St. Lawrence, and the northern shores of the great lakes of Erie and Ontario.

The American states and territory immediately opposite to our possessions on the Lakes Erie and Ontario, and the River St. Lawrence, are Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, and Detroit, all of them possessing a numerous population, and abounding in resources of every description.

Having thus briefly sketched the outline of the territory we have to defend, and that from which our opponents may be expected, the next consideration is the best means to be adopted for that purpose, confining the discussion to the line as above stated, extending between Quebec and Malden, a distance of about 740 miles, because it must be presumed that as we shall always maintain a superior flotilla below Quebec, the defence of that part of the Frontier may be safely confided to it.

In this place it may be worthy of remark, that in the system of national defence which has been recently brought under the consideration of the American Government in a letter from the Secretary at War, dated May 12, 1840 a report from the Board of Officers contains the following remarkable statement:—

"All are aware that the facilities of communication enter largely into the sum of military power, of national defence; good roads, canals, and above all, railroads, augment the capability of troops to defend a country many fold. 1,000 men at the present day, in nearly any populous part of the United States, may safely be pronounced equal to many thousands in 1812.

"Our army can now be moved with all its appointments, from one end of the Union to the other, and also from East to West, in time for most of the purposes of a sudden campaign."

If this remark be applicable for a large and populous country like the United States, containing by the last census 17,000,000 of people, it becomes of tenfold force, when the country to be defended, occupying a line of frontier of above 800 miles, one-half of which is separated from the enemy by a navigable river, the country comparatively thinly peopled, and those scattered throughout a narrow strip of land adjoining to the river, and without any interior to fall back upon.

The internal communication of Canada may be briefly sketched as follows:—

The great line of road leading throughout Canada is formed by the Lakes Erie, Ontario, and the River St. Lawrence*, but as this is essentially obstructed in some cases by natural causes, and in others, rendered dangerous in time of war by the river forming, for a considerable part of its course, the boundary between Canada and the United States, recourse has been successfully had to artificial means by canal, and a safe internal navigation has been thereby ensured between the upper and lower part of the province.

The Welland Canal, extending across that neck of land which separates Lake Erie from Lake Ontario, between Sherbrooke and Twelve-Mile Creek, a distance of about thirty miles, thus ensuring a safe internal communication between those lakes, otherwise interrupted by the falls of Niagara.

The Rideau Canal, extending from By Town on the Ottawa to Kingston, about 100 miles, thus ensuring a safe internal communication by water between Kingston and Montreal, by avoiding the Rapids of the St. Lawrence, and the danger of interruption from the right bank of the river on the American boundary.

The Rideau Canal, extending from the River Ottawa to Kingston, a distance of above 100 miles, may be justly estimated as the most useful and important work in design and execution that has been undertaken for the prosperity and security of Canada, combining as it does a commodious internal conveyance for the transit of merchandise and military stores between the River St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, and providing also a safe communication in time of war throughout that part of the province, at a distance from the enemy's frontier, and thus uniting the town and defences of Kingston with those at and near to the district of Montreal.

The protection of this important work must, therefore, be a primary object in every scheme for the military defence of Canada, and it will be seen in the report of the engineer of the 14th of November, that a fortress is suggested at By Town, the terminus of the canal on the Ottawa.

That this must be of an expensive description there can be no doubt; but no plan can be pronounced complete for the defence of Canada that does not comprise in its execution the construction of a work or works that may effectually provide for the defence and security of this important line of communication between the upper and lower districts of the province.

It is manifest, therefore, that the preservation of our line of communication throughout its whole extent is of vital importance, and as an enemy cannot be prevented at all times and everywhere from passing the frontier in force, we should establish places of such strength and capacity as would not only contain in safety our valuable stores and field equipment, but be sufficiently large to hold a garrison strong and numerous enough to render it dangerous for an enemy to advance with such a fortress in their rear.

It appears that this important subject has been under the consideration at different times of the following high and distinguished authorities, viz.—

* Sir Richard Jackson, dated November 14, 1840.

"The Americans have now an overwhelming superiority of Steam conveyance upon all the Lakes, except Ontario. In 1839, forty large steam vessels plied on Lake Erie, between the American Ports and Detroit, each capable of containing from 600 to 100 men."

The Duke of Wellington in 1819 and 1825;
The Military Commission, especially appointed by the Duke for that purpose in 1825;

Lord Seaton, commanding the forces in Canada;

Sir Richard Jackson, who succeeded to Lord Seaton, commanding the forces in that country.

These several authorities are unanimous in their opinion that Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston are the principal objects of attention; and the expressions of the Duke, as contained in his letter dated March 1, 1819, are,—“that Quebec, Montreal, and Kingston* are the points of the greatest importance in Canada, and that they should be fortified:”—and the soundness of this opinion, as expressed in 1819, may be proved by the words of Sir Richard Jackson, in his report dated November 14, 1840,—“that the nearer we can make our measures approximate to those recommended by the Duke, the better.”

Assuming, therefore, that these are the main points, and to be the first to be attended to, the only question for the consideration and decision of the Queen's Government is,—In what manner and to what extent are these three points to be fortified and secured?

Quebec is already a fortress, and as the whole of the works are understood to be at this moment undergoing repair, addition, and completion, the question is consequently narrowed to the other two, Montreal and Kingston, and resolves itself to this point, whether each of these places shall be made into a fortress, or the security of the position be maintained by detached forts at the proper positions and passes.

In the view which has been taken of this subject in the foregoing part of this paper, the inference is, that a strong and capacious fortress should be erected at each of these two places; and as every military work, large or small, must be liable to an ever-recurring expense for repairs of damage caused by time, and weather, and casualty, the larger work, although at the outset more expensive, would ultimately prove the most economical, as being, from the very nature of its size and strength, constructed of more durable materials, and of a more lasting form; besides that, in a military sense, a large and strong fortress would afford cover and protection for the stores and munitions of war, which would be liable to be captured in detail, in smaller works; and would in itself, with a competent garrison, be a more formidable obstacle against an advancing enemy, and which could not be reduced with the ordinary means attached to an army in the field.

For these brief reasons, therefore, the positions of Montreal and Kingston should be covered and secured by works of a large and imposing character, in addition to the smaller forts necessary for the protection of detached points.

With respect to the frontier between Kingston and Malden, comprising that tract of country called Upper Canada, the following considerations should be attended to:—

The frontier township on the St. Clair;

The Niagara frontier from Fort Erie to Fort Missisquoi; *Missisquoi*

The township on the St. Lawrence from Brookville to Prescott.

And it has been proposed by Lord Seaton to protect these frontiers with forts, in which arms and ammunition intended for the militia could be safely deposited, and which could be defended by 200 men.

The summary of the works which appear to be essential for the security of our possessions in Canada, may, therefore, be stated as follows:—

QUEBEC.

A fortress understood to be in course of completion.

Tower on the left bank of the River St. Charles.

Occupation of Point Levi on the St. Lawrence.

* The Commissioners recommend the construction of a citadel upon a hill 230 yards high, about 2,800 yards in the rear of the town of Montreal.—The completion of Quebec with additional Works.—Complete repair of the Works at Kingston, with some addition, and observe, that had the Works been of a permanent nature, little more would have been required to have been done.

MONTREAL.

Citadel as recommended by the Commissioners in 1825.

Sorel
Island of St. Helen's
Chambly
St. John's
Ile aux Noix
Chateaugay
Cascades

As stated by the Engineer now in Canada.

KINGSTON.

The towers and redoubts as stated by the Engineer.

NIAGARA.

Toronto Short Hills.—As recommended by the Engineer.

AMHERSTBURG.

Fortress, and the detached works as recommended by the Engineer.

If however Her Majesty's Government should, upon due consideration, determine that the expense of all these works is too great in the aggregate, in such case there should seem to be no alternative but to omit the larger works, and to construct those of smaller dimensions and of inferior description; and I must here express my entire concurrence in the opinion of Sir Richard Jackson, that no dependence upon the decided superiority of our troops, and arrangements made for defence connected with them, should lead us to neglect the construction and completion of permanent works calculated for the protection of the points of most importance to us; and that if works for the protection of Canada are to be constructed, they should be of a permanent description, as being the most effectual for the object in view, and best calculated not only for present purposes, but to meet adequately future contingencies, and ultimately therefore the most economical to the parent state.

In conclusion, if Her Majesty's Government should be induced for these reasons to direct the construction of works of an imposing and important character, or of any other works, the question of providing competent garrisons for them naturally comes under their notice, and the following observations are submitted for consideration:

A large effective regular force will become indispensable in Canada.

This force may be essentially assisted by the native population of the Province, and which may be brought forward upon the general principle of militia.

Every male between the ages of sixteen and sixty should be registered for military service in the nature of a local militia, but not to be called from their district except in the event of invasion.

From this population so registered, a certain proportion, as may be determined upon, should be clothed, armed, appointed, and embodied as a moveable militia, and this part of the armed population may be placed in the different garrisons in aid of the regular army.

This should seem to be the ruling principle, the details for the working of which may be subsequently considered.

(Signed) HILL.

No. 16.

Lord Hill to Lord John Russell.

My Lord,

Horse Guards, April 17, 1841.

WITH reference to my letter of the 8th instant, returning the papers relating to the defence of Canada, and transmitting a memorandum from the Duke of Wellington on that important subject, I beg leave to lay before your Lordship the copy of other communications from his Grace, containing some further information with regard to the inland navigation, and offering several important suggestions with a view to improve it, and to accelerate the traffic on the St. Lawrence by the employment of steam tugs, and so render the communication more rapid, and consequently the defence of the country more easy and certain.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HILL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Hill.

My dear Hill,

Strathfieldsaye, April 12, 1841.

SINCE I sent you my memorandum upon Canada, I have seen a person who has lately travelled by the Inland Navigation from Montreal to Kingston and back again.

It appears that the canals between Montreal and Bytown, that is the La Chine and Grenville, and those to assist the navigation of the Ottawa, are not so wide as the Rideau Canal from the Ottawa to Kingston.

The locks on the former will not admit the vessels required and employed to navigate the latter. The consequence is great delay in the communication by the inland navigation from the Rideau, that is Bytown to Montreal.

The difference of level between the River Rideau and the River Ottawa is considerable, and the locks by means of which the communication is kept up are numerous; this of course takes time, and is inconvenient. But there is no remedy. The inconvenience is vastly increased by the necessity of removing the passengers or cargoes from one description of vessel to another, at the very moment of making this ascent or descent.

It would be very desirable, therefore, that all the canals from Montreal to Bytown should be widened as soon as possible to the size of the Rideau Canal, their locks, &c. This work was always reckoned upon, and was estimated.

Much of the communication from Bytown to Kingston is carried on in the same vessels that navigate the canal, across lakes in some instances, and across submerged and overflowed land in others, but it is complete.

It would be very desirable, and would greatly accelerate this communication, if steam tugs were placed upon each of these lakes or pieces of water by which the land is submerged or overflowed, and over which the vessels pass, in order to tow the same from formed canal to formed canal. I should propose the use of steam tugs even upon the canal itself, only that I should apprehend injury to the banks. None can be done to the lakes, or to the water by which land is overflowed or submerged.

I would likewise call your attention to the communication between Quebec and Montreal. You will recollect that when I gave you a paper on the military operations which would be necessary in consequence of the rebellion in Canada, I recommended that steam tugs should be sent out to the St. Lawrence, in order to tow the vessels by which it might be necessary to keep up the communications on that river. I draw your attention to this same point at present. The difference in the facility and celerity of communication, particularly up the stream, would be enormous, and might be of the greatest consequence, in the event of extended military operations in North America.

There are many of these steam tugs in the Thames, and as I understand

on all the rivers in the north of England, by the navigation of which the coal trade is carried on; and I entertain no doubt that the services of these vessels could be hired by Government at a reasonable expense. This may be relied upon. Everything that tends to facilitate and to accelerate the communication will facilitate and render more certain the defence of the Queen's dominions with a smaller body of men.

Ever yours, &c.,
(Signed) WELLINGTON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

The Duke of Wellington to Lord Hill.

My dear Hill,

Strathfieldsaye, April 14, 1841.

I UNDERSTAND from my son Charles, who has been on the Rideau Canal, that the boats are towed even in the canal by steam-vessels.

But he says that there are not a sufficient number for the service either on the St. Lawrence, below Montreal, or on the Rideau.

Ever yours, &c.,
(Signed) WELLINGTON.